

**CONCEPTUALISING  
THE NATURE OF RELATIONS  
BETWEEN  
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN:  
Using the frameworks of Identity and rational choice Analytic Narratives as a  
means to interpret this dynamic relationship, 1990-2005.**

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
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## ABSTRACT

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This thesis explores the bilateral relationship between the European Union (EU) and Japan as interregional partners and as united global actors. The principal aim is to navigate the nature of relations between these two diverse entities asserting that ideology, culture and identity formation contribute significantly to the joint policies undertaken by these two groups. The theoretical assumptions of this thesis are discussed in parallel to observable phenomena relative to the nature of relations between the EU and Japan, 1990-2005. This research analyses EU and Japan interactions from the Joint Declaration 1991 and including the Action Plan 2001 and aims to use the theoretical concepts of Identity. The frameworks of the Four Point Plan and the Analytic Narrative are appropriate to gain insight to the nature of these relations. Both the Four Point Plan and the Analytic Narrative are broad in scope but defined in nature, thus they are most suitable for the purpose of this analysis. This multidisciplinary approach enables the deconstruction of the influence held by 'identity' in domestic and international policy, outlining that policy influences such as preference and 'stories'<sup>1</sup> affect the relationship between the EU and Japan. This modern research angle serves to emphasise the uniqueness of the EU and Japan as international actors. The United States and rise of China act as intervening variables, and their secondary role highlights the changing global environment over this period.

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<sup>1</sup> 'Stories' are an element of Charles Tilly's Four Point Plan and refers to the construction of non-factual influences on domestic and international identity formation.

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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION:

#### **An Introduction and Methodological Overview.**

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The intellectual who sets out to describe another culture embarks on a task as difficult and elusive as it is fascinating. The would-be ethnographer must make a whole series of strategic and tactical decisions: they must adopt an attitude towards both the society to be described and the informants who describe it; select a limited number of topics to cover, since no general description will ever be complete; and choose a literary form to convey the results of this enquiry to the public.<sup>2</sup>

### **1.0 ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND JAPAN**

The leading assumption of this research is that the alliance between the European Union (EU) and Japan is a stabilising partnership in an uncertain environment. While the contemporary world is plagued by ethnic mistrust and unilateralist actions, the EU and Japan as global actors, pursue a more passive course of international relations that warrants academic analysis and consideration. This research recognises the primary importance of identity formation as a key contributor to bilateral relationships within a global spectrum. While problematic economic issues between the EU and Japan are frequently present and discussed in literature, little attention is paid to the substantial and beneficial political dialogue that has reduced many of these tensions. The central documents that this thesis discusses; *The Joint Declaration on Relations between the European Community (EC) and its Member States and Japan* signed July 18<sup>th</sup>, 1991 at The Hague, and *Shaping our Common Future: An Action Plan for EU-Japan Cooperation* signed at the 10<sup>th</sup> EU-Japan Summit in Brussels 8<sup>th</sup> December, 2001, are indicative of this economic and political partnership and show a political pathway to strengthen international relations. Japan had created a successful niche export market that was a culmination of long-term vision, effective co-operation between government,

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<sup>2</sup> Grafton, Anthony. (1992). *New Worlds, Ancient Texts: The Power of Tradition and the Shock of Discovery*. Cambridge: The Belknap Press Harvard University. p42

industry and labour, and efficient implementation<sup>3</sup> under favourable circumstances supplied by the United States (US). From the late 1980s through the 1990s the robust nature of the Japanese economy became problematic and the West appeared to be threatened over the protectionist nature of Japan's exclusionary import policies. Japan's economy has slowed since the turn of the century and has changed little since then creating numerous points of discussion with the EU. There is some concern that the EU may be forced to reassess their foreign policy prerogatives in pursuit of a broader agenda within the Asian region. Potentially this may create a pathway for the EU to reduce their interactions with Japan and instead engage in closer relations with China, at the appropriate time. Often neglected in the political studies of international relations are the underlying yet crucial theme of identity and perception between bilateral actors and its effect on foreign policy decision-making.

The extraordinary economic and political evolution of the European Union (EU) runs parallel with the economic and subsequent political miracle of Japan during the fifty years from the end of World War Two (WWII). The EU and Japan appear separated not only by geographical distance, but also by culturally constructed ideologies; yet ironically both regions display similarities that are often neglected in scholarship. This absence may be justified when the author is not familiar with the cultural context of their subject, or when they take a purely subjective stance in their analysis of these two regions. Both the EU and Japan were influenced by the overwhelming civilisations of ancient Rome and ancient China respectively. Both regions sought internal solidity and governed accordingly. Furthermore the EU and Japan have been badly bruised by the ravages of war upon their territories, both suffering economic paralysis, and surviving political

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<sup>3</sup> James, Barrie.G. (1989). *The Trojan Horse*. London: Mercury Books. p7

unrest. The EU and Japan have both independently and co-operatively demonstrated a desire to forge their rightful place within the broader global community through strong political identities. By this assertion, both Europe and Japan create an area of study that demands exploration.

Much research has been attributed to each of these international actors independently, but a dual description of this pair seems absent from most research, which instead provide speculation about the EU and Japan largely as third actors. As outlined in the abstract of this research, the aim of this thesis is to analyse modern and historical interactions between the EU and Japan incorporating a chronology of events, frames of identity and a revamped theory of rational choice known as an Analytic Narrative to give insight into the nature contemporary of EU and Japan relations. The application of this theory and the observations of relations signal the strength of this interregional alliance at present. Charles Tilly's identity theory the Four Point Plan, draw recognition to both the endogenous and exogenous elements that form identity<sup>4</sup>. Margaret Levi developed similarly, the theoretical base of Analytic Narratives<sup>5</sup> aided by Robert Bates<sup>6</sup> and encouraged by editors such as Ian Shapiro and Donald Green<sup>7</sup> to provide a rational choice frame of analysis. The Analytic Narrative as a theory was published in 1998 by Margaret

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<sup>4</sup> Tilly, Charles. (2003). Political Identities in Changing Polities. *Social Research*. Vol.70 Iss.2 (Summer, 2003), p605.

<sup>5</sup> Levi, Margaret. 'A Model, A method, and A Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis' in Lichbach. Mark Irving and Alan S. Zuckerman. (1997). *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure*. Cambridge University Press, New York. Chap 2

<sup>6</sup> Bates, Robert. (1997). *Comparative Politics and Rational Choice: A Review Essay*. *American Political Science Review*. Iss.91. pp 699-704

<sup>7</sup> Green, Donald.P., and Shapiro, Ian. (1994) *Pathologies of Rational Choice: A Critique of Applications in Political Science*. USA: Yale University Press.

Levi, Avner Greif, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and Barry Weingast<sup>8</sup> all of whom were intrinsic to this study. Levi et. al.'s modern articulation of the rational choice model (as an Analytical Narrative) indicates a logical progression toward closer economic and political relations between the EU and Japan and is identified through human factors and opposes pure economic constructs. Tilly suggests that International Relations theories are often the product of a series of 'stories' deflecting the true intent and purpose from cross-cultural interactions<sup>9</sup>. Levi et. al.' agrees with this approach and further elaborates by exploring how actors' goals and preferences drive domestic and international policy. Conceptualised within these frameworks are strong cultural components, which build into a deeper analysis of bilateral relationships when examined closer.

Both primary and secondary sources provide a qualitative insight toward these relations, most specifically leading up to and including the *Joint Declaration on Relations between The European Community and its Member States and Japan*, 1991<sup>10</sup> (subsequently referred to by its more common name, 'The Joint Declaration') and the document which succeeded this, *Shaping our Common Future: An Action Plan for EU-Japan Co-operation*, 2001<sup>11</sup> (henceforth referred to as 'The Action Plan'). These agreements consolidate formal joint political co-operation and outline mutual areas of interest to promote joint diplomatic objectives. Chronologically, the events that attribute to these accords are analysed and amount to a more objective method of analysis. The deconstruction of high-level speeches, agreements and summits synopsis, coupled with the opinion of previous scholarship aids the refinement of intent, and thus the nature of

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<sup>8</sup> Levi, Margaret., Greif, Avner., Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent., and Weingast, Barry. (1998). *Analytic Narratives*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

<sup>9</sup> Tilly, Charles. (2003). Political Identities in Changing Polities. *Social Research*. Vol.70, Iss.2. (Summer 2003). p8

<sup>10</sup> See Appendix A

<sup>11</sup> See Appendix B

relations between these two actors. This becomes possible not only on a theoretical canvas, but also as an observable process.

Both the United States (US) and China play proactive roles within the fulfilment of relations between EU and Japan. This research discusses this in depth in later chapters and focuses on the cameo role of the United States being a proverbial thorn in the side of bilateral relations between the EU and Japan since the 1980s. This has forced a series of policy reformations and broader objectives within the greater world community. An unstable international environment over the 15-year period 1990-2005 discussed in this research finds the unilateral and reactionary role of the US in global affairs has accelerated many of the joint decisions made by the EU and Japan. In a conference paper presented at the Fourth meeting of the European Studies Centres in Asia Tanaka, Toshiro<sup>12</sup> stated, “[O]ne of the disturbing elements has been the revival of unilateral actions by the United States...especially under a new Bush administration”<sup>13</sup>. This example shows the descent of unitary actions the increasing tendency to pursue multilateral decisions in international relations. This is suggestive of much current scholarship and points towards a turn-around in global partnerships. The foreign policy objectives of the EU and Japan begin to reflect a more common agenda, often leaving the US as a unitary actor by its own choice. An enlarging EU as a global trader with a population of nearing 450 million inevitably prescribes a change in international relationships. Tim Garden notes that differences between the US, EU and Japan pre-date

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<sup>12</sup> The names of Japanese scholars will appear in traditional Japanese format, citation will carry the family name at the front and given name second. This is appropriate and is a basis to address a component of Japanese culture. Much current literature does not use this method as more modern, or rather ‘Westernised’ methods are chosen in intercultural research. Rather than assimilation I wish to note the distinction.

<sup>13</sup> Toshiro, Tanaka. ‘Japan and the Enlarging European Union (1)’, Fourth Annual Meeting of the European Studies Centres in Asia, Institute of European Studies of Macau: Macau, People’s Republic of China (April 7-8, 2004) p2.



the arrival of the Bush administration<sup>14</sup> and indicates the need for closer ties between the EU and Japan, independent of US action at an earlier stage.

Japan was long seen as a junior partner of the US and was symbolically identified both by the Yoshida doctrine,<sup>15</sup> and The Japan and US Security Treaty 1952. Japan became of political interest to Europe when its' trade surplus burgeoned during the 1970s resulting in economic competitiveness. This change resulted in a shift in national policy objectives and political tripolarity<sup>16</sup>. Added to this was a series of informally coordinated consultations with connections growing via numerous economic summits, the G5 and G7 meetings for example, but also through multinational institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)<sup>17</sup>, the World Bank and the United Nations (UN). International forums recognised needs of the both the EU and Japan and combined with a more settled international environment promoted a shift away from the US. Such international agencies promoted a trend of global interdependence and international dialogue to promote stability.

The role of China provides one of the most contemporary area's of instability in Japanese and European relations. The remarkable economic prowess that China currently promotes

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<sup>14</sup> Garden, Tim. (2004) 'The Future of European-American Relations: A Historic Bond'. *Journal of European Affairs*, Vol.2, No.2 [www.europeananalysis.org.uk](http://www.europeananalysis.org.uk)

<sup>15</sup> The *Yoshida Doctrine* was Yoshida, Shigeru's policy for Japan's post-war recovery. The Doctrine consisted of focusing the country's resources on economic production supported by well-trained workers while adopting the United States stance on issues of security and international politics in return for a spot under the United States great security umbrella.

<sup>16</sup> Østengaard, Clemens Stubbe. In Nørgaard, Ole., Pedersen, Thomas., and Petersen, Nikolaj. (eds) (1993). *The European Community in World Politics*. London: Pinter Publishers. Chapter 9, p160-181. Tripolarity refers to a balance of economic power between three nations—in this case, the European Community, Japan and the United States.

<sup>17</sup> Now incorporated under the auspices of the World Trade Organisation (WTO)

has attracted the attention of European economists, while it has unsettled Japanese policy makers. Interestingly these regionally orientated insecurities have prompted the US to support Japan's dissent toward the EU as the Union pushes to remove the arms restrictions currently placed on China. It appears that the EU may overlook China's human rights records and communist agenda to indulge in its current economic prominence. This would be undertaken at the expense of the stagnating Japanese economy. This research suggests and attempts to show that such a move at present would result as an international mistake and asserts that democratic relations will prevail as the Japanese economy revives. In the case of China, the power of identity politics plays a crucial role when reviewing foreign policy protocols and a hasty policy by any nation would no doubt deteriorate the security situation in this region.

Currently, there is limited literature on the bilateral relations shared by the EU and Japan comparative to each group independently. The insights of this thesis are largely drawn from an interpretive perspective using a linear timeline of events and include extraneous variables such as globalisation. Perceptions gathered from previous studies within this field are largely constituted as 'stories' with a large proportion of scholarship taking Western ideological frameworks. The theoretical guidelines built upon by this paper are intended to draw an accurate perception of the EU and Japan relationship, to reveal and re-align the 'stories' pertaining to the nature of this association, and use cultural consideration when analysing bilateral interactions to enhance the conclusions of this research. A comparative analysis creates greater depth to the study where appropriate theoretical frameworks accurately construct the true nature of relations shared by the EU and Japan, their policy formations and joint actions.

As outlined in the introduction of this research, Grafton declares a writer's attitude to be central to the study of diverse cultures, and in particular when reviewing their interactions. This excerpt acknowledges that an informed approach, in a practical sense, is necessary to complete a qualitative inquiry within the field of cross-cultural studies in international relations. This is a difficulty that often reflects on the quality of past research and explains the frequent inconsistencies of scholarship within this field. The objective position held in this research acknowledges the limitations of other authors in this field but does not detract from the intent of the study. The amalgamation of personal exposure both physically and academically within Asian communities enables this non-biased theoretical explanation. While this study is still derived from Westernised suppositions, the context in which it is taken is more real. Former EU Commissioner for External Affairs, Chris Patten recognised this scholastic need in 2002 when he was quoted "I utterly reject the position that these ideals [the protection of human rights, the spreading of democracy, good governance and the rule of law] are 'Western' and somehow incompatible with Asian values"<sup>18</sup>. Here, Commissioner Patten recognises a cultural intimacy with Japan more efficiently than most literature on this subject. It is unfortunate then that later in the same speech Patten asserts, "There are differences in implementation of [universal] values in the East and West, I am inclined to put these down to a time lag rather than to profound cultural differences"<sup>19</sup>. When interpreted in context, Patten somewhat agonistically assumes that the East will 'catch up' to the West in time. Cultural clarity must be reflected in each account of intercultural scholarship,

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<sup>18</sup> Patten, Chris. 'The relationship between the EU and Japan— one or many?' Speech, September 2001 (Speech/02/368): London.

[http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/news/patten/sp02\\_368.htm](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/sp02_368.htm)

<sup>19</sup> *ibid*

historical, primary and secondary<sup>20</sup> on a continuum that will add greater validity to the assumptions of this thesis and any person undertaking a similar study.

While the focus of this research discusses the driving forces behind the EU and Japan's bilateral relationship, what hinders these relations adds balance. Likewise, does the theory of identity (the way in which one group is perceived in a society, both internally and externally) substantially affect foreign policy decision-making? What, role do 'stories' play in bilateral interaction and policy formation? Each of these questions gives way to another and when traced in the review of an enquiry of this sort attention is drawn toward both the achievements and failure of international policy. Also, this method encapsulates a sense of connection, or lack of, within a particular relationship. The importance of a strong, open bilateral relationship between the EU and Japan central to international relations but as will be argued, it is also necessary for regional stability in a multipolar, global environment<sup>21</sup>. The novelty of this research as indicated previously evolves from the lack of scholarship involving both the EU and Japan as a partnership in international relations most notable since the Joint Declaration 1991. Perhaps most predominantly, there is an area of uncertainty in academic literature following the emergence of non-state terrorism such as the events of 11 September 2001. The recent enlargement of the EU to twenty-five member states is inherently another example neglected in external relations literature. Most academic reviews, particularly surrounding the foreign affairs of the EU and Japan independently, direct toward

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<sup>20</sup> The author has lived in Japan for two years in a small rural township in southern Kyushu, and studied the Japanese language for 15 years. The author wishes to acknowledge that this contributes to an informed approach to the cultural admissions within this thesis, but realises that her assumptions may not always be aligned with other authorities within this field.

<sup>21</sup> Inoguchi, Takashi. (1993). *Japan's Foreign Policy in an era of Global Change*. New York: St Martin's Press; Bourke, Thomas. (1996). *Japan and the Globalisation of European Integration*. England: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd.

relations with the US. Greater scholastic review is needed to truly understand the global environment of this new paradigm, international relations of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

The plethora of information including primary documentation from governmental websites tracking bilateral relations<sup>22</sup> tend to denote much political rhetoric and tautological statements that often sidestep the major issues between the two nations in the spirit of diplomacy. Often high-level meetings remain soft in their policy concerns, resulting in a series of diplomatic accords and action plans that merely sit on the shelf. The strength of this research positively demonstrates that both the EU and Japan have made significant ground in the area of cultural adaptivity, an important action by which other nations could take example from. Early interactions between Europe and Japan have seen a void in this area which has lead to obscurity and recently an awareness of this has resulted in culture-orientated exchanges and heightened awareness enabling smoother policy considerations.

Secondary reviews of past scholarship form a more realistic interpretation of any given relationship over time. These accounts must ensure impartiality, a problem discussed in later chapters, to supplement as a more useful source of analysis. The literature review of research in this area is compiled in Chapter Two and combines both primary and secondary sources used in the interpretation of the documents the bind this thesis. The transparency of these sources plays a crucial role in the credibility of this thesis. Filtering out nonchalant statements and reconstructing a more multi-faceted angle will determine the formation of bilateral policy. This must take into account both civilian populations

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<sup>22</sup> Example of these in include: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, European Union Joint Business Round Table, The Delegation of the European Commission in Japan, The Japanese Mission to the European Union, The European Commission, and The European Parliament among numerous lobby groups and international agencies.

and political governments. The analytic approach, using international relations and political theory in conjunction with primary documentation is most appropriate. This approach also develops a people perspective to the review.

Accurate interpretation of the rhetoric used within the related literature adds to the validity of this research, as does a fresh insight to the productivity of the Joint Declaration 1991, and the Action Plan 2001. Denoting the US as a *secondary* focus will supply a further point of novelty and emphasis within this thesis also. This thesis will present this research in the following chapters; the introduction, literature review, historical grounding, theory and overall findings of this study.

### **1.1 THE EU AND JAPAN: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ACTORS**

The European Union and Japan are recognised as unique world identities, yet there is a lack of current, non-biased literature on this increasingly dominant pair. Influenced by many great men and idealists in Japan, and across the continent of Europe, the relationships between Japan and the EU are increasing in size and competence within the global environment. Substantive research has evolved with the growth of the EU into the twenty-five member state union that it is today. It is of notable importance that university research departments are beginning to prosper with regard to the study of EU and Japan related areas. The Jean Monnet Action<sup>23</sup> is a European Commission initiative that provides an excellent example of this. The study of the EU and Japan has also increased in breadth as well as depth across Asia, as acknowledged by the attendance of professors, policy makers, business and civil society at an increasing number of EU orientated conferences. This engages an open flow of information between groups and contributes to the deconstruction of regional stereotyping and misconception.

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<sup>23</sup> More information available on line at [www.europe.canterbury.nz.nz/jeanmonnet/](http://www.europe.canterbury.nz.nz/jeanmonnet/)

While parallel in world affairs within the Asian sector, the remarkable recovery and transformation of Japan after WWII. The economic and increasingly political international player we see today provides a new landmark for academic research. For the moment, China and the US are granted secondary status in this study but must still be recognised as significant contributors to the state of EU and Japan affairs. The recent economic emergence of China has had an unsettling effect on the north Asian region, while the unilateralist actions of the US question the role and importance of international organisations. These factors, among others compel political scientists and other academics to study the scale, scope and indeed shifting nature of both Japan and the European Union as multidisciplinary enterprises. In doing so, this analysis facilitates a better understanding of the global weight of this bilateral relationship. This research is a relatively new initiative that is complementary to new research frameworks' understanding of multicultural political phenomena.

Contributing factors from a fragile international environment have been a major influence on the EU and Japan. The US-coined 'War on Terror'<sup>24</sup> is a foundation issue that not only consolidated a number of international alliances but also distinctly stirred established international protocols. The 'War on Terror' has not only united different cultures, it has put impotence around global differences. Perhaps most noticeably are global environment issues such as the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change. This was clearly placed higher on the agenda of the EU and Japan than they were for the US. The enlargement process of the European Union and its growing economic and political presence has captured

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<sup>24</sup> The EU and Japan were both very sympathetic to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and were fast to offer all their support to the United States Government and President Bush. Both Japan and the European Union supported international dialogue on this matter but were not impressed by the US disregard for established frameworks within the United Nations.



Japan's attention. Likewise, the continued stagnation of the Japanese economy makes for an interesting period of bilateral, regional and multilateral alliances. The ever-changing nature of the EU makes for a topical bilateral study, especially when looking at the interactions of two communities that are culturally diverse. While Japan has been titled as a futile nation overcoming the odds, it has emerged as a strong political and economic figure within the Asian empire. Stagnation in the Japanese economy, coupled with the contentious rise of China including recent arms sales dilemma, signifies a series of future pathways in Asia. The international community at large correlates Japan's increased confidence in foreign affairs and diplomatic responsibility in a positive manner as Japan enters this new period, closely aligning its democratic principles with both the EU and the US. The unique historical roots, mindset and culture of Japanese history and path of modernisation make Japan's interaction with foreign actors one of considerable interest. This relationship is indicative of a shift in global hegemony and thus becomes a part of international relations and political scrutiny.

A definitive understanding of 'culture' and 'diversity' explains the nature of the bilateral relationship between Japan and the EU. This becomes particular as their nascent relationship develop has developed. Also, this research confronts how the developments of symbolic identities fuel the 'stories'<sup>25</sup> that plague Japan and the EU in third-party group interactions. Charles Tilly uses the Four Point Plan framework to reveal the barriers within the bilateral structure and proposes a method to dispel misleading stereotypes and misrepresented values<sup>26</sup>. Conceivably, policy alignment between these two groups may have been pursued as a rational option, or one of reciprocal exchange.

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<sup>25</sup> Tilly, Charles. (2003). Political Identities in Changing Polities. *Social Research*. Vol.70, Iss.2. (Summer 2003). p5

<sup>26</sup> Tilly, Charles. (2003). Political Identities in Changing Polities. *Social Research*. Vol.70, Iss.2. (Summer 2003). p5-8



This thesis recognises that the qualitative human element in international relations is paramount in analysis, as opposed to simple quantification.

## 1.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: THE US AND CHINA

A conscious effort must be made to extract and acknowledge variables within a study of this nature. Contributions from globalisation and media are discussed but are not the primary focus of this research. The role of the United States features as a pre-existing actor, meanwhile the impact of a fiscally powerful China adds a new angle of research. This section highlights the variables of analysis and their effect domestically, regionally and multilaterally.

Where the US is firmly connected, in various ways, both with Europe and Japan, relations between the latter two are poor and brittle, confined purely to economic matters, devoid of political or cultural dimension—no more than a dotted line indeed.<sup>27</sup>

The US has shown itself to be a pillar of strength politically, economically and militarily in the early part of Japan- EU relations. Unfortunately, through a series of international misadventures the images surrounding this entrepreneurial nation altered and resulted in a change in the perceived power the United States within the international spectrum in the early 1980s<sup>28</sup>. The decision to include the US as an independent variable is rational in essence, due to the nation's heavy involvement with both the EU and Japan through the course of history. The end of the Cold War and the changing international dynamics that followed saw new international associations beginning to emerge. Changes can be observed more recently in US governance, militancy and economy and have impacted on the nature of many of these international associations and has encouraged the exploration

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<sup>27</sup>VanAgt, Andreas. (1993). Europe-Japan: Conflict and Cooperation? In: Thomas Anderson. (ed). Japan: A European Perspective. UK: Basingstoke. p3

<sup>28</sup> McGinnis, Michael.D, and Williams, John.T. (1989). Change and Stability in Superpower Rivalry. *The American Political Science Review*. Vol. 83. No. 4. p1101

of alternative paths in global relations. The EU and Japan have found an increasing number of areas of mutual interest out of their increasing bilateral and multilevel dialogue which has thus resulted in closer diplomatic coordination, away from the US. Chris Patten recognised this in 2002 at an ASEM summit promoting regional cooperation, "...wherever we can develop common EU-Asian approaches and initiatives we can make a real contribution; we can help to reduce temptations in the US towards exceptionalism..."<sup>29</sup>, with respect to the events of September 11, 2001. The recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, coupled with US non-ratification of the Kyoto Protocol are direct examples of this. The global power status of the US has changed, arguably due to the US's inability to work cooperatively in international forums. This does not imply that the EU or Japan is in direct competition with the US; rather that they are independently secure enough to embrace a more evenly balanced, multi-polar world system.

Clyde Prestowitz, former president of the Washington-based Economic Strategy Institute and a former US trade negotiator in Japan, refers to the US colourfully as an '800-pound gorilla'<sup>30</sup>. The use of such imagery and the resulting effect on the greater public and political spectrum begins to emerge. The intimidating presence of this analogy often makes countries careful in their wording and coordination of policy decisions towards the US. There seems to be a tremendous and growing resentment towards the US, especially in reaction to the resulting military events after September 11, 2001<sup>31</sup>. In part this drove

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<sup>29</sup>Patten, Chris. 'The Relationship between the EU and Japan—one or many?' Speech, September 2001. (Speech/02/368): London.

<sup>30</sup> Kaslow, Amy. (2002). Asia: US Hard Line Moves Many Nations Closer to the EU. *Europe*. Iss.419 (September, 2002) p27

<sup>31</sup> The World Trade Centre bombings and attacks on the United States of America, 11 Sept 2001 resulted in the loss of over 3000 lives. Greater emphasis was attached to the problem of terrorism and domestic and international security concerns. This was pertinent to the revision of international policy in this area. Evidence of international resentment can be seen on the independent research site Global Research

European and Japan diplomatic relations closer. In the case of the EU and Japan, indicative of the Action Plan 2001, compromise has been achieved through inter-regional cooperation on their respective continents, formalised by the EU and Japan 'Joint Declaration on Terrorism'<sup>32</sup>, which was included in the Action Plan 2001 agreement as an annex. Maintaining caution, the EU still holds a great admiration, good will and economic connection toward the US, but has united with Japan indicating displeasure over some US policy decisions. Recognised at this point must be the joint position of the EU as a many-member institution and possible conflicting interests of individual member states over these issues.

The beginning of the Twenty-First Century prompted the economic, and to a lesser degree political, growth of China. A multitude of problems associated to this rise became recognised. How China chooses to handle its growth and new influence will determine the stability of East Asia and will be an avenue of increased scholarship over the coming years. Perhaps more contentiously, *how* China has achieved such a significant change will become a strengthening area of research. The notion that China will surpass Japan as Asia's primary political partner in the north-east is over-emphasised at present. China lacks the association in many multilateral alliances; their anti-democratic nature and their somewhat capricious typology of rule indicate that China will not be a threat; more so a motivating factor for Japan. The 'stories' that surround China are more scarring in a modern sense; while the Chinese economy may seem more attractive as an economic

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<http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=3184> and in an article written by the Social Science Research Council viewable at <http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/ross.htm>. Other authors' documents throughout this research echo these claims, see *The Economist*. (2005a). Asia: Keeping their balance; China, Japan and America. Vol.374, Iss.8415 (Feb 26).

<sup>32</sup> For more general information on the Joint Declaration on Terrorism (8 December, 2001:Brussels) see <http://www.jmission-eu.be/realtions/basicdoc/10sumter.htm>

association to the EU, the Chinese future is far from assured. This is recognised by the European Commission noting the slowness of China to adhere to Human Rights dialogue with one report stating “[China has achieved]...marginal concrete results have been apparent, more progress is needed...”<sup>33</sup>. This statement was also reflected by the European Central Bank (ECB)<sup>34</sup>. The current intention of the EU to lift the arms embargo currently installed on China has seen a shift in recent global alliances as China insists that lifting the embargo would be beneficial to the sound development of the EU and China’s comprehensive partnership<sup>35</sup>. Backed by the US, Japan has insisted the EU must uphold the embargo citing matters of regional security. Japan and the US highlight Taiwan, and democratic autonomy in regard to this matter of joint concern<sup>36</sup>. The EU’s instinct to engage China is not misplaced in an economic sense as China’s economy surges; rather it is possible changes in some policies that are dangerously naïve, especially as tensions with democratising Taiwan re-emerge. Questions remain as to who would take responsibility for the upkeep of the region should the arms embargo be lifted leading to the rapid militarisation of China. Optimistically centred frameworks would show China’s potential to change, with the ‘stories’ surrounding China being dispelled, noting the negative images of previous Chinese actions to be outdated. Unfortunately much of China’s success stems from a massively undervalued currency making exports cheaper and leading foreign investors to locate to China<sup>37</sup>, thus quashing optimistic frames of thought. Higher employment, buoyant retail and local manufacturing in China showcase

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<sup>33</sup> Schmiedel, Frank (April 2005). China Action Points/Guidelines for Action. Brussels: EC Commission: FS D(2005)

<sup>34</sup> Tumpel-Gugerell, Gertrude. (2005). The next dimension of EU-China relations. European Central Bank: (19 April 2005) Directorate Communications, Press and Information Division. [www.ecb.int/press/key/date/200/html/sp050419.en/html](http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/200/html/sp050419.en/html)

<sup>35</sup> 7<sup>th</sup> China-EU Summit: The Hague: 08 December, 2004.

[www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t174512.htm](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t174512.htm)

<sup>36</sup> Asia: Keeping their balance- China, Japan and America. *The Economist*. Vol.374, Iss.8415. (February 26, 2005). p65.

<sup>37</sup> *The Economist*. ( 2005b). China the key to Asian Peace. Vol 374, No. 8419. p11

a host of positive spin offs<sup>38</sup> and has deflected some attention away from Japan's economic issues onto China. While economic ties are proving attractive to the EU, it is widely acknowledged that China holds a poor record on the charters of the rule of law, democracy and human rights principles. These are central doctrines within EU foreign policy. Recent attempts by the EU to lift the arms embargo of 1989 have caused a stir across the globe, highlighting that political proximity between the EU and China is still distant.

Currently little critical analysis has been given to the nature of EU-Japan relations and the founding documents of the EU and Japan alliance. The intention and direction of this study is to avoid westernised premises and stereotypes and use qualified practical and academic experiences from Eastern and Western culture. This style avoids presumption that currently surrounds some of the current literature in this field<sup>39</sup>. The use of identity and rational choice frameworks in tandem provides a degree of novelty, although in a cross-cultural comparative study this novelty should have been well exhausted. The Four Point Plan aptly establishes the need to look at both internal and external contributions that effect the way in which a nation or group is perceived to provide qualitative analysis<sup>40</sup>. The *Analytic Narrative* contributes to the logical progression both the EU and Japan have taken politically, economically and socially and provides a firm base to comment on the research question of this paper; *what is the nature of relations between the EU and Japan?*

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<sup>38</sup> The National Bureau of Statistics China (2002)

<http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata>. Chapter 16

<sup>39</sup> Bourke, Thomas. (1996). Japan and the Globalisation of European Integration. England: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd.

<sup>40</sup> Tilly, Charles. (2003). Political Identities in Changing Politics. Social Research. Vol.70, Iss.2. (Summer 2003). p4

### **1.3 IDENTITY AND THE ANALYTIC NARRATIVE FRAMEWORK**

Frameworks of analysis must be chosen to suit the study undertaken—an obvious yet often neglected concept in deductive research. Theoretical frameworks must be able to extract information from primary documents to give a deeper insight to the research problem. These frameworks must be chosen for their explanatory qualities. During the formation phase of this research a series of international relations and political theoretical applications were proposed with the general concept of identity formation and the Analytic Narrative being most significant. These two concepts became significant with regard to cross-cultural interactions and enabled the extrapolation of key information. Charles Tilly's Four Point Plan<sup>41</sup> was chosen for its ability to analyse the barriers that both further and inhibit bilateral policy co-ordination. The Four Point Plan technique establishes 'you', 'me' and 'we' contextually, in tandem with narrative 'stories' and 'stereotypes' of the actors. Charles Tilly is a renowned sociologist with influential contributions to the academic fields of politics, history and how societies change. Tilly tackles fundamental questions about the nature of domestic, political, and national identities and their linkages to historic events such as revolution, social movement and processes of political interaction. His emphasis is often on the role of 'stories' in policy formation, which extends to the provenance of stereotyping in political bilateral relationships. As Chapter Four of this thesis explains the notion that group identities are politically pivotal and as such provides direction to research and the better understanding to the evolving nature of relations between the EU and Japan.

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid, p5



In addition to the framework of identity and the theme provided by the Four Point Plan, this thesis derives a comparative perspective from the *Analytic Narrative*<sup>42</sup>. This rational choice analytical narrative is fluent with contributions from belief, ideology and culture and the impact this has on the bilateral interaction between two parties. The *Analytic Narrative* surveys the goals and perspectives of actors and uses the subjectivity of the human experience to narrate policy outcomes. The analytic narrative model encompasses a path of study rejuvenate of traditional rational choice assumptions which are elaborated up on in Chapter Five.

Identity and the Analytic Narrative conceptions illuminate and streamline the context of this study. Identity formulations in international relations by Charles Tilly ask ‘Who are you?’, ‘Who are we?’ and, ‘Who are they?’<sup>43</sup> and are shaped by four primary distinguishing questions to<sup>44</sup>. This framework is central to the establishment of relations between two groups, establishing the stereotypes that affect these relations and decisions that are made in foreign diplomatic negotiations between the EU and Japan. Further, the rational choice Analytic Narrative has the ability to use identity characteristics of nations, or supranational groups such as the EU to weigh the costs and benefits of action. The analytic narrative therefore identifies decisions that are based on maximising objectives<sup>45</sup>. The analytic narrative model suggests that the goals and preferences of Japan and the EU are directly attributable to the nature of their relations and are made to maximise utility.

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<sup>42</sup> Bates, Robert. (1997). Comparative Politics and Rational Choice: A Review Essay. *American Political Science Review*. Iss.91. pp 699-704

<sup>43</sup> Tilly, Charles. (2003). Political Identities in Changing Polities. *Social Research*. Vol.70, Iss.2. (Summer 2003). Also see, Hopf, Ted. (1998). The Promise of Constructivism in International Politics. *International Security*. Vol.23, No. 1. pp171-200

<sup>44</sup> Tilly, Charles. (2003). Political Identities in Changing Polities. *Social Research*. Vol.70, Iss.2. (Summer 2003).

<sup>45</sup> Levi, Margaret. (1997). A Model, A Method, and A Map: A Rational Choice in Comparative Historical Analysis. In: Lichbach, Mark Irving., and Alan.S. Zuckerman, (1997) *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure*. New York: Cambridge. Chapter 2.

Differing from traditional rational choice boundaries, the Analytic Narrative is also influenced by beliefs and value factors. Both the models of Tilly's Four Point Plan and Levi et. al.'s Analytic Narrative forges different means to achieve similar, interpretive ends that are reflective of the mutual theme of identity. The use of each framework independently correlates similar outcomes, and as such has predatory values.

Identity and intercultural competence, that is the ability to communicate effectively and successfully on a multicultural platform has become a crucial issue. Yet identity as a framework has often been peripheral in political science bilateral relations' studies where the focus is primarily confined to pure political and economic settings. Recognising how a group is characterised domestically as a nation, and how they are perceived as international actors are implicit to foreign relations. The concept of an identity frame is important because it allows scholars to analyse how individual identity and group affiliation influence views and responses on both domestic and international issues. Identity theory prescribes that people tend to protect those things (beliefs, values, group affiliations) that help create our sense of self<sup>46</sup>. In short, identity frames crop information and perspectives that do not align, or contradict these values. It is important to remember that the internal workings of a group are not always interpreted the same way from an external perspective. Often sensitive factors need to be overseen and purely quantitative and historical facts recognised. An example of this could be the Japanese alignment with axis powers in WWII, a nation looking to further her regional power and gain global recognition as opposed to a menacing evil empire seeking hegemony.

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<sup>46</sup> Gardner, Robert. (2003). "Identity Frames." *Beyond Intractability*, In Burgess, G and H. Burgess. (eds). (2003). Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. [http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/identity\\_frames](http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/identity_frames); Falk, Armin., and Fischbacher, Urs. (2001). A Theory of Reciprocity Institute for Empirical Research in Economics Working Paper. No. 6: CES info Working Paper Series No.457. (April 2001). <http://ssrn.com/abstract=203115>



The Analytic Narrative theme and the influence of identity in international relations draw attention to areas of mutual interest between the EU and Japan. It is assumed but not always possible for two groups to reciprocate diplomatically and on even terms. Reciprocity promotes that people reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. Reciprocity takes into account that people evaluate actions not only by its consequences but also by the intention underlying this action<sup>47</sup>. Reciprocity is a policy that is innately practised in most areas of foreign and public policy, usually economic in nature yet it is not included in rational choice theory to be key to diplomatic actions taken between Japan and the EU. The working agenda of the Joint Declaration 1991 and the Action Plan 2001 pursue deeper political relations through reciprocal open dialogue; educated cultural considerations and as rational choice actors pursuing co-ordinated policy that reflects a clear and refined purpose. Outcomes are not always individually separated, rather, they can be deemed as a compromise, or future orientated collective benefit to both actors. This notion becomes more apparent in the third section of this research.

#### **1.4 THE JOINT DECLARATION 1991, AND THE ACTION PLAN 2001**

This thesis has chosen to explore the foundation documents that formalised EU and Japan political relations; the Joint Declaration 1991 and the Action Plan 2001. In the case of the former, the Joint Declaration 1991 has been enshrined as the cornerstone of formal political relations between the EU. As an iconic beginning to formal EU and Japan relations, the Joint Declaration shows an established degree of sincerity on behalf of the EU and Japan to pursue a common focus toward both bilateral and multilateral issues of mutual interest. The two actors have decided to “...intensify their dialogue...strengthen

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their cooperation and partnership so that the challenges of the future may be met”<sup>48</sup>. The Joint Declaration formalised regular ministerial and high-level meetings whilst encouraging an open mind to innovation and initiative under a pillar of transparency. The question remains as to what it was that really brought the EU and Japan together? Chapter Four of this research reviews these criticisms of the Joint Declaration and discusses whether it truly was a common desire to become a strong bilateral partner, or as Abe Atsuko’s *Japan and the European Union* argues was merely the EU reacting to a nearing of Japan and US relations?<sup>49</sup>

The Action Plan 2001 replaced the Joint Declaration 1991 and was considerably more comprehensive. The Action Plan built upon the original intent of the Joint Declaration by forging a closer diplomatic and economic relationship between Japan and the EU, yet the Action Plan 2001 further stressed the need for transparent communication and joint policy coordination that underpinned parallel policy initiatives in conjunction with international organisations and multilateral institutions. The Action Plan aimed higher than its predecessor and included amendments pertaining to the threat of terrorism, global environmental initiatives. Nuclear non-proliferation and the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol<sup>50</sup> under UN treaty based efforts took a central position with regard to global climate change (and global sustainability as per the Kyoto Protocol), and especially

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<sup>48</sup> Joint Declaration on Relations between the European Community and its Member States and Japan. (1991) Preamble. <http://jpn.cec.int/english/eu-relations/e3-0201.htm>

<sup>49</sup> Abe, Atsuko. (1999). *Japan and the European Union: Domestic Politics and Transnational Relations*. N.J: The Athlone Press. Chapter 5.

<sup>50</sup> In November 2004, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment reported that Arctic temperatures are increasing more rapidly than initially indicated. This process could eliminate animal species, threaten indigenous peoples and lead to a rise in sea levels (National Research Council, 2002). The European heat wave of 2003, which claimed upwards of 35,000 lives, has now also been linked to human induced global warming and signals the importance of the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol is embodied in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992), an international agenda that requires national compliance to reduce emissions.

pronounced a cultural component. The worth and relevance of the Joint Declaration and the Action Plan are discussed under the theoretical conceptions of Identity and the Analytic Narrative. While not primary in this research due to both limitations of time and length more so than importance, Christopher Hill's research on the Capabilities-Expectations Gap (CEG)<sup>51</sup> deserves to be mentioned, despite this framework having been used exhaustively. In the case study of EU and Japan relations it appears that while not all directives outlined by the Joint Declaration and Action Plan have been actioned in due time almost as Hill prescribes, all components have been awarded due diligence and the intent and integrity of the documents supersede the time in which it has taken to achieve 'real' progress. Perhaps most simply, the CEG does not accurately sum up this bilateral study because it assumes there is a *gap* in relations, which this study observes as ungrounded.

Perhaps the EU's most significant downfall is its lack of a single voice of representation in the Union's policy positions, and the dislocation or lack of a common foreign policy advocate during the formation of the Joint Declaration and Action Plan. The enlargement process, a deepening and widening of the political structure of the EU and the adoption of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) blanketed bilateral policy from an EU position. The Japanese government has committed to high profile international agendas and with the relative decline in US popularity, scattered key developments have arisen within the context of international power distribution. The current stagnation of the Japanese economy continues to worry bilateral trading partners, but joint consultations between the EU and Japan ensure that this does not escalate. China's economy in contrast

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<sup>51</sup> For more information on Christopher Hill's Capability Expectation Gap theory, relative to the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, see: Hill, Christopher. (2003). The Capabilities Expectation Gap or Conceptualising Europe's International Role. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.31, Iss.3. pp305-328

has become much more aggressive, but the nation remains contentious on diplomatic matters of global interest. The importance of relations between the EU and Japan are thus self-evident in a global community that is largely working together to achieve a common outcome. Free trade, strong economies, political tolerance, environment and culture are beneficial political components to all contenders regardless of the time it takes a nation, group or set of individuals to get there. Strong bilateral alliances need to show real purpose in their plan which gives lenience to time constraint.

The Joint Declaration of 1991 between the EU and its member states and Japan is the formalisation of many years of ad hoc, unmotivated interaction in a political sense<sup>52</sup>. Until the Joint Declaration 1991, Japanese and European political leaders met on occasions such as G7 ministerial meetings and summits, and multilateral forums. Reviewing such interactions there was little sign of a concrete move to build upon bilateral relations between European and Japan. Contact via multilateral institutions that invariably involved the US as a primary constituent was the only true sense of communication up to the late 1980s. The nature of EU and Japan relations can therefore be characterised differently through the many historical upheavals both parties have faced. The idea of building solid political relations with the European Community occurred among Ministerial officials in the midst of structural changes effecting world politics and the international political economy. The lack of relations between Europe and Japan thus became unsuitable in such an environment.<sup>53</sup> As such, the Joint Declaration 1991 symbolised both depth and breadth being added to the relationship and

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<sup>52</sup> Daniels, Gordon., and Drifte, Reinhart. (eds). (1986). *Europe and Japan: Changing Relationships since 1945*: Ashford; Van Agt, Andreas. (1993). *Europe-Japan: Conflict and Cooperation?* In: Thomas Anderson (ed) (1994) *Japan: A European Perspective*: Basingstoke.

<sup>53</sup> Abe, Atsuko. (1999). *The European Union and Japan: Domestic Politics and Transnational Relations*. London: Athlone Press. p119

thus can be seen as the founding document of economic and political cooperation and was deemed independently self-satisfying. It can be argued that all nations have action plans and joint declarations that are of little or no true importance to the greater good of their relations; neither the EU nor Japan wanted a similar predicament and as such were hesitant about the outcome. To add salt to the wound of intent, Abe reports Prime Minister Kaifu to have signed, even though he held superficial concerns about the documents true effect on the domestic actor<sup>54</sup>. The case of Japan and the EU did prove to be different. Primary indicators from government documentation and summit minutes do show a consistent increase in contact and commitment between the parties on political and economic levels. The year 1991 saw a turn-around in the nature of relations with the signing of and visual commitment to the Joint Declaration between the European Community and Japan. Recognition of this document marked the enhancement of relations between these two actors, especially with the direct focus on human rights, rule of law and democratic principles. Both parties to expand upon existing regular consultation mechanisms such as frequent high level discussions between the President of the EC Council and Japan's Prime Minister; annual ministerial meeting between the EU troika and the Japanese government and open dialogue with joint members of the business round table community<sup>55</sup>. Responses driven by these initiatives have shaped an open, transparent forum for bilateral discussion and mutual benefit. Each party demonstrated a mutual commitment to the reduction of poverty, awareness of cross border terrorism and environmental hazards, especially notable with regard to nuclear

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid, p131

<sup>55</sup> This was to become the EU Japan Business Dialogue Round Table (EUJBDRT) created in 1995. This group brings together more than 40 top CEOs from various EU and Japan enterprises to discuss and promote business cooperation between these two groups. The EUJBDRT also makes policy recommendations to the European Commission and the Japanese government, as incorporated in the Joint Declaration 1991. See: <http://www.eujapan.com/europe/roundtable.html> for more information



testing. The Joint Declaration signified an agenda that was no longer dominated by the US, but rather pushed from coordinated offshore policy. Scholarship on the true validity of this Declaration is rife but it is vastly difficult not to recognise the leap forward economically given the policy consultations it has facilitated. Prior to the Joint Declaration transnational relations between Japan and Europe had used their economies as the sole accelerator to develop relations. These economic affairs were also significant to bilateral relations with member states, independent of the Community as a whole. The Joint Declaration from this perspective was an attempt by Japanese bureaucrats, in particular those in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' in Japan (MFAJ), to provide a framework for more intensive development recognising the EU as an entity and consolidating dialogue at a higher level. This feeling was reciprocated by the commitment of the EC and the member states through the European Commission.

The success of the Joint Declaration 1991 led to the renewed commitment shown in the Action Plan of 2001. The Action Plan was the protégé of the Joint Declaration and was established at the 9<sup>th</sup> EU-Japan Summit in Tokyo, July 2000<sup>56</sup>. The Action Plan promoted a need to elaborate on the success of the past decade and to energetically pursue an advancing relationship. The 10<sup>th</sup> EU-Japan Summit in Brussels, December 2001<sup>57</sup> realised and acted upon these ideas providing a result-orientated partnership, and provided greater strength to the bilateral relationship, but also attracted attention from other foreign actors due to the increase in pro-activity Japan and EU joint initiatives were taking. The Action Plan was a ten-year co-operation project to shape a common future for both the EU and Japan on bilateral, regional and multi-regional matters of joint interest.


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<sup>56</sup> See: [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/japan/summit\\_7\\_19\\_2000](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/japan/summit_7_19_2000) for joint conclusions

<sup>57</sup> see: [http://jpn.cec.eu.int/home/news\\_en\\_EU20NEWS202601.php](http://jpn.cec.eu.int/home/news_en_EU20NEWS202601.php) for Joint Press Statement

The objectives of the Action Plan echoed those outlined in the Joint Declaration but increased the importance of bringing cultures and people together. The EU and Japan friendship year of 2005 was the pinnacle of these initiative and furthered academic and professional exchanges between Japan and Europe, while promoting a peaceful existence as its key.

(Figure 1)



Source: Chronology of EU-Japan Relations, CEC<sup>58</sup>

Figure 1 demonstrates a series of interesting patterns (derived from official high-level meetings held between the EU and Japan) about the type of bilateral dialogue engaged by the EU and Japan. Figure 1 shows the three years leading up to the Action Plan 2001 to have involved little if any, official dialogue based solely on cultural issues and bicultural enhancement. The late 1990s show a large emphasis on economic issues which can be explained by the EU's concern over restricted market access to Japan and also the open

<sup>58</sup> [http://www.jupn.cec.eu.int/relations/showpage\\_en\\_relations.chronology.php](http://www.jupn.cec.eu.int/relations/showpage_en_relations.chronology.php)

dialogue encouraged by the Joint Declaration 1991. The year 2000 was the most even balance of political, economic and multilateral discussions, perhaps as indication of the need for closer, multifaceted bilateral relations. The shift into the twenty-first century shows a change in the balance of joint dialogue and is addressed by Objective Four in the Action Plan 2001. There has been a steady increase in cultural and multilateral dialogue independent of a strictly political agenda. European Union and Japan Business Dialogue Round Table (EUJBDRT)<sup>59</sup> discussions have occurred biannually since 1999 this can in part, account for the pendulum nature of bilateral economic meetings shown in figure 1.

The events of September 11, 2001 and the World Trade Centre bombings led to the attachment of 'The Joint Declaration on Terrorism' to the Action Plan 2001. This represented an international commitment to the 'War on Terror'<sup>60</sup>. The US decision to pursue actions in accordance to the events of September 11 was contentious, and left the international community polarised. Member states within the EU along with other nations that include Japan pushed to use established international frames to react appropriately. Internal disagreements within the EU and from other nations around the world were problematic in reaction to the September 11 act terrorism and in particular the expansions of Al Qaeda. This culminated in the US taking evasive actions that were not parallel to the recommendations of international governing bodies. This has further widened the gap of international political cooperation fuelled by unilateral actions undertaken during this period.

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<sup>59</sup> November 1999 was the first meeting of consumer associates of the EU and Japan under the framework of increasing consumer dialogue. The European Commission supports the EUJBDRT which is a private sector initiative to strengthen links between European and Japanese businesses.

<sup>60</sup> A phrase coined by President George W. Bush after the World Trade Centre terrorist attacks (September, 2000)



It would not be exaggerated to claim that most of the developments in external affairs, the evolution of policy, progress and attitude to relations between Europe and Japan have been constantly evolving. The following sections of this thesis will concentrate on precisely this explaining why this has occurred firstly under the framework of identity theory and secondly incorporating rational choice moves and finally rational actor theories.

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**PART ONE**  
**CHAPTER TWO**  
**LITERATURE REVIEW**

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## **2.0 INTRODUCTION**

This literature review compiles an analytical account of scholarly works that draw attention to the interactions between Japan and the European Union (EU) primarily as political actors in an international arena. As stated, but to reiterate further this research accounts for the literature that explores the nature of relations between Japan and the EU as cooperative actors on a global level. It also acknowledges the foundations of those interactions by comparatively analysing relations leading up to the Joint Declaration 1991. A review of both primary and secondary materials, including scholarly books, journal articles, official websites, summit synopses and cooperation agreements, forms the base of this investigation, and the selected texts are chosen for their direct relevance to the qualitative and comparative inquiry of this research. The ability to interview scholars specialising in this area would have been ideal, but due to this thesis being conducted in a third country— New Zealand— access to such key informants was limited in nature. Both historical and contemporary literature has instead been gathered

to form a clear picture of the political nature of these bilateral interactions. The most notable finding of this information gathering process has been the dearth of published scholarship in this area over the past five years. By way of introduction, followed by in-depth analysis of the topic, this literature focuses on themes that clarify the nature of relations between the EU and Japan. The governing theme of Identity embraces the theoretical concepts of Charles Tilly's Four Point Plan, and secondly, Margaret Levi et. al.'s Analytic Narrative.

## 2.1 GOVERNMENT LEVEL DOCUMENTATION.

The diplomatic accords, the *Joint Declaration of Relations between The European Community and its Member States and Japan*<sup>61</sup> and, *Shaping our Common Future: An Action Plan for EU-Japan Cooperation*<sup>62</sup> are the two shaping agreements to which this literature will provide reference. These two cooperation agreements form the cornerstone of a politically recognised agenda between the EU and Japan and thus are the central indicator in the narrative of this bilateral relationship until June, 2005; the period in which this research has been confined. The Joint Declaration 1991 recognises common values between the EU and Japan, and the Action Plan 2001 strives to achieve common outcomes.

There is an abundance of high level primary documentation on relations between the European Union and Japan; however much of it is unbalanced. On the part of the European Union, bilateral events with Japan are given little recognition in the annual *General Report*. Where a brief description of the ministerial and high level meetings of that year does appear in the Report there is no analytical content. Transcribed speeches of

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<sup>61</sup> The Hague. (1991). See Appendix A

<sup>62</sup> Brussels. (2001). See Appendix B

these meetings are analytically more important, yet readers must practise caution as often rhetorical and tautological commentary overrides the true intent of each party's contribution. Evidence of such misconstrued information is found through the course of this thesis, particularly in part three: chapters four and five.

The annual EU and Japan Summit Joint Press Statements<sup>63</sup> provide a useful mechanism with which to review the joint initiatives between these two nations. High and ministerial level authorities provide a complete discussion of joint objectives and diplomatically state any grievances between the European Union and Japan while outlining future prerogatives. Joint Statements should be used in conjunction with dialogue from non-governmental interest groups such as the European Union and Japan Business Round Table to provide comparative analytic substance to these narratives. The most efficient way to analyse Joint Summit meetings is in tandem with a chronological timeline to access internal and external events and their effect on the dialogue and outcomes at a point in time. Joint Press Statements are crucial to understanding both the Joint Declaration 1991, and the Action Plan 2001; a sense of identity emerges, values and beliefs are clarified, regional and multilateral initiatives explained and narratives scrutinised.

Domestically, both European and Japanese receive most of their information about each other's region via the media. The use of the European Commission opinion survey poll *Eurobarometer* provides an interesting insight into the EU's images of Japan. *Eurobarometer* covers many fields of surveyed opinion and when contextualised can give insight into government level bilateral movements. Media in Japan is restricted in

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<sup>63</sup> The Annual EU-Japan Summit Joint Press Statements are available online at <http://www.europa.eu.int>

nature due to the use of Media clubs.<sup>64</sup> When looking at opinion, and assuming that the bulk of public knowledge is drawn from the media, media clubs make it difficult to gauge true public perception. Also, the difference between East and West in narrative analysis proves difficult and is often reduced ideologically to: Communitarianism and Individualism. Mayo and Lehmann best describe these ideologies in *Cultures, Communities and Identities* discussing the homogeneity of the Japanese culture<sup>65</sup>, and in *Japan and Western Europe* with the Japanese language as a national idiom<sup>66</sup>. Individualism on the other hand is multi-dimensional and has ‘separate drives and desires’ that shift and interact within different cultural systems<sup>67</sup>. Such an example is viewable in communities of individual nations such as the EU. Essentially both Levi et al.’s Analytic Narrative and Tilly’s Identity framework help to remove these obstacles.

To date, there has been a lack of scrutiny by third parties asking *why* certain actions were taken. Paul James Cardwell summarises the academic reaction to the content of the Joint Declaration 1991 as “lukewarm”<sup>68</sup>. Critiques range from “a fairly unassuming document”<sup>69</sup> and largely composed of “verbal compromises”<sup>70</sup>, but most literature generally contends that closer relations were prompted most directly from the signing of

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<sup>64</sup> Media clubs are made from a certain number of journalists and groups that are invited to official press conferences. The flow of information is thus limited and more biased.

<sup>65</sup> Mayo, Marjorie. (2000). *Cultures, Communities and Identity*. Great Britain: Palgrave. p41.

<sup>66</sup> Lehmann, J.P. in Loukas Tsoukalis and Maureen White. (1982). *Japan and Western Europe*. London: Frances Pinter Publishers. p22.

<sup>67</sup> Mayo, Marjorie. (2000). *Cultures, Communities and Identity*. Great Britain: Palgrave. p42.

<sup>68</sup> Cardwell, Paul.J. The EU-Japan Relationship: from mutual ignorance to meaningful partnership? *Journal of European Affairs*. Vol.2, No.2. (May, 2004). p13

[www.europeananalysis.org.uk](http://www.europeananalysis.org.uk)

<sup>69</sup> Gilson, Julie. (2000). *Japan and the European Union: A Partnership for the Twenty-First Century?* Basingstoke: St. Matins Press. p168


<sup>70</sup> Nuttall, Simon. (1996). *Japan and the European Union: Reluctant Partners*. *Survival*. Vol.38. p110

the Joint Declaration 1991. In a pure sense, the Action Plan 2001 is reflective of this and it positively contributes and expands to a more comprehensive bilateral agenda. This logically reflects a changing decade of political agendas—especially since the World Trade Centre attacks, 11 September, 2001.

## 2.2 'IDENTITY' AS A GOVERNING THEME OF ANALYSIS

Due to the cross-cultural manner of this study, identity becomes a prime theoretical contributor to the nature of relations between two actors.

(Figure 2)



**SOURCE:** A condensed interpretation of Charles Tilly's 'perspective' on international relationship

Figure 1 displays the variables that influence the formation of identity from an external view point and how this can affect policy outcomes. This thesis uses this diagram to analyse the stereotypes, perceptions and stories that surround the bilateral relationship of EU and Japan. Identity as a social study has recently extended its scope to the study of

political relations<sup>71</sup> and can be used to display how identities are formed and the role they play in foreign policy decision making. Both of the dominating theoretical assumptions that bind this study are largely influenced by identity. These are explained, discussed, and analysed within this review; the most appropriate assumptions were then chosen to frame the remainder of this thesis.

Identity and globalisation are two areas that have recently been attributed substantial acclaim in bilateral relations. Tsoukalis and White<sup>72</sup> agree with Richard Storry's description of Japan's animosity towards the West during the mid-nineteenth century in *A History of Modern Japan*<sup>73</sup>, partly explaining the xenophobic nature of Japan's internationalist policies during this time. Tsoukalis and White are respected authors of European integration and both highlight the importance of perceptions and stereotypical analysis in *Japan and Western Europe*<sup>74</sup>. The authors develop an awareness of external and internal issues affecting relations between these two regions which complement the research of Holloran<sup>75</sup>. Itoh also recognises these stereotypes and focuses her research on their effect on political relations in a global society<sup>76</sup>. All of these authors agree that a new dimension of political analysis needs to be introduced to international relations studies. This relates directly to the core assumptions of this thesis, especially the correlation of perceptions, national interests and identity in foreign policy. Many

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<sup>71</sup> Mayo, Marjorie. (2000). *Culture, Communities and Identities: Cultural Strategies for Participation and Empowerment*. Basingstoke.

<sup>72</sup> Tsoukalis, Loukas., and White, Maureen. (eds). (1982). *Japan and Western Europe*. London: Frances Pinter Publishers.

<sup>73</sup> Storry, Richard. (1990). *A History of Modern Japan*. London: Penguin History.

<sup>74</sup> Tsoukalis, Loukas., and White, Maureen. (eds). (1982). *Japan and Western Europe*. London: Frances Pinter Publishers.

<sup>75</sup> Halloran, Richard. (1970). *Japan: Images and Realities; The Inner Dynamics of Power in a Nation of Outside Change*. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, Inc.

<sup>76</sup> Itoh, Mayumi. (2000). *Globalization of Japan*. New York: St. Martins Press.



contemporary theorists are beginning to incorporate elements of culture<sup>77</sup> which resonate in identity frameworks when seeking to understanding reasons pertaining to certain actions undertaken by bilateral partners. This is a much needed proactive stance within this area of research.

Globalisation theorists such as Tsoukalis and White<sup>78</sup> and Itoh<sup>79</sup> aptly point to Western imprudence having had direct effect on Japan, and on the political and social changes throughout Japan's more modern evolution. These scholars wisely avoid any attempts to attribute a change in the traditional Japanese mentality. Research provided by Richard Halloran in *Japan: Images and Realities*<sup>80</sup>, who expands upon the past research of Sir George Samson, provides an exemplary discussion to the East and West effect concluding that, "while the Japanese have taken *forms* of the West, they have moulded them around the *substance* of Japan."<sup>81</sup>

### 2.2.1 Perceptions

Globalisation theorist Itoh highlights similar interpretive limitations when exploring the psychological predispositions of foreign policy decision makers and the effect of the policy makers' views of national interest (input), and the formations of foreign policy (output) also pursuant to the works of Robert Jervis in application to Japan<sup>82</sup>. Jervis describes the importance of decision makers 'perceptions' in foreign policy to presume

<sup>77</sup> Williams, David. (1996); Itoh, Mayumi. (2000); El-Agraa, Ali.M.(1988).

<sup>78</sup> Tsoukalis, Loukas,. and White, Maureen. (eds). (1982). *Japan and Western Europe*. London: Frances Pinter Publishers.

<sup>79</sup> Itoh, Mayumi. (2000). *Globalization of Japan*. New York: St. Martins Press.

<sup>80</sup> Holloran, Richard. (1970). *Japan: Images ad Realities; The Inner Dynamics of Power in a Nation of Outside Change*. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuytle Company, Inc. Chapter 5.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid, pxvi-xvii

<sup>82</sup> Itoh, Mayumi. (2000). *Globalisation of Japan: Japanese 'Sakoku' Mentality and US Efforts to Open Japan*. New York: St. Martins Press. p7

that elites will see a situation most accurately. This is a similar concept to David Williams's elaborations on the role of the 'perceiver' and the 'perceived'<sup>83</sup>, and the difficulties of ascertaining contextual interpretations in foreign policy negotiations. How then can we come to understand the factors influencing the perceptions of these decision makers, and what effect will this have on the assessments that are made? Charles Tilly meets William's discussion under his four point plan where such misconceptions, which may result in less optimal outcomes, can be clarified. Tilly's ambition of decreasing the line between 'us' and 'them' is most important, and the four point plans is designed to meet this situation by recognising the boundaries that separate two groups and the perception distortions relevant to stereotyping.

### **2.2.2 "Supporter vs. Challenger"**

Inoguchi is also a major contributor to literature on the modernising role of Japan within the global context and is cited widely across many secondary works. Inoguchi is often critical of the policy decisions Japan has made, implying that Japanese decision-makers have a lack of world vision. However, a counter to Inoguchi's over judgemental position, it may perhaps be that Japan lacks the desire to become a hegemonic global power, and is instead more comfortable in the role of contributor rather than a leader, or as a "supporter rather than a challenger"<sup>84</sup>. As a common theme across his studies of Japan, Inoguchi juxtaposes two competing images of Japan. The first is one of the nation adrift in the circles of foreign policy with decisions being somewhat ad hoc and opportunistic, and the second is of Japanese determination to tenaciously defend its national interests. In Japan's Foreign Policy in era of Global Change<sup>85</sup> and Japan's Images and Opinions:

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<sup>83</sup> Williams, David. (1996). *Japan and the Enemies of Open Political Science*. London: Routledge.

<sup>84</sup> Inoguchi, Takashi. (1993). *Japan's Foreign Policy in an Era of Global Change*. NY: St Martins Press. p63

<sup>85</sup> Ibid. p.ix



not a Challenger but a Supporter'<sup>86</sup>, Inoguchi develops the vision of Japan's modern role in the international arena is that of 'supporter' rather than 'challenger', instigating considerable pressure from the West as indicative of the Constitution of Japan<sup>87</sup>, and as such the political psyche of Japan. Abe, and Itoh both echo this international relations perspective of Western pressure, and frequently refer to the Japanese keyword *gaiatsu*, meaning foreign pressure, in their reviews of EU and Japan relations<sup>88</sup>. Inoguchi's works are usually of a bilateral tendency but unfortunately like the works of many other bilateral specialists of Japan have chosen the United States as their secondary region of research at the expense of other regional partners. Other States do make occasional appearances in Inoguchi's studies<sup>89</sup>, but these are not central to his analysis. Despite this focus on US and Japan relations, Inoguchi's insights have considerable depth and many transferable qualities that can be nonetheless applied in the case of the EU and Japan.

Similar to Inoguchi's juxtaposed images noted above Iriye Akira also classifies Japan's global interactions into two central themes. These themes firstly include Japan's pragmatic response to changing world affairs, and secondly, a search for cohesive ideas

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<sup>86</sup> Inoguchi, Takashi. (1986). Japan's Images and Options: A Supporter, not a Challenger, *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol.2, No.1. pp 95–119.

<sup>87</sup> The Constitution of Japan: Chapter II- Article IX: Renunciation of War (3 November, 1946) reads: 'Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.' For a full view of the Constitution of Japan see:

<http://www.solon.org/constitutions/Japan/English/english-Constitution.html>

<sup>88</sup> Abe, A. (1991). *Japan and the European Union: Domestic Politics and Transnational Relations*. London: The Athlone Press. Chapter 1; Itoh, M. (2002). *Globalisation of Japan: Japanese Sakoku Mentality and US Efforts to Open Japan*. NY: St Martins Press. pp16-18,154,

<sup>89</sup> Inoguchi, Takashi. (ed). (2002). *Japan's Asian Policy: Revival and Response*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

to guide policy formation.<sup>90</sup> The first theme shows Inoguchi and Iriye to be divergent, but the second is reflective of Japan seeking a place in the world. Inoguchi and Iriye differ dramatically on how they perceive Japan to have responded to world affairs; this research contends that both in part is correct and asserts that Japan's evolution since 1950 is reflective of the international environment at that time. Japan has been both pragmatic and ad hoc in its foreign policy approach, but it is the second theme on Japan's role in the world, which aligns with the first. Itoh perhaps provides the most astute recognition of this in her book *Globalisation of Japan: Japanese Sakoku*<sup>91</sup> *Mentality and US efforts to open Japan*<sup>92</sup> by looking at the role of perceptions in national interests and foreign policy from an external perspective.

### 2.2.3 Stereotypes

Current inquiries within this field are notable in the degree to which they draw on Western rhetoric in the application of the theoretical concepts that underlie their research. This contributes to the power of imagery as a factor of national identity. Even translators such as American author Arther Waley<sup>93</sup> were thrown back by the powerful imagery and beauty Lady Murasaki describes in the epic novel 'The Tale of Genji'.<sup>94</sup> The Tale of Genji, or *Genji mono gatari* in Japanese, is still recognised to be of literary importance and dispels many of the modern stereotypes held by Western culture about Japanese

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<sup>90</sup> Iriye, Akira. (1987). *Japan and the Wider World: From Mid Nineteenth Century to the Present*. Singapore: Longman Singapore Publishers (Pte) Ltd.

<sup>91</sup> 'Sakoku' in Japanese refers to the 'closed door' policy of Japan to foreign countries for more than 200 years in the Edo period. The 'Sakoku' mentality Itoh refers to a 'secluded nation'. Itoh's study revolves around the study of 'sakoku' while taking into account 'kokusaika' (internationalisation).

<sup>92</sup> Itoh, Mayumi. (2000). *Globalization of Japan*. New York: St. Martins Press.

<sup>93</sup> For further reading on Arther Waley see: John Walter de Grunchy. (2003). *Orienting Arther Waley: Japanism, Orientalism, and the Creation of Japanese Literature in English*

<sup>94</sup> Tsoukalis, Loukas., and White, Maureen. (eds). (1982). *Japan and Western Europe*. London: Frances Pinter (Publishers).

culture through the novel's progressive foresights. The example of translation demonstrates a common fallacy between those theorising and conceptualising nations and cultures of which they hold no practical affiliation; not bold enough to dispel the beautiful images and critique the reality of a situation rather than propel the stereotype. For this reason there is an abundance of worthy literature from Japanese theorists on Japan, and European theorists on European perceptions but the area in-between examining the relationship demands fulfilment. David Williams has recognised this "Japan shaped hole"<sup>95</sup> in Western literature within his study of *Japan and the Enemies of Open Political Science*. It is unfortunate that Williams' book points out such an important canard yet fails to substantiate with any deeper analysis. Williams recognises this problem yet refuses to engage his opponent's views in a way that would substantiate his own assumptions; his bibliography is well worth reviewing. The role of stereotyping in cross-cultural investigations provides a recognition of the fundamental phenomena that is taken out of context. This in part explains the reluctant nature of relations between the EU and Japan up to the late 1980s. The inclusion of such social components in the Joint Declaration 1991 has helped reduce this hesitancy by promoting close bilateral understandings.

Observations determine that the literature suggests that the governing theme of identity, Charles Tilly's Four Point Plan to deconstruct stereotypes, used in tandem with Inoguchi's work on 'supporter and challengers' and supplemented by the Analytic Narrative's exploration of perception provides a theoretical framework on which to base this thesis.

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<sup>95</sup> Williams, David. (1996). *Japan and the Enemies of Open Political Science*. London: Routledge.

### 2.2.4 “Stories”

The recognition of the role and impact of “stories”<sup>96</sup> in international relations is important. Stories, to develop the term widely used in the Four Point Plan research of Charles Tilly, must be deconstructed to allow an accurate formation of a group identity. The Analytic Narrative uses the terms ‘perception’ and ‘stereotype’ to explain similar distortions when analysing why groups react in different ways. Globalisation theorists attribute this information to a lack of cultural understanding between groups and encourage the deconstruction of stories by closer bilateral contact and participation in Multilateral Organisations (MLOs) and Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs). The deconstruction of stories in political analysis is central to the investigation of this thesis and will more clearly evaluate the nature of relations between the EU and Japan.

## 2.3 THE FOUR POINT PLAN: Charles Tilly


The growing use of cultural perspectives in academia includes Charles Tilly’s macro-historical notion of political identity in *International Review of Social History: Citizenship, Identity and Social History*<sup>97</sup>. Tilly brings systematic and cultural dimensions of thought to specific case studies that are transferable to the study of the EU and Japan. The theoretical concept of identity involves many co-existing images that are often complementary, perhaps giving the framework greater grounding when applied practically in case studies. The following diagram outlines how Tilly’s Four Point Plan interconnects the various areas of his analyses to best assist this research.

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<sup>96</sup> Information that is misinterpreted or ill informed and perceived to hold a degree of truth by nation-states.

<sup>97</sup> Tilly, Charles. (ed). (1995). *Citizenship, Identity and Social History. International Review of Social History*. Vol.40, Supplement 3. Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.

(Figure 3)



**SOURCE:** Jeanine Begg. This diagram was created to depict the interactions of the Four Point Plan and shows how each part interacts with the others.

As Tilly advocates, modern day research needs to evolve to a higher level of understanding when undertaking a task as varied as cross-cultural study. In *Culture, Communities and Identities*<sup>98</sup>, Marjorie Mayo who specialises in community development and cultural awareness, classifies identity through culture with the fundamental promotion of people-to-people exchanges as a prerogative to cultural understanding and more conscientious political understanding. Mayo, like Tilly, centres her research on citizenship and identity being globally contextual, and indirectly aligns

<sup>98</sup> Mayo, Marjorie. (2000). *Cultures, Communities, and Identities: Culture Strategies for Participation and Empowerment*. New York: Palgrave.

her assumptions toward the importance of the Action Plan 2001<sup>99</sup> signed by the EU and Japan. People-to-people exchange programmes have become fundamentally important; such examples include the Vulcanus Programme<sup>100</sup>, university scholarships and grants, and business relations such as the three pillars of the Export Promotion Programme (EXPROM): The Gateway to Japan programme, the Executive Training Programme and an ad hoc scheme through which the Commission can provide selective one-off financial support to European market access initiatives aimed at the Japanese market.<sup>101</sup> Social events like film festivals, arts and theatre, friendship weeks and people-to-people exchanges have been successfully established between the EU and Japan to promote awareness inter-regionally by pursuing a degree of familiarity between both regions.

The Four Point Plan distinguishes the boundaries to foreign policy formation between two groups. Firstly, it pinpoints the boundaries that separate the EU and Japan on a physically level. Secondly, it establishes the set of relations within the boundaries—domestically. Thirdly, it established the set of relations outside of the boundaries—internationally. While finally, the fourth point analyses the stories that transcend all of these boundaries.

The Action Plan 2001 closely integrates identity formation and cultural awareness within the global community; this has been recognised by both the European

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<sup>99</sup> The 2005 people-to-people year of exchanges between Japan and the EU ensue the actualisations of this under Objective 4: Bringing together people and cultures (4.1-4.3) Shaping our common Future: An Action Plan for EU-Japan Cooperation, 2001.

<sup>100</sup> Vulcanus is a program of exchanging people between the EU and Japan and is predominantly financed by the EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation. For more information see: [http://www.eujapan.com/europe/vulcanus\\_japan.html](http://www.eujapan.com/europe/vulcanus_japan.html)

<sup>101</sup> These initiatives are set up to encourage a working relationship between different nationalities and businesses. For more information see: [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/japan/intro/exprom.htm](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/japan/intro/exprom.htm)



Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan<sup>102</sup>, and is reflected in these joint initiatives. Mayo assumes that culture is a ‘learned’ phenomenon attributable to ‘experience’, thus links to the formations of stereotypes when practical interactions are lacking. Mayo substantiates these claims on an anthropological basis implying the very concept of a ‘person’ varies from one culture to another<sup>103</sup>. Mayo also addresses the shifting nature of identity, relative to time and place, and complementary to Inoguchi’s recognition of a multi-cultural understanding in bilateral comparisons during specific time periods.

This links directly to the assumptions of Tilly and central themes within this thesis that show how a group’s identity is affected by situational events. Both Mayo and Inoguchi orientate their work towards multilateral initiatives, notably through the promotion of joint actions through the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the United Nations (UN)<sup>104</sup> which mandate the peaceful representation of likeminded nations in areas the national, regional and international fora. Exposure to different communities reduces such unrealistic expectations.

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
<sup>102</sup> The European Commission [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/index\\_en.htm](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/index_en.htm); The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan. <http://www.mofa.go.jp>. Joint Summit Statements from 2001 demonstrate this.

<sup>103</sup> Mayo, Marjorie. (2000). *Cultures, Communities and Identities*. Great Britain: Palgrave. p41

<sup>104</sup> The relationship Japan and the EU hold jointly between organisations such as the WTO and the UN are comprehensively summarised in the EU-Japan summits available in the form of joint statement online at [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/japan/intro/summ\\_index.htm](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/japan/intro/summ_index.htm) also find links to official speeches from this site.

## 2.4 THE ANALYTIC NARRATIVE: Margaret Levi et. al.’

(Figure 4)



**SOURCE:** Jeanine Begg: This diagram was drawn by the author to visually demonstrate how the Analytic Narrative is a useful theory of analysis.

To supplement identity and the Four Point Plan as contributors to cross-cultural comparative studies, the second central theme this thesis investigates is the International Relations study of the Analytic Narrative. This framework is from the field of rational choice but has been adapted by Levi et. al.’ to be neo-realist in context<sup>105</sup>. While the rational choice theories are traditionally a tool in economic assessment and International Political Economy inquiries, the Analytic Narrative is a new but well-critiqued model that provides a narrative with human, value-oriented dimensions to interpret the international nature of the EU and Japan relationship. Levi et.al.’s theoretical basis is

<sup>105</sup> Levi, Margaret. (2002). Modelling Complex Historical Processes with Analytic Narratives. <http://www.yale.edu/probmeth/Levi.pdf>



defined by its ability to extract narratives from key actors and analyse the goals and preferences that influence an actor's behaviour. This information can then be correlated to better understand how interactions can constrain some actions while facilitate others<sup>106</sup>. Robert Bates utilises this blend of strategic reasoning and includes how beliefs and values can shape an actor's behaviour<sup>107</sup>. This thesis reviews these theoretical aspects pursuant to the case specifics of the Joint Declaration 1991 and the Action Plan 2001, and thus enables an all-encompassing insight into qualitative and empirical scholarship pertaining to the bilateral course of the EU and Japan. Frequently scholarship has neglected to draw parallels with identity frameworks and international policy formations, regarding identity as too interpretive<sup>108</sup>. It is this fallacy that this thesis aims to address and provide more substance to human relations based discourse.

Literature that applies the international relations theory of rational choice is open to much scrutiny as the analytic narrative as it seeks to interpret as opposed to drawing upon pure fact. While scholarship in this area traditionally amalgamates 'Game Theory' and conflict based models, Robert Bates, Margaret Levy, Gerald L. Munck where encouraged by critiques from Green and Shapiro to tailor an approach in which political entities weigh their options in foreign policy decision-making from a neutral level. In James Mahoney's article in the journal *Studies in Comparative International Development*<sup>109</sup>, Margaret Levi and Robert Bates promote a new type of rational choice application that upgrades the importance of analytic induction suggesting an interactive

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<sup>106</sup> Ibid, Chapter 2

<sup>107</sup> Levi, Margaret., Bates, Robert, Grief, Avner., Rosenthal, Jean-Larent., and Weingast, Barry. (1998). *Analytic Narratives*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p241

<sup>108</sup> Mahoney, James. (2000). *Rational Choice Theory and Comparative Methods: An Emerging Synthesis?* *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. 35. p86

<sup>109</sup> Mahoney, James. (2000). *Rational Choice Theory and the Comparative Method: An Emerging Synthesis?* (2000). *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol.35, Iss. 2: New Brunswick.

relationship between theory and practice<sup>110</sup>. This rational choice Analytic Narrative targets the use of rational choice models more practically but is criticised as a pursuit of endless theoretical generalisation<sup>111</sup>. Most scholars view the rational choice model based on a series of preliminary requirements, a means by which to test hypotheses. As Iriye suggests, continuity and adaptability on behalf of both Europe and Japan will maximise benefits for both actors<sup>112</sup>; and Inoguchi concurs with this and uses the example of Japan's lack of natural resources<sup>113</sup>. Abe analyses the case study of the technology and car industries in *The European Union and Japan*<sup>114</sup> and provides a reason for Japan's adoption of concise foreign trade policies with the EU resulting in mutual benefit. Economists do not believe a compromise is a possible outcome and behavioural theorists generally view policy formation as self-seeking. Perhaps the alternative view, explained by the Analytic Narrative explores the view that it may be that the maximisation of the utility of *both* parties is possible, and that this encourages a more transparent relationship. Those who believe a country's unique history or culture determines the operations of its institutions and political processes may reject rational choice models and feel that decisions are devalued by rational choice assumptions<sup>115</sup>. This thesis adopts a more political (qualitative) than economic (quantitative) approach and argues that the Analytic Narrative most efficiently summarises the EU and Japan relations by understanding the goals and perceptions of each actor. This is clear on a functional level

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<sup>110</sup> Levi, Margaret., Bates, Robert., Greif, Avner., Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent., Weingast, Barry. (1998). *Analytic Narratives*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

<sup>111</sup> *ibid*

<sup>112</sup> Iriye, Akira. (1997). *Japan's Asian Policy: Revival and Response*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>113</sup> Inoguchi, Takashi. (2002). *Japan's Asian Policy: Revival and Response*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>114</sup> Abe, Astuko. (1999). *Japan and the European Union: Domestic Politics and Translational Relations*. London: The Athlone Press. Chapter 3.

<sup>115</sup> Fiorina, Morris. (Feb 26, 2000). *When Stakes are High Rationality Kicks*. New York Times.

incorporating a comparative and chronological dynamic to the analysis, congruent to value-orientated trends.

## **2.5 THE PRIMARY ACTORS**

The European Union and Japan are the primary actors of this study but as in any international relationship their decisions are contextualised by other states. For the purpose of this study the United States plays both a historic and contemporary role, and the increasing power of China contributes to decisions made between the primary actors.

### **2.5.1 The European Union**

The European Community, formed in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome, reflects the economic and political foresight of Western Europe reconstruction after the tragedies of World War One (WWI) and World War Two (WWII). This appears undisputed in literature. The European Union of today is a powerful supranational grouping of nations and has received enormous academic attention throughout its evolution. The core institutions and functions of the Union are elaborate and multifaceted and because of this it has received much academic appraisal<sup>116</sup>. Due to the internally focused nature of the EU during this period the group appeared self-absorbed and as such the 'Fortress Europe'<sup>117</sup> perception

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<sup>116</sup> Cram, Laura., Dinan, Desmond., and Nugent, Neill. (1999); Etzioni, Amitai. (2004); Feld, Warner.J. (1983); Holland, Martin. (ed) (1991) to name a few examples of scholars of the European Union who have been cited within this investigation.

<sup>117</sup> Hook, Glenn.D., and Gilson, Julie., and Hughes, Christopher.W., and Dobson, Hugo. (2001). *Japan's International Relations*. London: Routledge. p260; and Bourke, Thomas. (1996). *Japan and the Globalisation of European Integration*. England: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd. p4

escalated. The stereotype of fortress Europe was reflected by both Japan and US as preparation and implementation of the Single Act become paramount<sup>118</sup>.

Identity became a denominator in studies of EU interaction as the changing nature of policy, both domestic and international, became present in both the scholarship of Euro-philosophes and Euro-sceptics in bilateral and international relations research. Consequently, the analysis of external relations between the European Union and Japan becomes contingent up on internal shifting policy concerns. Warner Feld<sup>119</sup> and Amitai Etzioni<sup>120</sup> contribute to this field of research and review the effect of identity construction in their work.

### 2.5.2 Japan

Japan is a nation of intrigue to many scholars, and much has been written about its historical, political and economic interactions. Some excellent examples of Japan's external relations are investigated by Abe<sup>121</sup>, Inoguchi<sup>122</sup>, Bourke<sup>123</sup> and Williams<sup>124</sup>,

<sup>118</sup> Head, Keith., and Mayer, Thierry. (2002) Effet frontière, intégration économique et "Forteresse Europe". *Economie et Prévision*. CEPII: France (September 2001). No.6. p8. [http://team.univ-paris1.fr/teamperso/mayer/Eufort\\_cepii\\_fin.pdf](http://team.univ-paris1.fr/teamperso/mayer/Eufort_cepii_fin.pdf)

<sup>119</sup> Feld, Warner.J. (1983). *The European Community in World Affairs: Economic Power and Political Influence*. UAS: Westview Press.

<sup>120</sup> Etzioni, Amitai. (2004). *From Empire to Community*. USA: Palgrave Macmillan; and, Lapid, Yosef and Kratochwil, Frederick. (eds). (1996). *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. pp119-125.

<sup>121</sup> Abe, Atsuko. (1999). *Japan and the European Union: Domestic Politics and Translational Relations*. London: The Athlone Press.

<sup>122</sup> Inoguchi, Takashi. (1991). *Japan's International Relations*. USA: Westview Press, Inc; Inoguchi, Takashi., and Bacon, Paul. (2005) Japan's emerging role as a 'global ordinary power'. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*. Vol.6, No.1. (November 29, 2005).

<sup>123</sup> Bourke, Thomas. (1996). *Japan and the Globalisation of European Integration*. England: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd.

<sup>124</sup> Williams, David. (1996). *Japan and the Enemies of Open Political Science*, London: Routledge.

while Tsoukalis and White<sup>125</sup> have compiled a number of insightful critiques as editors. Much of this literature provides a central discussion of Japan's relationship with the EU but largely focuses on political and economic commentary relevant to the Joint Declaration 1991 or the Action Plan 2001. The contributions of these authors have been used in tandem with literature that supplies a deeper cultural and identity framed opinion which will provide analysis to the decision made by the EU and Japan. Richard Halloran and Richard Sorry supplement the current literature in this field and directly align their assumptions to the core theoretical insights of this research. Japan appears to be a region where Western or English speaking writers stumble, often applying ill-conceived and inappropriate assumptions, especially the rise of Japan to a prominent international actor. It is beneficial that recent times have seen the translation of Japanese scholarship in these areas provoking a broader discussion. The reopening of Japan after a 200-year period of self-imposed geographic isolation known as *Sakoku*, symbolised an increased curiosity toward the outside world and all things Western<sup>126</sup>. As *Sakoku* was enforced, an evolutionary internal cohesion was established under the Emperor. Relates to this thesis in a historical sense, Japan established internal cohesion and changing political status. Andrew Gordon's, *A Modern History of Japan from Tokugawa to the Present*<sup>127</sup> presents Japanese traditions by weaving narratives of Japan's complex and evolving society. Importantly, Gordon discusses an array of historical events in Japan and attributes these to the moulding of internal and external images and the effect of these images on the political decision the nation makes. The effect that Western ideologies had on Japan are

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<sup>125</sup> Tsoukalis, Loukas., and White, Maureen.(eds).(1982). Japan and Western Europe. London: Frances Pinter Publishers.

<sup>126</sup> Itoh, Mayumi. (2000). Globalization of Japan: Japanese *Sakoku* Mentality and US Efforts to Open Japan. USA: St. Martins Press.

<sup>127</sup> Gordon, Andrew. (2003). A Modern History of Japan from Tokugawa to the Present. New York: Oxford University Press.

well summarised by James L. McClain's *Japan: A Modern History*<sup>128</sup> which provides historical coverage of Japan and is endorsed by the Japan Foundation. It reviews relative images of Japan over periods of time, but does not critique why these images have arisen. However, McClain does find that Japan was never subjected to modernising pushes from the West. Academic opinion is more or less established in this area including supporting political commentaries from Tsoukalis and White<sup>129</sup>, and Itoh<sup>130</sup>. These authors note that the influence of the West was innately absorbed by Japan and adapted to pursue a nationalist agenda, or more simply, adapted the West to suit Japan.

A common theme in modern scholarship is the ability of different communities to adapt and mould specific ideas to their own cause; this contradicts traditional rational choice theory, but is consistent with contemporary Analytic Narratives. Identity has become a feature of globalisation and has meant that a dual West—East geographic division is no longer sufficient for understanding bilateral relationships<sup>131</sup>. This is a theme in Charles Tilly's Four Point Plan, used to establish the boundaries of interaction between nations and is connected directly to the nature of relations between two nations.

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<sup>128</sup> McClain, James.L. (2002). Rational Choice Theory and the Comparative Method: An Emerging Synthesis? *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol.35, Iss.2: New Brunswick.

<sup>129</sup> Tsoukalis, Loukas., and White, Maureen (eds), (1982). *Japan and Western Europe*. London: Frances Pinter publishers

<sup>130</sup> Itoh, Mayumi. (2000). *Globalization of Japan*. New York: St. Martins Press.

<sup>131</sup> Iriye, Akira. (1997). *Japan and the Wider World*. Singapore: Longman Singapore Publishers (Pte) Ltd; Tsoukalis, Loukas., and White, Maureen. (eds). (1982). *Japan and Western Europe*. London: Frances Pinter (Publishers); Abe, Atsuko. (1999). *Japan and the European Union: Domestic Politics and Translational Relations*. London: The Athlone Press.

### 2.5.3 The US and China

The role of the US and China and their effect on the EU and Japan are central in this study. America-centrism is a recurrent literary theme that surrounds the EU and Japan. This is slowly changing and the role of the United States is becoming less central to the making and breaking of interregional relations, especially as security and financial dependencies are redistributed. While the US remains a powerful actor in the political economy of the world, the EU and Japan have decentralised the US's dominance in global security issues. The end of the Cold War signalled this global paradigm shift. Inoguchi analyses the disjointed response of Japan towards Europe in 1992<sup>132</sup> as triangular relations met a mix of ups and downs, bearing in mind the infancy of the Joint Declaration. Abe concurs and provides a fine account of the Japan-US-EU struggle leading up to and through the beginning of the Joint Declaration 1991. Uniquely, the world systems perspective of Stephen M Walt and Robert Jervis provide quite a different discourse to that of Inoguchi and Abe placing the US at the core of the Asia-Pacific economy<sup>133</sup>, but in doing so provides grounds for inter-imperialistic conflict between the US and Japan, leaving the EU standing back as an observer, positioned to gain everything.

The EU and China also share a prosperous economic relationship. This relationship was originally established politically, just prior to the EC and Japan Joint Declaration yet closer relations have largely been marred by political dislocation. The robust economy of Japan as an industrial hub complements the democratic stance of Japan domestically and

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<sup>132</sup> Inoguchi, Takashi. (1993). *Japan's Foreign Policy in an Era of Global Change*. New York: St. Martins Press. Chapter 3. Japanese responses to Europe 1992: Implications for the United States. pp72-88

<sup>133</sup> Walt, Stephen.M. *International Relations: One World, Many Theories*. *Foreign Policy*, No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring, 1998), pp.29-32,34-46



multilaterally, helping to bolstering this nascent relationship with outside parties. Literature surrounding the rise of China has become abundant since 2000. The *Economist* is thriving on the changing nature of the Chinese economy and has successfully added to the 'stories' the public reads pushing headlines such as "How China runs the world economy"<sup>134</sup>, and "China and the key to Asian peace"<sup>135</sup>. China is a strategic issue for Europe, and is directly linked to the overall global responsibility that central to the heart of the EU's role in foreign policy.<sup>136</sup> The formal establishment of EU and China long term relations began in the 1995 document, "A Long Term Policy for China Europe Relations"<sup>137</sup>, which promotes bilateral agendas to aid the positive reform process for China to become more constructively involved in the international community. Current EU policy towards China is based on the policy paper of the Commission entitled, "A maturing partnership: shared interests and challenges in EU-China relations"<sup>138</sup> which was endorsed by the European Council on 13 October 2003, although like the Joint Declaration between the EU and Japan it has evolved during this period. China is a trend area of scholarship, much the same way as Japan was during its economic rise. China is a central component to security in Asia, likewise to the economic success in the area. Yet, the economic boom of China has also aroused the attention of the European Central Bank with Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, a member of the Executive Board of the ECB, announcing in 2005 that, "China should be understood primarily as a *challenge* (original

<sup>134</sup> The *Economist*. (2005d). How China runs the World Economy. Vol.376, No.8437 (July 30) pp66-68

<sup>135</sup> The *Economist*. (2005b). China the Key to Asian Peace. Vol.374, No.8435 (July 16) p50

<sup>136</sup> Ferrero-Waldner, Benita. Security in the Far East. *Hampton Roads Security Quarterly*. Portsmouth. (Oct 15, 2005)

<sup>137</sup> COM (1995) 279/final.

[http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_relations/china/com95\\_279en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/china/com95_279en.pdf)

<sup>138</sup> COM (2003) 533/final.

[http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_relations/china/com\\_03\\_533/com\\_533\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/china/com_03_533/com_533_en.pdf)

emphasis) to the European economy”, and that China “lacks economic flexibility”<sup>139</sup>. A Chinese perspective can be found in journal articles in *Contemporary International Relations* that highlights the overall good co-operation between the EU and China, highlighting fundamentally the common interests of both groups far outweighs their differences and contradictions<sup>140</sup>. The China and Japan connection also poses a pivotal area of research and is most frequently characterised as “cold politically but warm economically”<sup>141</sup>. Analysis of the relationship between the EU, China and Japan provides a narrative of interregional competition and political insecurity which adds to the nature of relations between the EU and Japan directly.

## 2.6 INTERPRETATION: The nature of relations between the EU and Japan

The nature of relations between Japan and the EU must be diagnosed together with aspects of culture-based political theory in order to substantiate their interaction. Examples of this method include how Holleran, Tilly, Williams, Bates and Storry integrate cultural aspects into their works, regardless of how controversial this may be. A common fallacy that appears in the literature surrounding relations between the EU and Japan is the application of Western theories constructed by Western ideologies, to cross-cultural studies without reference to limitation. This scholarly ignorance is slowly adjusted as more modern comparative analysts choose to integrate these variables into their studies, balancing narrative and interpretive conclusions in this field. In review of much of the relevant literature, more emphasis needs to be placed on the EU and Japan as

<sup>139</sup> Tumpel-Gugerell, Gertrude. (2005). The next dimension of EU-China relations. Statement issued by the ECB. (19 April, 2005). Directorate Communications, Press and Information Division. [www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2005/html/sp050419.en.html](http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2005/html/sp050419.en.html)

<sup>140</sup> Anon. (2002). More Stable EU-China Relations. *Contemporary International Relations*: Beijing. (March, 2002). Vol. 12. Iss. 3

<sup>141</sup> Pottinger, Matt. (2005). China Tempers Anti-Japan Rhetoric, Emphasizes Economic Ties, *The Wall Street Journal*. New York: (21 April 2005), p.A14.

a direct bilateral partnership and less as a third party supplement. This thesis uses identity parallels to better explain the ‘stories’<sup>142</sup> that affect the policy decisions that are made on a regional scale, while prompting an awareness up on the ability of a group to form new identities and to pursue different political agendas. In sum, the overall literature surrounding the relationship between the EU and Japan is qualitatively disjointed and has not been given truly critical review, under appropriate theoretical conceptions. To better advance the study of international and bilateral relations many of the scholars included in this thesis should integrate a more humanistic dimension to their work. This would better account for the shifting nature of politics and economies, thus reducing rhetoric and advancing scholarship.

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<sup>142</sup> Tilly, Charles. (2002). *Stories, Identities and Political Change*. USA: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc; Tilly, Charles. (2003). *Political Identities in Changing Politics*. *Social Research*. Vol.70, Iss.2. (Summer 2003).

## **PART TWO**

### **CHAPTER THREE**

#### **HISTORICAL RELATIONS (1500-1991)**

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#### **3.0 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF EU AND JAPAN RELATIONS**

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Throughout the 1980s the relationship between the EU and Japan was primarily economic in nature. A new level of cooperation was established in the signing of the Joint Declaration 1991, which confirmed a joint commitment to freedom and democracy, free trade, human rights and other common values, and chartered a course for joint contributions to the solution of global issues and strengthening the interregional partnership of the European Community and Japan. Since 1991, Japan and the EU have honoured the spirit of the Joint Declaration by holding annual diplomatic summits that engaged dialogue and cooperation across a wide variety of fields and on a broad range of levels. In the field of economic relations, particularly while trade imbalances hit record levels in 1992, trade became a subject of concern. Great efforts by both sides have helped to steadily reduce this. There has also been more of an effort to promote dialogue in political fields since the Maastricht Treaty which took effect in 1993 and the political unity of the EU itself strengthened. In addition to problems of a specifically Japan - EU nature, there is active co-operation on more global issues, including environment and development assistance. Thanks to a number of efforts, relations between the EU and Japan are friendly and productive in nature. Ties between both sides have been considered relatively weak compared to those between Europe and the US or Japan and the US, but the policy initiatives arising from the Joint Declaration are helping to improve the imbalances of relations between this trio. The Action Plan 2001

demonstrated the proven strengths of tightening relations between the EU and Japan and included significant extensions, in particular the Joint Declaration on Terrorism 2001 and environmental considerations. Though currently only five years into the Action Plan, the increased strength and determination of the EU and Japan has been apparent, although not without hurdles.

The following section serves as an historical overview of initial Europe - Japan relations. This is an important section to understand the events, reasons and purposes that have built the perceptions each partner holds of the other, and the rationale undertaken in their foreign policy decisions. Political historian Richard Halloran shows that Europe viewed Japan as "...an oriental despot"<sup>143</sup> nation leading up to WWII; with authors noting that Japan was driven by a sense of "ultra-nationalism"<sup>144</sup>. After the US bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki which effectively ended the War, 1945 over-shadowed Japan's national image with despair as national prestigious past came to an end<sup>145</sup>. This was furthered by the US occupation of Japan from 1945-1952 with the loss of Japanese independence and national privilege.

Meanwhile, Europe too, struggled with the end of the war. As a continent of both winning and losing nations, Europe was emotionally, politically and militarily polarised. Both Japan and Europe were swamped by instability and mistrust. As discussed above Japan was occupied by the US while Europe was mediating peace between her nations through a path also occupied by foreign troops. Japan regained its own restricted political

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<sup>143</sup> Lehmann, J.P. In Tsoukalis, Loukas., and White, Maureen. (eds). (1982). *Japan and Western Europe*. London: Frances Pinter (Publishers). p17.

<sup>144</sup> Halloran, Richard. (1970). *Japan: Images and Realities; The Inner Dynamics of Power in a Nation of Outside Change*. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, Inc. p57.

<sup>145</sup> Storry, Richard. (1970). *A History of Modern Japan*. England: Penguin books. p47.

control in 1952 but it not until the 1960s were a series of bilateral arrangements made between Japan and individual nations in Europe. The United Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands (who received nearly half of all Europe bound Japanese investment for the period 1951 to 1995<sup>146</sup>) were paramount to this and not until 1983 did the Japanese government agreed to negotiate voluntary export agreements on a Community-wide basis. Popular perceptions explained in Chapters Four and Five of this thesis explain the lack of interaction on an interregional scale; Japan saw a Europe who was discriminatory about Japanese products which can be explained by a Europe-wide internal restructuring focus<sup>147</sup>. This stated, Europe and the US still maintained that Japan pursued economic development by unfair practices<sup>148</sup>. The establishment of the European Commission Delegation in Tokyo<sup>149</sup> in 1974 continued to show a relationship strained by trade frictions and Japan became a target for increased public criticism. Gilson explains this economic standoff signalling that Japan felt Europe was finding a convenient scapegoat for its own economic and social problems.<sup>150</sup> Despite continued criticism a recognisable European Community identity had developed within Japan itself<sup>151</sup> aided by Japan sending delegates to various destinations in Europe with a mandate to ease trade frictions.

<sup>146</sup> Bourke, Thomas. (1996). Japan and the Globalisation of European Integration. England: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd. p17

<sup>147</sup> Inoguchi, Takashi. (1993). Japan's Foreign Policy in an Era of Global Change. NY: St. Martin's Press. p78-79

<sup>148</sup> The US case example is described in Hook et. al.' (2001). Japan's International Relations: Politics, economic and security. London: Routledge. pp106-110. Europe held that Japan made little effort to engage in the fair trade of products across borders. Japan was happy to export but without reciprocating with imports. This caused balance of trade frictions early in Japan's move into the global economic environment.

<sup>149</sup> This allowed the Japanese exposure to EC representation in Japan and has been crucial to later political developments between the two actors. The delegation is able to collect and distribute information as a *de facto* European embassy that is much better resourced than many of the state embassies themselves bringing together the national interests of EU member states under a single banner and thus consolidated a more united identity.

<sup>150</sup> Gilson, Julie. (2000). Japan and the European Union: A Partnership for the Twenty-first Century? Basingstoke: St. Martin Press. p23

<sup>151</sup> *ibid.* p24

During this period Japan was perhaps disillusioned in an international sense by the soft stance of the US relationship with Japan<sup>152</sup>. An economic and military reliance on the US continued, based on economic concessions and a lenient balance of trade repayment scheme, in return for continued strategic support for the US in the Asian region. Nationalism and a continental focus continued to be a by-product of the changing structural prerogatives in Europe and in Japan as the US guaranteed both a strong market and a security ally. From this point a series of bilateral images, stories and stereotypes began to emerge that would continue into the 1990s when closer relations and bilateral interactions demanded dialogue and discussion to defuse some of these diplomacy-hindering scenarios. There is an imbalance of academic references on the joint partnership between the EU and Japan. There is much more scholarship in Japan about European relations than there exists in Europe about Japan. Tsoukalis and White give a widely cited explanation for this:

Whenever reference is made to Western Europe as an international partner, it is almost invariably the European Community that is implied. The Community...is not, at least as yet, a federal state. Nor is it, however, an example of traditional inter-governmental organisation in which case there would be little point in talking about EC-Japan relations. The hybrid nature of the Community makes it a very complex subject to study but also a difficult interlocutor, as many Japanese negotiators must have discovered in their dealing with it and at the cost of a certain frustration. The existence of the Community may be seen as an additional complicating factor in Euro-Japanese relations but also potentially as a favour that may make the effective management of those relations more likely.<sup>153</sup>

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<sup>152</sup> Abe, Atsuko. (1999). *Japan and the European Union: Domestic Politics and Translational Relations*. London: The Athlone Press. pp 4-9;

<sup>153</sup> Tsoukalis, Loukas., and White, Maureen. (eds). (1982). *Japan and Western Europe*. Great Britain: Frances Printer.



### 3.1 Early Encounters: JAPAN

When attempting to capture the nature of any relationship, it is important to reiterate historical tracings independent of bilateral contact. This is important when looking at the relations between two groups, the EU and Japan, both having been shaped from age old narratives of history. Often without historical background, many issues of today become incomprehensible. Historical accounts draw attention to the birth of joint relations, and are attributable to the state of contact in a modern sense. For the sake of a bilateral comparative study, the groups being analysed must be accurately positioned in historical, social and historical senses. This chapter will explore the characters of Japan and Europe, creating a frame of each group independent of the other, then establish the roots of the relationship and follow with how these experiences effect the current nature of realtions. This chapter will provide an interlude into the political analysis of current affairs, providing insight into the following theoretical chapters.

Japan's *Edo* period<sup>154</sup>, was marked by internal stability but also by a policy of national seclusion. Japanese nationalism was born from an elitist patriotism felt by a handful of extraordinary men who led Japan late into *Edo*. Western missionaries<sup>155</sup> and traders reached Japan in the 1540s introducing Japan to new ideas and commodities. This ushered in a new facet to Japanese life, some arguing particularly with the introduction of Catholicism. Western propaganda overwhelmed this period as a Westernisation ideology was introduced into Japan. Scholars such as Storry commonly write with critical undertones toward the Western misconception that Christianity had more impact on Japan than it actually did<sup>156</sup>. While it is difficult not to attribute Christianity to a strong

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<sup>154</sup> Also known as the *Tokugawa* period dating from 1600-1867

<sup>155</sup> Lead by Francis Xavier

<sup>156</sup> Storry, Richard. (1990). *A History of Modern Japan*. London: Penguin Group. p44, 55-63.

sense of harmonisation and hard work ethic of the Japanese while under Warlord ruled seclusion, it can be argued to have had no enduring influence on Japanese political evolution. Political exposure in the early Twentieth Century was the turning point in this respect and it came about by an internationalisation of Japan. It was often the case that the Christian influence particularly alarmed Japan's rulers, and under the Tokugawa regime Western presence was restricted to a Dutch trading post in Nagasaki, Kyushu where the authorities could closely monitor activities<sup>157</sup>. Undisturbed by external pressures, this was an age of national consolidation in Japan, notable for economic growth and generally efficient government guided by Confucian ideology<sup>158</sup>. Inevitably, this resulted in Japan as a nation falling behind the West in technology—both militarily and developmentally. When confronted by US ships in 1853, Japan was forced to open the country to foreign trade. Much scholarship of the 1960s describes the 1500s as the Christian century of Japan a more in-depth examination suggests this conclusion to be Euro-centric in nature and rather over-estimated.

1840 saw a series of reforms in Japan leading to 'the (re) opening of Japan'<sup>159</sup> and culminating in the Meiji Restoration<sup>160</sup>. During the Restoration it is difficult to make a comprehensive assessment whether Europe or the United States made the greater impact of Western life became visual: railways, post offices, banks and newspapers among others. With regard to this period Basil Hall Chamberlain said, "Foreigners have stood in amazement at Japan's ability to swallow so many new ideas and institutions whole...has

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<sup>157</sup> Bourke, Thomas. (1996). *Japan and the Globalisation of European Integration*. England: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd. pp33-34

<sup>158</sup> Backhouse, A.E. (1993). *An Introduction to the Japanese Language*. Australia: Oxford University Press. p5

<sup>159</sup> 1853-1854

<sup>160</sup> 1867-1868

shown herself consistently teachable”<sup>161</sup>. From this, Chamberlain’s colonial diatribe perceived Japan to take on Western culture easily and adapt it to their benefit as an entrepreneurial state. This was a period of enlightenment and entrepreneurship and the beginning of well-grounded relations with Britain. The Meiji Restoration of 1868 saw change in societal Japan transforming from a feudal structure to a more open hierarchy-based model that values wealth and talent<sup>162</sup>. The likes of joint stock companies, small manufacturing enterprises and agricultural cooperatives began to emerge as Japan modernised at its own rate. Richard Halloran describes this era as “...Enrich the Nation [of Japan], Strengthen Its Arms...”<sup>163</sup> where the ‘Meiji men’<sup>164</sup> set about building a nation that was capable of maintaining its independence from the West. The men of the Meiji era were motivated by a need to get the nation moving again; it was not a revolution as such, rather, restoring a sense of national unity and group identity<sup>165</sup> to the nation of Japan again.

The Meiji Restoration perhaps signified Japan’s departure from Asian ideology and a shift to a more Western understanding<sup>166</sup>. It was transition designed by Japan to move away from its neighbours (who were practicing decadence and despotism) which held no

<sup>161</sup> Chamberlain, Basil.H ( famous for the study of Japanese poetry in a European Language) .(1905). cited by Richard Storry in Tsoukalis, Loukas., and White, Maureen. (eds). (1982). Japan and Western Europe. London: Frances Pinter (Publishers). p4, Chapter 1.

<sup>162</sup> McVeigh, Brian. (July, 1998). Linking State and Self: How Japanese the State Bureaucratizes Subjectivity through Moral Education. *Anthropology Quarterly*. Vol.73, Iss.3. p125

<sup>163</sup> Halloran, Richard. (1970). Japan: Images and realities- the inner dynamics of power in a nation of outward change. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company. p28

<sup>164</sup> Ibid. p28

<sup>165</sup> See Breton, A., Galeotti, G., Salmon, P. and Wintrobe, R. (eds). (1995). Nationalism and Rationality. USA: Cambridge University Press. p17; Lapid, Yosef and Kratochwil, Frederick. (ed). (1996). The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. pp 91-94, 169-171.

<sup>166</sup> This may include foreign trade options, political appendages and an internationally compatible image.

benefit for the country. After the period of isolation the Japanese pursued a more internationalist line of policy which in tandem with many other countries of the time. Japan had begun to interact with visiting people and increased her market profile with its newly created government adopting much of its knowledge from European models.

Even during this prosperous period of liberalisation Japan still failed to entice the US into the Japanese market, even though they had previously shown interest within the region. This modernisation, referred to above as the Meiji Restoration led Japan to enter into treaties with Western powers and encouraged the conduct of affairs in a way which was more internationalist and Western with regard to diplomacy. These interactions were based on the feverish development of nationalism within Japan, as well as a growing national identity among the Japanese. 1871-73 saw travel to Europe by Japanese for educational reasons. Japan began to open embassies in Europe, prompted by a court noble, Iwakura Tomomi. This led to a much-enhanced state of relations between Japan and Europe. Perhaps more importantly, the embassies exposed the people of Europe to the Japanese. These relations were very important for promoting Japan's international status during the early twentieth century and denote the rise of a national consciousness the aided the transformation of Japanese civil society and encouraging further bilateral relations with Europe. Narratives of history suggest this to be a balance between an innate impulse to be regarded as an empire within Asia but equally, to distinguish itself from "...backwards Asian neighbours... [who were] not capable of attaining modern citizenship"<sup>167</sup>. This was not a case of *dastu-a nyu-o* (abandoning Asia and joining the

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<sup>167</sup>Hashikawa, Bunso. (1980). Japanese perspectives on Asia: from dissociation to coprosperity. In Iriye, Akira. (ed). *The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays on Political and Cultural Interaction*: Princeton University Press. pp331-41.

West)<sup>168</sup>, nor does this symbolise a simple infatuation or recognition of Western superiority. In an objective sense there was no other path that Japan could take. This view is contrary to many historical scholars from Europe and the US who seek to show the West to have had greater impact on Asia than more insightful narratives, discussed later, would suggest.

Under the frame of Identity, Japanese Foreign Minister Kono, Yohei among others scholars cite *Genji monogatari*<sup>169</sup> or in English, *The Tale of Genji* by Murasaki Shikibu to be the greatest work of Japanese literature because of its symbolic and representational nature<sup>170</sup>. With regard to the political narratives of Japan, *The Tale of Genji* provides an epic account unravelling the superiority of Japanese civilisation and the strength of the Japanese nation<sup>171</sup>. The Tale shows the representational beginning of Japanese history in a modern sense, unleashed from Chinese culture and modelled on Japanese traditions<sup>172</sup>. This highlighted the initial willingness to assert her position within international circles. As Japan flourished she went through many transitory stages, marked by long centuries of isolation punctuated by rare but significant burst of foreign influence. Japanese familiarity with the Chinese language provided access to a rich source of lexical

<sup>168</sup> Shinichi, Kitaoka. (1998). Japan's Identity and What It Means. Chapter 2 [http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/research\\_e/seminar1/conversation.htm](http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/research_e/seminar1/conversation.htm)

<sup>169</sup> *The Tale of Genji* composed by Murasaki, Shikibu (Family name written first in accordance with Japanese custom) becoming the first Japanese book to be translated into other languages. Copies in English can be found by Arthur Waley- translated 1925-1933, published in 1935; and later by Edward G. Siedensticker published in 1976.

<sup>170</sup> Kono, Yohei. (2000). Europe of today: achieving dynamic change while remaining true to long traditions. *French Institute of Foreign Affairs*, Paris. *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan*. (Speech: January 13, 2000). France.

<sup>171</sup> Williams, David. (1996). *Japan and the Enemies of Open Political Science*, London: Routledge. p33

<sup>172</sup> Kono, Yohei. (2000). Europe of today: achieving dynamic change while remaining true to long traditions. *French Institute of Foreign Affairs*, Paris. *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan*. (Speech: January 13, 2000). France.

borrowing, and classical Chinese has continued to play this role similar to that performed by the Ancient Greek and Latin in Europe. Custom and religion gave way to the creation of a Japanese national identity and an evolving, strengthening nation of like-minded people.

Europe underwent numerous trials of leadership and internal issues throughout the middle ages. Land battles and religious wars were rampant but still, at a rapid pace, Europe developed into and became recognised as one of the most advanced regions in the world. Still both Japan and Europe struggled to find their place in the world. The influence of Dutch merchants discussed above, did without doubt innovate Japan. Japanese encounters and contacts with the West and Western rapid progression made her the first non-Western country to embark on the process of modernisation. Religion will also be discussed as a contributing factor to EU – Japan relations. Different religious frameworks in this case overall strengthened relations rather than deterred them.

### **3.2 Early Encounters: EUROPE**

In the case of Europe a multitude of nations must be taken into account, yet only an overall historical account may be given. When reviewing European continental history a starting point for analysis is difficult. This paper does not intend to go into such depths, the Ancient Romans and Greeks for example, but instead broadly conceptualises a concise version of history. Europe began primarily with factionary elite-rulers such as religious leaders, and men of science, law and the arts. Over the past 2000 years, and especially since the Renaissance, three features of European life became primarily distinctive: the pervasive pressure and promotion of Christianity (in faith and in ritual building structures across the lands); the rise of an economy that promotes trade and urbanism; and the growth of pan-European expressions in architecture, literature and

music<sup>173</sup>. All of these have created lines of association between the many countries of Europe. 'Europe' has always been more of a mental construct than a geographical or social entity and only in the late eighteenth century did a consciousness of being 'European' truly begin to exist within the wider community<sup>174</sup>. This consciousness can be attributed to the conquests of Napoleon stimulating national identities, and ultimately trans-national awareness. The Greek goddess '*Europa*' was the symbol of future hope but also of ever-present danger, and guided Europe through its histories. In 1950, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and later the European Economic Community (EEC) signified the economic and political realities that were to become the European Union of today.

### 3.3 "NATIONALISM"

The Nineteenth Century saw Europe preoccupied with balance of power initiatives between states. Accredited to this period of relative peace, Europe became self-absorbed and left the market in Japan untapped. The Japanese still looked to Europe as a mentor in maritime matters and medicine, but without much reciprocity. Europeans believed that balance of power policies prevented the emergence of any dominant state or hegemony and therefore discouraged alliances and controlling factions at the time. Consequently, an inward focused European region paid little or no interest in Asia. This did not immediately affect how Japan saw Europe. Conversely it appears that the Japanese perception of the West was considered neither good nor bad intrinsically. Europe and the US pragmatically remained an object of emulation for Japan. Therefore, the nature of

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<sup>173</sup> Tarschys, Daniel. (2002). Promoting Cohesion: The Role of the European Union, Paper for the ARENA Conference, Oslo 4 March, 2002.

<sup>174</sup> McCormack, John. (2005). (ed.3). Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction. New York: Palgrave. Introduction.



relations between Japan and Europe was thus characterized as one-sided and non-ideological during the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Even with this assertion we cannot assume that Japan was simply emulating Western philosophies—this would be somewhat overstating the situation. Instead, perhaps it was pure *rationalism* that paved the way for the acceptance of European techniques by the people of Japan. The Japanese had everything to gain in this case, and the action can thus be considered as a rational choice.

Nationalism and the motives accrued to patriotism have been abundantly researched. State-ism in this case demands that all Japanese subjects obey and serve the state as the highest object of their allegiance. Whilst lessons from the West seem unavoidable, nationalist feeling was ethnic in nature and centred on commonality. Fukuzawa<sup>175</sup> described Japanese enlightenment as a process of entrepreneurship that prescribed Japan's departure from the East, perhaps reflecting that of the West<sup>176</sup>. This seems to be a more probable analysis of relations between East and West, but leans toward the analogy of the East being tutored by an unaware teacher.

Asia is comprised of a multitude of different races, languages, traditions and histories, which have been further complicated by invasion. The course of history would suffice that all of these interactions have moulded images within a country and toward countries. It is a process of Western ideology to take the view that most bicultural interactions are

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<sup>175</sup> Fukuzawa, Yukichi was one of the most respected writers on Japanese modernisation during the Meiji period. Fukuzawa's work is often quoted in secondary research about Japan and her external relations and his writing should be read when discussing early Japanese transitions.

<sup>176</sup> Inoguchi, Takashi. (ed). (2002). *Japan's Asian Policy: Revival and Response*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p2

positive because of 'us' and if these interactions are negative, it is because of 'them'<sup>177</sup>. These perceptions then have a direct result on current inter-regional relations that then affects the nature of any one relationship. This is not to reject that Western ideals are not compatible with Asian values rather that these factors feed back into the international system, in this case the independent relationship between two regions. These early interactions fuel the idea of promoting education both in Japan and Europe, looking to a changing world of how people and cultures *feel*<sup>178</sup> about these changes and what they have in common. This will be discussed later in the paper relevant to the Joint Declaration 1991 and Action Plan 2001.

Japanese development initiatives flourished in the early 1930s to combat the Great Depression and as a result of the end of World War One (WWI). Unfortunately, Europe and Japan relations slumped during this period, as individualism became a complaint across the European continent. At this point the commitment of Japan to co-operate in the Anti-Comintern Pact 1936 against international communism with Germany, and the Tripartite Pact with Italy and Germany 1940, closely aligned Japan to fascist power states. This not only upset the burgeoning relations between Europe and Japan but also gave rise to international complications. This bond between Japan and fascist Europe<sup>179</sup> distressed Western Europe and weakened pro-Japanese relations. The United States also showed discontent and influenced the US decision to freeze all Japanese assets in 1941. In short, Japan can be characterised as a fragile global community at this juncture. In 1940 the Japanese still occupy Manchuria and invade Indochina with the intent of

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<sup>177</sup> Wendt, Alexandar. (1994). Collective Identity Formation and the International State. *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 88. pp384-396

<sup>178</sup> Emotional words are not usually used to depict a circumstance under and international relations framework, but this case can be justified by the governing theme of this thesis—identity—and emotions are a direct expression of values and beliefs.

opening a passage through South East Asia (SEA) and increasing its global identity while consolidating a position of power in the world. The US and Europe acted quickly to protect South East Asian states and installed a total embargo upon all Japanese merchandise to protect the independence of these small Asian nation states. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1940 further compounded an already tense situation which would affect the memory of the international community for decades to come.

WWII and the period of reconstruction following this was an era of considerable psychological and geographical distance between the two regions of Europe and Japan. The World Wars of the Twentieth Century were dynamic turning points in global international relations concerning national identity formation and regional security. In 1945 the effects of the Nagasaki and Hiroshima nuclear bombings rendered Japanese self-confidence sub-level<sup>180</sup>, or what Itoh refers to as an “inferiority complex toward the West”<sup>181</sup>. It was a nation whose image had been discredited<sup>182</sup> and the US occupation ensured that under the new Constitution of Japan the initiation of war would be impossible<sup>183</sup>. Likewise this must be considered in the nature of relations between the EU and Japan—the perceived identity of each region was one of zero-sum. The Japanese faced a futile situation. The occupation of Japan by the US lasted for a period of seven years with the Japanese government losing all control and the Emperor being stripped of power. All efforts became focused on the recovery and reconstruction of Japan under the benevolent watch of the United States. Like many other bilateral relations, Japan and the

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<sup>180</sup> Halloran, Richard. (1970). *Japan: Images and realities- the inner dynamics of power in a nation of outward change*. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company. p191-192

<sup>181</sup> Itoh, Mayumi. (2000). *Globalization of Japan*. New York: St. Martins Press. pp61-62.

<sup>182</sup> Inoguchi, Takashi. (1991). *Japan's International Relations*. USA: Westview Press, Inc. p42

<sup>183</sup> Inoguchi, Takashi. (1993). *Japan's Foreign Policy in an era of Global Change*. New York: St. Martins Press. p184

US's modern day relationship became interconnected with the legacy of war<sup>184</sup>. Symbolised by mistrust the US occupied Japan for 10 years and in late 1955 after the withdrawal of US forces from the island nation EU and Japan relations remained contingent on US foreign policy decisions.

### **3.4 A PERIOD OF REBUILDING**

The way in which Japan resurrected its statehood after the defeat of WWII can be explained by economic factors to become Asia's first newly industrialised nation. The US government had guaranteed the security of Japan during its immediate occupations enabling the Japanese to focus their energy almost exclusively on economic redevelopment. This economic strength has since helped consecutive Japanese governments maintain a high level of civil legitimacy and public support during this growth period. Notably, this continued to increase Japan's international profile.

During the post WW2 period, national work ethics combined with traditional values were consolidated. Japan experienced rapid internal growth and focused on the community's role to achieve success during the twenty years from 1950. This demonstrates examples of how collectivity in socio-political structures can benefit a group. With the onset of the Cold War, Japan became a useful protégé for the US in East Asia as a "bulwark against Communism"<sup>185</sup>, and also contributed to Japan's acknowledgment of the European

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<sup>184</sup> Maull, Hanns.W. (1990/91). Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers. Foreign Affairs. The Council of Foreign Relations. (Winter 1990/91).  
<http://www.stage.foreignaffairs.org/19901201faessay6053/hanns-w-maull/germany-and-japan-the-new-civilian-powers.html>

<sup>185</sup> Nakamura, Takafusa. (1980). The Post-war Japanese Economy: Its development and Structure, Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. p85

Economic Community<sup>186</sup>. In Europe, at the same time, the six founding nations of the ECSC had agreed on the idea of a Free Trade Area (FTA) between its members. European countries resisted calls from the US to allow Japan to develop economically within the new economic fora such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)<sup>187</sup>. The process of reconstituting a Japanese national identity became evident in the 1980s with a desire to be “recognised and liked”<sup>188</sup>. The Japanese ambition to take on more global responsibility arose in 1988 when the administration of former Prime Minister Takashit Noburo announced the International Co-operation Initiative listing three foreign policy areas that Japan would emphasis. These were cooperation for World peace; quantitative and qualitative Official Development Aid (ODA); the promotion of international exchanges<sup>189</sup>.

While in the East Japan was on a path of reconstruction, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman envisioned a European community; “...an undertaking of a common task...not to negotiate for our own national advantage, but to seek that advantages of all”<sup>190</sup>. This European project also arose from the ravages of WWII and was a way to boost the

<sup>186</sup> A ‘bulwark of Communism’ is often used to explain the American occupation of Japan pursuant to the objective of demilitarisation. It has been argued that Japan became a protégé for the US in East Asia to safeguard against Communism. See: Cardwell, Paul.J. (2004). The EU-Japan Relationship: from mutual ignorance to meaningful partnership? *Journal of European Affairs*. Vol.2, No.2. (May, 2004) [www.europeananalysis.org.uk](http://www.europeananalysis.org.uk); Gordon, Bill. (May 2000). The Allied Occupation of Japan. <http://wgordon.web.wesleyan.edu/papers/alliedoc.htm>

<sup>187</sup> Daniels, Gordon. ‘Japan in the post-War World- between Europe and the United States’. In G. Daniels and Drift, Reinhart. (eds). (1986). *Europe and Japan: Changing Relationships since 1945*, Norbury: Ashford. p14

<sup>188</sup> Blackburn, Paul., Unger, Danny., Rienner, Lynne. (1993). *Japan’s Emerging Role as a Global Actor*. Institute for the Study of Diplomacy: Boulder. p37. Note: the author justifies the use of this phrase in academia with a methodological move away from traditions of the world as a self-help system by categorising Japan as a nation wanting to enhance its role in international affairs just to “feel good” as a nation.

<sup>189</sup> Blackburn, P., Unger, Danny., Rienner, Lynne. (1993). *Japan’s Emerging Role as a Global Actor*. Institute for the Study of Diplomacy: Boulder. p55

<sup>190</sup> Pascal, Fontaine. A new idea for Europe: The Schuman Declaration. [http://ec.europa.eu/comm/publications/booklets/eu\\_documentation/04/txt\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/publications/booklets/eu_documentation/04/txt_en.pdf)

economy of Europe and re-unite the disjointed nations of Europe. Monnet and Schuman persuaded six leading countries in Europe<sup>191</sup> to an internal focus, but one with an optimistic future. Whilst this six-nation focus was essentially introverted, group identity was being constructed. The creation of the first European community, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 1951, saw economic cohesion begin to take shape, giving the six nations an avenue to achieve economic growth. *The Treaty of Rome* established the European Economic Community (EEC) and from 1 January 1958 this included common institutions and decision-making structures. In this sense the internal interests of member states and of the Community gave a stronger voice to the group. This was unique and not comparable to any other framework of the time. The new six-member Community was to delegate sovereignty to common institutions to represent the Union, which would then function on matters of joint interest.

Japan entered into a phase of high-growth in their economy through the 1960s. In 1963 the European Commission submitted to the Council proposals for a common commercial policy towards Japan through the Kennedy Round talks<sup>192</sup>. Although progress was made by way of tariff reductions between Japan and the European Community, the process of liberalisation of trade at the Community level remained low despite the mandate for the Commission to engage in direct negotiations with Japan. Bilateral negotiations between the EC and Japan remained but hopes were increased with Japan's entry into the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) late in 1963. The 1964 Tokyo Olympics provided an impetus for further economic development and a chance to prove Japan's value to the world. Huge infrastructure investments in Tokyo created employment, spending and included the construction of a bullet train

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<sup>191</sup> Namely: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands

<sup>192</sup> Report on Trade Relations between the Six and Japan, *European Parliament working Documents*. Document No.212. (February 2, 1970)

(*shinkansen*) system between Tokyo and Osaka. The bullet train stood as a symbol of Japanese innovation remains so today. With the cancellation of the Tokyo Olympics scheduled in 1940 due to WWII, the 1964 Olympics gave Japan an opportunity to show the world its resilience and symbolised the acceptance of Japan back into the international community.

Throughout the economic boom of the 1960s and 1970s Japan - EC relations continued to be indifferent. A special relationship, a rather less-bitter association between Japan and the US began to prosper, motivated by the importance attributed to trade and security. As time advanced and the international tensions of the Cold War subsided Japan benefited from a restructured national economy and trade capability. A need for Japan to seek new trading partners arose due to export restrictions in certain industrial sectors of the US economy. Balance of trade issues still remained a point of fierce contention between the trio of the EU, US and Japan, even today. Until the 1980s, however, the political (and security) cooperation between the European Community and Japan (such as their attempts to achieve coordinated approach to the Iranian and Afghan crises) remained underdeveloped and conducted on an ad hoc basis. In contrast it was economics that defined the exclusive nature of EU and Japan relations during this period.

Whilst Japan looked at alternative markets, the success of Japan depended largely on the capacity and willingness of the US to absorb Japan's huge export of manufactured goods without demanding a similar balance of trade<sup>193</sup>. The US assumed this leniency was in exchange for Japanese co-operation and support in the containment of communism (which Japan had vowed support)<sup>194</sup>. Japanese industrialisation became targeted and

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<sup>193</sup> This was later to become a part of the US framing Japan as a 'free-rider'.

<sup>194</sup> Gao, Bai. (1997). *Economic Ideology and Japanese Industrial Policy*. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. pp302-4



specific in their export products, rather than exporting a wide array of goods as was the case previously: this industrial and specialised focus became their driving force<sup>195</sup>. Japan began to enter into regular meetings at ministerial levels with the European Community but this proved to be largely tokenism. The significance of a supranational Europe coincided with the beginning of economic and social recovery in Europe. This inspired the formation of a single market and an open free trade stance. Simultaneously, structural reforms were being undertaken in Japan by closely monitored by the US. Both Japan and Europe succeeded in restructuring economically; both were consumed in their own form of state building leaving little time for each other. Bilateral relations between individual member states and Japan remained minimal and as such discouraged the pursuit of political ties at the higher level, leaving Japan conditionally reliant up on the US.

The EU and Japan agreed in 1974 to the establishment of a European Commission Delegation in Tokyo with full diplomatic privileges and immunities, similar European Commission Washington-based delegation in the US. This created a formal and permanent avenue for the EU and Japan to liaise and constituted the first official diplomatic association between the two.

Japan began to seek exposure in international markets during this time, reflecting industrial proficiency. The Japanese industrial focus was facilitated primarily through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) initiatives, but as will be discussed in Chapters Four and Five, misunderstandings between Japan and the EC led to difficulties throughout the 1970s and 1980s with each blaming the other for making too few attempts to agree on areas of highlighted interest. Briefly, the EC became antagonised by Japanese protectionism and their reluctance to respond to European concerns, whilst the Japanese

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<sup>195</sup> Ibid. pp92-94. Gao provides the case and example of the motor vehicle as a specialised industry.

became caught up a translational battle of words plagued by misinterpretations which will be discussed. During the 1980s Europe receive vast benefit from market operations on a continental scale, but also realised policy agendas towards Japan may have been over-reactive with regard to the cited problems of cultural and language differences that previously stagnated interactions. The 1980s as such symbolised a turning point and much needed understanding in EU – Japan relations.

The end of the Cold War represented a significant turning point in the nature of relations between the Japan and the US. A re-evaluation of global security issues and fundamental international concerns were inevitable. Both Japan and the European Community independently revised their American-centric policies promoting an increase in the number of transactions involving non-state actors. The small but vital inclusion of state actors assisted this transformation and resulted in a surge of business relations between the Community and Japan enhancing political ties. With the collapse of the economic, political and military sectors in the Soviet block, (symbolised by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989) US policymakers had reduced motivation and rationale for making concessions and trade-offs with Japan. Bilateral dialogue between Japan and the European Community had previously been contingent on US foreign policy. Extraordinary arguments from Maull and Drifte<sup>196</sup> foresaw closer political relations between the European Community and Japan given the relative decline of the US. This relationship was premature and unrealistic due to global perceptions of the time especially when identity, language barriers and the international stigma attached to WWII memories of Japan were abundant.

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<sup>196</sup> Maull and Drifte (1999). in Abe, Atsuko. (1999). *Japan and the European Union: Domestic Politics and Translational Relations*. London: The Athlone Press. pp120-121

### **3.5 HISTORICAL SUMMARY**

The nature of relations between Japan and the EU from 1500 to the early 1980s is difficult to condense. This chapter has summarised a series of events that have contributed to the respective identities of the EU and Japan and conveyed the hurdles that have impeded the route both parties have taken independently, regionally, multilaterally and bilaterally. The relationship has been marred by isolation policies, World Wars, economic booms and depressions, and consequently the relationship has flowed and ebbed. As the Cold War dominated the later part of the Twentieth Century both economic and political contact began between the EU and Japan but ultimately resulted in an alignment with American-centric foreign policy. This period of relations was fraught with misunderstanding between this trio of economic superpowers with complaints predominantly interregional. Tensions appeared to be relative to the different political cultures of each group, and due conflicting national values shaped by past experience. During this later period, both the EU and Japan continued to emphasise and solidify their respective relationships with the US, thus obscuring each other. It was accepted that the US and Japan would remain security partners, even in the absence of threat from the Soviet Union (this decision was based primarily on Europe's inability to contribute to regional security in Asia.) Due to the non-reciprocity of interest in Europe, ministerial meetings between the regions had little effect.

Multilateral institutions became a prominent factor during the 1980s and brought Japan, the Community and the US together via G7 Ministerial level meetings. The G7 sought joint co-operative action in isolated regions of mutual interest via multilateral institutions and moved towards to closer relations via the international agenda. Japan was awarded an opportunity to take an assertive role in foreign activities but the ad hoc style of

negotiations consumed political relations rather than systematic policy co-ordinations. The G7 was nonetheless a meeting ground of nations with a common schedule of global commitment, which contributed to an understanding between the EU and Japan. The extemporised nature of EU and Japan relations throughout these summits opened a framework of communication and in return to the signing of the Joint Declaration 1991. The Joint Declaration is the symbolic cornerstone of current relations between the EC and Japan and was paramount to the path Japan and the EC would take in the following decade.

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## PART THREE

### Theoretical concepts applied

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## CHAPTER FOUR

### WHO ARE YOU?, WHO ARE WE?, WHO ARE THEY?<sup>197</sup>

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#### 4.0 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Part Three of this research merges the theoretical context of the Four Point Plan and the Analytic Narrative. Chapters Four and Five are guided by the underlying theme of identity as a socio-political framework. The methodology of this study allows the use of the Four Point Plan and the Analytic Narrative to investigate the relationship between the EU and Japan on an observable level where stereotyping, perception and ‘stories’<sup>198</sup> are apparent. Both of these frameworks are case specific to the Joint Declaration 1991 and the Action Plan 2001 where each document is analysed by the method of each framework to extract a clear understanding of evolving EU and Japan relations domestically, regionally and internationally.

International relations theory and the traditional articulations of rational choice as a framework have become outdated and inappropriate. The rational choice Analytic Narrative concept has bridged economic and political traditions, distinguishable by the interpretive and qualitative approach that is different from previous international relations discourse. Drawing attention to interactions between cultures allows international

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<sup>197</sup> Tilly, Charles. (2003). Political Identities in Changing Polities. *Social Research*. Vol.70, Iss.2. (Summer, 2003). p3

<sup>198</sup> Ibid. p3

relations theory to extrapolate beyond the established boundaries of the discipline<sup>199</sup>. A Western worldview of such an idea would assert that the rational man as an individual is central, viewing nature as something to be mastered. The Western model of rational choice is driven from a self-serving stance. From a Japanese perspective, a rational choice is something that works for the greater benefit of the community and that to do otherwise would lead to the loss of man's livelihood<sup>200</sup>. Rational choice theory indicates that a group weighs costs and benefits making decisions accordingly. Looking at the decisions made through the duration of the Joint Declaration 1991 and Action Plan 2001, the Analytic Narrative breaks down and observes how the goals and perceptions of the EU and Japan are interpreted.

#### 4.1 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF IDENTITY IN PRACTISE

All the world's a stage,

And all the men and woman merely players.

They have their exits and entrances,

And one man in his time plays many parts.<sup>201</sup>

Identity is something to which each of us subscribe, each individual being characterised in a different manner, by different communities, needs and experiences. As Shakespeare appropriately highlights, we are all actors in a global 'play' with our roles open to shift and change thus affecting the images that we then convey and decisions that are made.

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<sup>199</sup> Little, Richard. International Relations and large-scale historical change. in: Groom, A.J.R., and Light, Margot. (ed). (1994). *Contemporary International Relations: A guide to Theory*. London: Pinter Publishers. p9

<sup>200</sup> The Economist. (2005b). China the Key to Asian Peace. Vol.374, No.8419 (March 26). p36

<sup>201</sup> Shakespeare, William. *As you like it*. (2.7, 139-142): First preformed 1600, but printed in 1623.

The Merriam-Webster online dictionary<sup>202</sup> elaborates further in defining the concept of *identity* as, “the collective aspect of a set of characteristics by which a thing is defined as recognisable...known in the first instance” and secondly as, “The set of behavioural or personal characteristics by which an individual is recognisable as a member of a group”<sup>203</sup>. The way in which identity is perceived by outside individuals or groups is subject to a series of external indicators thus creating images<sup>204</sup>. By shedding rhetorical and propaganda-loaded statements we are able to show a deeper insight to the direction and intention of international relations. Sensationalist literatures, even from reputable current affairs magazines such as *The Economist*, also fuel the formation of these images. This is observable by the branding of Japan as “a lion’s roar”<sup>205</sup>, Japan and China as “The tortoise and the hare”<sup>206</sup>. Likewise in academic studies for example, the US is depicted as an “800-pound Gorilla”<sup>207</sup>. Recognising how identity frames a person or group and their judgements, and how identities cast shadow over important concepts are integral to understanding both interaction and reaction on a bilateral level. Charles Tilly’s approach to this is that “the line between *us* and *them* must fall”<sup>208</sup> or at least one must decipher why that line exists. Sometimes images are captured wrongly by misleading information or assumption, but if the barriers that lead us to these concerns are overcome then qualitative assessment becomes possible. Identity can be formed both intentionally and unintentionally; it is the former that is often the case in bicultural analysis. As such the

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<sup>202</sup> [www.m-w.com](http://www.m-w.com)

<sup>203</sup> [www.dictionary.com](http://www.dictionary.com), search word: ‘Identity’

<sup>204</sup> Defined as: ‘A mental conception held in common by members of a group and symbolic of a basic attitude and orientation’. ([www.m-w.com](http://www.m-w.com))

<sup>205</sup> *The Economist*. (2005e). The Bravery of Junichiro Koizumi. Vol.376. No.8439 (Aug 13). p25

<sup>206</sup> *The Economist*. (2005g). The Sun also Rises. Vol.377, No. 8447. p11.

<sup>207</sup> Kaslow, Amy. (2002). Asia: US Hard Line Moves Many Nations Closer to the EU. *Europe*. Iss.419. (September, 2002). p27

<sup>208</sup> Tilly, Charles. (Summer, 2003) Political Identities in Changing Polities. *Social Research*. Vol.70, Iss.2. p2



framework of identity needs to be more deeply immersed into the study of international relations.

Charles Tilly offers a framework by which a comprehensive set of questions provide a common theme around the internal and external barriers related to identity, and thus the role that identity plays in bilateral agreements. Tilly analyses images of the EU and Japan from an internal perspective looking outward and from an external point looking inward to establish the vision and intent of the Joint Declaration 1991 and the Action Plan 2001. An accurate comprehension of ‘Who are you?’, ‘Who are we?’ and, ‘Who are they?’<sup>209</sup> helps focus Tilly’s Four Point framework to understand the key actors. This is similar to the conjecture of Margaret Levi et. al.’s Analytic Narrative<sup>210</sup> where the actors are established and their goals and perceptions form the basis of analysis.

Organised to review sub-themes within the primary documents presented, this chapter analyses the bilateral impact of identity. Internal and external perception aligns the motives of Japan and Europe at the point of entrance to these pacts and will be balanced by how each group views itself, and how others view it. The core difficulty in analysing perception is the gap between the perceiver and the perceived<sup>211</sup>; hence this research strives to broadly encompass both the internal view of each group through the scope of Charles Tilly’s Four Point Plan. Previous political scholars have placed little importance on frameworks of identity, especially within the scope of bilateral relations, tending

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<sup>209</sup> Tilly, Charles. (2003). *Political Identities in Changing Politics*. Social Research. Vol.70, Iss.2. (Summer 2003); Lapid, Yosef and Kratochwil, Frederick. (eds). (1996). *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p51

<sup>210</sup> Levi, Margaret., Bates, Robert., Greif, Avner., Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent., and Weingast, Barry. (1998). *Analytic Narratives*. Princeton: Princeton University Press

<sup>211</sup> Williams, David. (1996). *Japan and the Enemies of Open Political Science*. London: Routledge. p17

towards more traditional political and economic methods of analysis; this research finds this approach lacks insight. Identity is a key indicator in a social context by the stigmatisation of an actor and their position within global affairs. By recognising that these social hurdles can have political implications, the Four Point Plan becomes a viable framework of situational analysis.

In any intellectual study variables must be identified and their contributions discussed. In this case the power of the US and the emergence of China reside as contributors in the global society context. In a trilateral sense, the US provided a thorn in the side of EU-Japan relations during earlier decades, most notable through the late 1980s and early 1990s. The US plays a significant role within the scope of both regional and interregional affairs between the EU and Japan, yet the past identification of the US as a global hegemon and protector changed at the end of the Cold War as too did the identity attributed to the nation. A shift in the way international actors view the US evolved considerably through the 1990's and more so at the turn of the century with the first and second Gulf Wars, Afghanistan and Iraq respectively. The identity attributed to the US through the eyes of the world, has been altered in a political, and security sense. This is in part due to the unilateralist actions taken by the US when multilateralism and discussion (rather than force alone) was the preferred management technique at this time. With the US slumping in popularity<sup>212</sup>, the increasing presence of economic China, and the bumptious Chinese<sup>213</sup> demanding to enter the international community Japan's economy slowed at the turn of the century. Perceptions play a crucial role in the subsequent effect

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<sup>212</sup> Nye, Joseph.S Jr. US power and strategy after Iraq, Foreign Affairs July-August 2003. Vol.82. No.4, Japan Today (online) Saturday 16 October 2004  
<http://www.japantoday.com/jp/news/315726>

<sup>213</sup> The Economist. (2005g). p11. The Sun also Rises. Vol.377, No. 8447 (Oct 18) - An example of image characterisation in academia

China will have on the EU's relationship with Japan in Asia. An extemporary article in *The Economist* written by editor, Bill Emmott, resorts to an analogy to summarise the relationship of China and Japan<sup>214</sup>. Emmott superimposes a Japanese tortoise and Chinese hare scenario, implying therefore that slow and steady will win the race, not just in fable<sup>215</sup>. The question arises as to which pace, slow and steady, or fast and loud does the international community prefer? Will China become the new economic miracle that once Japan was? Observations and interpretations of high level and ministerial level meetings provide a comparative outlet to show the ebbing nature of EU - Japan relations.

This section does not attempt to correlate information as a statistical comparison nor a quantitative influence as more traditional and empirical scientists would prefer. What this chapter does intend to do is outline the boundaries which separate these two groups, while providing a stepping stone in academic research to incorporate a humanistic variable, identity, in the study of international relations giving an observable and ethically adept interpretations of historical fact. The concept of identity when applied to the EU and Japan shows distinct areas of misperception often due to parallels stereotyping.

## 4.2 NATIONAL IDENTITY BUILDING

When discussing the identity of a *nation* (Japan) or a *group* (in this case the EU) a definition is required at the outset. While a definition for identity was provided earlier in this chapter, Walker Connor's definition of a nation is very specific. Connor classifies a nation, the largest grouping that believes they are ancestrally determined<sup>216</sup>. In

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<sup>214</sup>Ibid. pp11, 3-18

<sup>215</sup>Ibid. p11

<sup>216</sup> Connor, Walker. (1994). *Ethnonationalism: The quest for understanding*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p90-117

international relations this *nation* would also have to be recognised by other nations for this assumption to be true. Alternatively, Connor prescribes a *group* as independent nations of an arguably supranational system such as that of the EU<sup>217</sup> supported by two phenomena, i) acting together, towards a common goal, and ii) being acted upon together as members of a common group<sup>218</sup>. The intrinsic theme is that both a *group* and *nation* require acknowledgement of such by a third actor, thus identity, stereotyping and perception are external contributors. Ted Hoft is also at the forefront of linking the social theoretical construction of identity to foreign policy. Hoft argues that in order to understand another state's foreign policy decisions they must first understand themselves.<sup>219</sup> Both Connor and Hoft link the theme of identity to the perceptions a group hold about the other and thus ties the central assumptions of this thesis.

For the purpose of this study national identity is created through the interplay of socio-political conditions and shifting perceptions. For Japan the threat of Western power predate the 'closing of Japan' or (*Sakoku* period) and as a cliché from the post WWII times of East emulating West, intellectuals in Japan strived to generate a national community through the creation of a group identity. The thickening of commonalities amongst the Japanese encouraged the country to rally around nationalism to avoid foreign domination. Under the feudalist system each domain in Japan enjoyed relatively autonomous power. There was no conception of 'Japanese' being a single distinctive race, group, or people. The threat from outside precipitated the creation of a national

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<sup>217</sup> This thesis does not attempt to delve into the debate over which system more concisely summarises the EU, supra national or intergovernmental, that is an area of research that would deserve much greater insights. For the purpose of this study I contend the EU to be a group under the prescription given by Connor.

<sup>218</sup> Connor, Walker. (1994). *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for understanding*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp90-117

<sup>219</sup> Hopf, Ted. (1998). *The Promise of Constructivism in International Politics*. *International Security*. V.23. No.1. pp171-200

identity and led to the development of nationalism. In Japan, a discourse of internationalisation and external identity has arisen over the past two decades. Japanese people were encouraged to be more knowledgeable of foreign languages and customs as a part of this international framework and Japanese corporations became more integrated, responsible players on the world stage. A global identity became observable— Japanese: a language and people with customs, histories and traditions— yet, the modern civilisation was built to complement the global community. This sense of understanding was recognised to pursue a nationalist drive within the greater economic and trading sector, and was reinforced by the lifetime company employment scheme, seniority pay increments and a fully functioning labour force. Japan, by its economic and technological achievements, both as an expression of public policy and private enterprise has redefined its image into a social and mental reality. Simultaneously, there has arisen a movement promoting hometown community spirit, an important step in consolidating the Japanese psyche. In increasingly urbanised and atomised Japanese neighbourhoods, municipal governments have attempted to foster greater community spirit through the promotion of festivals that celebrate ‘togetherness’ and tradition while drawing upon folklore and history. Karen Cerulo highlights this in the case of Japan with the establishment of ‘Culture Day’, an annual event held on 3 November used by leaders to stimulate a blended interest in traditional Japanese culture and modern success<sup>220</sup>. This perhaps had a two-fold effect, highlighting national historical experience but also demonstrating a unique culture to foreign onlookers. Media such as newspapers, television and radio have been the link to outside events for several decades and despite this, large gaps remain in both Europe and Japan over the perception of each other’s societies. In Japan, literature asserts cultural identity has been influenced by a movement of “Americanised”

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<sup>220</sup> Cerulo, K.A. (1995). *Identity Designs: The Sights and Sounds of a Nation*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. p22

modernisation<sup>221</sup>, yet the nation has remained rooted in a desire to preserve some sense of traditional self-image, choosing to take and adapt modernisations for its own advantage—to ‘Japan-ise’ it<sup>222</sup>. These cultural influences have been absorbed by the scale and scope of bilateral negotiations between Japan and Europe, yet there still remains a serious imbalance of stereotyping images surrounding Japan<sup>223</sup>.

In the case of the EU, a much less orthodox approach was taken. The Treaty of Rome in 1957 initiated six nations of Europe in to an economic union to achieve self-satisfying and continental benefits. The novelty of this was enormous and has sustained fifty years of relative success with other nations in western, central and recently Eastern Europe united by way of the enlargement process. Growth in this sense broadened the scope and direction of this expanding group. James Coleman expresses this phenomenon, “When persons are treated as a group it may be rational to respond collectively because of spill over benefits”<sup>224</sup>. Not only was the European Community an economic group, but it was growing in political competencies. Nowadays, and for the purpose of this research the EU is awarded the status of a group of frequently likeminded nations acting (for the most part) as one. The challenge of identity building within the EU has been a troubling concept with member states unwilling, or at least apprehensive to relinquish certain

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<sup>221</sup> Richard, Storry. (1982). In. Tsoukalis, Loukas., and White, Maureen. (eds). (1982). *Japan and Western Europe*. London: Frances Pinter (Publishers). p10

<sup>222</sup> James, Barrie. (1990). *Trojan Horse*. London: Mercury Books. pp144-145

<sup>223</sup> Of interest, yet not crucial to the central focus of this thesis is a Google search engine result of the keywords ‘Japan, stereotyping images’, and then ‘EU stereotyping images’. While the first search provides over 4 million hits directly related to image, the EU search finds only gender-based reports rather than culture-based. The removal of false national stereotyping was reiterated by former British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook “The whole point of the European ideal is to get away from crude national stereotyping” in response to a comment made by Silvio Berlusconi in 2003: *The International Herald Tribune*, July 5, 2003.

<sup>224</sup> Coleman, James. (1995). *Rights, Rationality, and Nationalism*, in: Breton, Albert., Galeotti, Gianluigi., Salmon. Pierre, and Wintrobe, Ronald. (eds). (1995). *USA: Nationality and Rationality*, USA: Cambridge University Press. p11

national privileges from which their group identity is inseparable in their mind. The current twenty-five member states of the EU are in constant dialogue to overcome these matters and it seems a constant flow of power is ascending to the various supranational institutions of the EU. In response to the lack of a 'single voice' dilemma, the EU's external image is in transition. The positive manner of this is confirmed by an improved international identity and presence through the group of regional and multiregional initiatives and by dialogue over common interests with other nations. This directly relates to the core assumptions of this research, that misperceptions are decreased by physical interaction with other cultures and communities.

For several decades, the transmission of information, both diplomatically and informally between Japan and Europe ultimately has dictated the formation of a less troubled relationship. However, there remains a large gap among the public in Europe and Japan and their knowledge and perception of each other's nations, movements and intentions. Part of this may stem from unique biases in the way the media depicts ordinary people. This is based on a belief that cultural differences are fundamental, a barrier that is unavoidable in context as DuPont explains, "one's own culture provides the lens through which they view the world..."<sup>225</sup> yet the model of the EU rejects nationalism, but not national identity. At the same time, the integration of Europe has added a new dimension to the continent's self image, notably a greater understanding and lenience in cross-cultural and multilingual negotiations. The increase in the breadth and depth of bilateral dialogue has been indicative of this and is also reflective in the quality of dialogue produced at bilateral and multilateral levels.

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<sup>225</sup> DuPont, M.E. (1996). Working on Common Cross-cultural Communications Challenges. [www.wwcd.org/action/ampu/crosscult.html#patterns](http://www.wwcd.org/action/ampu/crosscult.html#patterns)



Language is also synonymous with theories of identity. Perceptions, representation and interpretation of fact are manifested through the medium of language. Social science is quintessentially about mediating phenomena in context. Synonymous to identity, language plays an important role in the Four Point framework and is highlighted as a barrier that upon recognition can be overcome. The next section reviews Charles Tilly's Four Point Plan as a process to establish the boundaries that hinder relations between the EU and Japan.

#### 4.3 CHARLES TILLY: THE FOUR POINT IDENTITY PLAN

This section reviews the application of Tilly's Four Point Plan framework of identity content analysis<sup>226</sup> using the case example of the EU and Japan, specifically considering the Joint Declaration 1991 and the Action Plan 2001. This methodological preference provides an interpretive insight of comparative value to the nature of relations between the EU and Japan. Greater transparency is needed as this chapter analyses how stereotypes do influence the greater decision-making bodies within groups. The removal of the less favourable myths is an important step towards increased qualitative relations at all levels of society. Supporters of Japan guide their writing in such a manner, whereas there is a distinguishable group of detractors who are more critically placing emphasis on what *appears* different, or is unexplainable by their own cultural standards<sup>227</sup>. The multidisciplinary nature of the identity paradigm discussed by Tilly allows an all-encompassing review of bilateral relations interactions and the effect they have within domestic and international circles.

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<sup>226</sup> Tilly, Charles. (2003). Political Identities in Changing Polities. *Social Research*. Vol.70, Iss.2. p605

<sup>227</sup> Leitch, Richard.D Jr., Kato, Akira., and Weinstein, Martin.E. (1995). Japan's Role in the Post-Cold War World. *Contributions in Political Science*. No.361. USA: Greenwood Press. p xiii

Charles Tilly is an award-winning sociologist with expertise that resonates in politics, history and how societies change. Tilly's work investigates the fundamental questions about the nature of personal, political, and national identities and how this links to global interaction. As a social scientist, Tilly's work is bound by specific case studies and modern insights with the juxtaposition of different cultures in a comparative style. This combined method is politically pivotal and is integral to the study of bilateral relations. Tilly's research area is broad, his experience vast, and his writing well critiqued thus making the Four Point Plan an appropriately humanistic choice. Tilly's framework of analysis concisely integrates into the second theoretical review in this study, the rational choice Analytic Narrative by Levi et. al.'. Both frameworks provide an excellent outline to explore the nature of relations between the EU and Japan.

Below is a summary of the four components that bind Tilly's framework. Subsequently, each question is then extended to describe, explain and interpret the role it assumes within the nature of relations between the EU and Japan.

#### **The four components of Tilly's framework**

- |    |  |
|----|--|
| 1) | A boundary separating me from you, or us from them             |
| 2) | Set of relations within the boundary (Domestic)                |
| 3) | Set of relations outside the boundary (International)          |
| 4) | A set of <i>stories</i> about the boundaries and the relations |

Firstly, a description of the boundaries Tilly recognises as separating factors between the EU and Japan are outlined. These boundaries are observable and include geographical distance and regional concern, polarised ideological frameworks, the security situation,

culture and language. These barriers make up a large component of dialogue between the EU and Japan within the Joint Declaration 1991, and more manifestly within the context of the Action Plan 2001.

The second and third components of Tilly's framework observe the internal and external boundaries that separate. Historically, the period 1950 to 1970 indicate both the European Community and Japan focus their political attention to nation building, economic recovery and to a lesser extent, regional affairs, whereas the late 1970s and 1980s can be summarised as mutual ignorance. The end of the Cold War and reliance on the US security umbrella encouraged a more closed circuit international perspective from that established within the domestic boundaries.

Finally, Tilly's fourth point requires the establishment and evaluation of the '*stories*'<sup>228</sup> each actor believes pursuant to these boundaries. Tilly assumes the EU and Japan actually believe these *stories*, each group framing the other stereotypically. It is true that without established fora, these actors have ignored each other, as shown during the 1960s and 1970s. Without the benefit of bilateral interaction policies national identities are constructed by popular *stories*, rather than fact. Tilly's Four Point Plan shows the interconnections between political, economic and social areas. Images fluctuate and change as contact between the European Community and Japan grew. Throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s transparent forms of dialogue did not exist. The 1990s and the turn of the century showed an improved dialogue and a closer, more open interaction, an observable contrast. This change is correspondent to bilateral joint declarations signed

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<sup>228</sup> Tilly, Charles. (2003). Political Identities in Changing Politics. *Social Research*. Vol.70, Iss.2. (Summer 2003).

across all sectors of both the EU and Japan. The pretence of the Joint Declaration in 1991 facilitates discussion of how some of these boundaries are more importantly realised and overcome. While Tilly's emphasis is on the barriers that separate both actors, this thesis also explores the similarities.

(Figure 5)

**Summarising Tilly's Four Point Plan**

	<b>JAPAN</b>	<b>EU</b>
Boundaries that <b>Separate</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Geographical distance</li> <li>*Regional security threat</li> <li>*Language and communication</li> <li>*Tradition and ideology</li> <li>*Lifestyle desires</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>*Geographical distance</i></li> <li><i>*Regional security threat</i></li> <li><i>*Language and communication</i></li> <li><i>*Tradition and ideology</i></li> <li><i>*Lifestyle desires</i></li> </ul>
Set of Relations <b>Within</b> the Boundaries	<p><b>Political</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Ultra-nationalistic</li> <li>*Emperor &amp; Prime Minister</li> </ul> <p><b>Economic</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Hard work &amp; result orientated</li> <li>*Tight access to domestic industry</li> </ul> <p><b>Social</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Community Focus</li> <li>*Tradition &amp; Custom</li> </ul>	<p><b>Political</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>*3 Pillar/multilevel governance</i></li> <li><i>*National &amp; Supranational</i></li> </ul> <p><b>Economic</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>*Internal and external drivers</i></li> <li><i>*Good access to foreign ownership</i></li> </ul> <p><b>Social</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>*Individual Focus</i></li> <li><i>*Diversity</i></li> </ul>
Set of Relations <b>Outside</b> the Boundaries	<p><b>Political</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Joint Declaration, 1991</li> <li>*Action Plan, 2001</li> <li>*UN</li> </ul> <p><b>Economic</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*EUBRTD</li> <li>*RRD</li> <li>*WTO</li> </ul> <p><b>Social</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*People to people exchanges</li> <li>*Valcanus/ Exprom/ CIR</li> </ul>	<p><b>Political</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>*Joint Declaration, 1991</i></li> <li><i>*Action Plan, 2001</i></li> <li><i>*UN</i></li> </ul> <p><b>Economic</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>*EUBRTD</i></li> <li><i>*RRD</i></li> <li><i>*WTO</i></li> </ul> <p><b>Social</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>*People to people exchanges</i></li> <li><i>*Valcanus/ Exprom/ CIR</i></li> </ul>
A set of ' <b>Stories</b> ' about the Boundaries	<p><i>Japan's 'stories' about the EU</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Western</li> <li>*Knights/ Crusades/ Vikings</li> </ul>	<p><i>EU 'stories' about Japan</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Asian</li> <li>*Geisha/ Occupation</li> </ul>

	*Often eccentric	<i>*Tranquil, ironical paradox of violence</i>
	*National member state importance	<i>*Monolithic workhorses</i>
	*no 'single voice' for the group	<i>*Free-rider syndrome</i>
***A set of <b>commonalities</b> ***	*Wartime enemies	<i>*Wartime enemies</i>
	*Economic giants	<i>*Economic giants</i>
	*MLOs	<i>*MLOs</i>
	*Rule of Law and Democracy	<i>*Rule of Law and Democracy</i>
	*Wary of US unilateralism	<i>*Wary of US unilateralism</i>

The table above (*figure 5*) outlines Tilly's four primary questions of identity formation and acts as a comparative apparatus to the following the sections of this chapter. The points drawn in figure 5 briefly display a comparative of EU and Japan relations via the Four Point Plan. Included in the figure are points that show area's of similarity and areas of divergence. The following subsection builds up on these elements and establishes the contributions of each section.

#### 4.3.1 Establishing boundaries which cause separation.

Boundaries that separate the EU and Japan are similar to those that arise in any cross-cultural comparative analysis. Primarily, geographical distance is the most obvious contributor. Language is the verbal barrier can attributes mostly to cultural misunderstanding, and false impressions. Likewise, ideology and tradition are subliminal actors attributable to differing worldviews, styles and mannerisms. Do the actors recognise these hurdles? Has the Joint Declaration 1991 succeeded to create awareness in this area? Do the elaborations of the Action Plan 2001 acknowledge and address these problems?

- The Distance factor
- Defining regional security threats
- Language and communication
- Culture, religion and ideology

➤ Distance

A quick glance at an atlas will show the great distance between Europe and Japan—15,343 kilometres<sup>229</sup>. Currently technology, aided by the Internet, air and sea travel has lessened this issue somewhat over the past two decades yet perceived distance as a psychological barrier remains. The internet for example aided by the Information Technology (IT) revolution encompasses all the domains of economic activity and continues to expand. By its very nature the IT revolution has largely reduced, even removed the obstacles of distance and distribution between different regions of the world. However, the barrier of geography does remain in a regional sense. Significantly, how each actor frames or categorises regional security matters, is the primary concern of distance. Throughout the Cold War this barrier of distance defined regional threats, and thus the different coping mechanisms required. This psychological distance redefined Europe and Japan. During this time bilateral relations for both actors remained fixed primarily with the United States who carried the image of a recognised ‘global protector’<sup>230</sup>. The end of the Cold War prompted a change in global security perspectives and terms of international governance and multilateral focus. Subtle changes in Japan’s

<sup>229</sup> <http://www.mapsofworld.com>

<sup>230</sup> Inoguchi, Takashi. (1993). *Japan’s foreign Policy in an Era of Global Change*. New York: St Martins Press. p62; Hook, Glenn.D., Gilson, Julie., Hughs, Christopher.W., Dobson, Hugo. (2001). *Japan’s International Relations*. London: Routledge. p278; Tsoukalis, Loukas., and White, Maureen. (eds). (1982). *Japan and Western Europe*. London: Frances Pinter Publishers. pp36-40; among others.

orientation towards Europe occurred. Hook et. al.' foresaw new security goals and enhancing bilateral diplomatic actions, citing Japan's non-military participation in reconstruction projects across Bosnia and Kosovo<sup>231</sup>. Europe reciprocated by EU engagements in the Korean Peninsula through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) project. These movements, on behalf of both parties largely reduced the barrier of distance through multilateral engagements, establishing the framework for cooperation in the preamble of the Joint Declaration 1991<sup>232</sup>.

➤ Regional Security

Synonymous with barriers related to 'geography', regional security continues to play a central role in dialogue between the EU and Japan. For Japan, regional security issues were largely dominated by relations with the US, as well as by concerns from within east Asia. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was one of the only forums where Europe and Japan discussed military concerns, albeit under the watchful eye of the US. The closer multilevel relationship that evolved from the end of the Cold War contributed to the merging of global perspectives internationally, bringing nations closer together, building bilateral ties and discouraging unilateral actions. The extent to which Japan could contribute to regional security was limited by the 1946 Constitution of Japan<sup>233</sup> dictating that no war shall ever be fought again by Japan. Inoguchi affirms Japan's status in the international community as a 'supporter' rather than a 'challenger', claiming *memories* to be irrevocable.<sup>234</sup> Most notable is the role of regional security as a separating boundary that is contingent upon specific regional attitudes; an example of this is the

<sup>231</sup> Hook, Glenn.D., Gilson, Julie., Hughs, Christopher.W., and Dobson, Hugo. (2001). Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security. Routledge, N.Y p280

<sup>232</sup> The Joint Declaration between the European Community and the member states and Japan: Objective 1: The Hague (18 July 1991)

<sup>233</sup> See Appendix C

<sup>234</sup> Inoguchi, Takashi. (1993). Japan's Foreign Policy in an Era of Global Change. New York: St Martins Press. pp61-65



EU's consideration (*supporter*) to drop the arms embargo placed upon China in 1989<sup>235</sup>. This is an issue of international concern for both the US and Japan, especially parallel to the 'One China' Policy and the democratisation of Taiwan. The post-Cold War era has seen an increase in international tourism, which too has again reduced the perceived geographical distance between these actors. The reduction of distance combined with the acute problems connected with terrorism has become the modern day version of the Cold War. Japan has become closely involved in this international agenda and has established a common focus with the EU in the 'Joint Declaration on Terrorism' amendment to the Action Plan 2001. The Action Plan provides a working agenda for both groups to recognise regional concerns and act upon them in Objective One<sup>236</sup>, and likewise in Objective Three<sup>237</sup> in health and global environment issues. These regional and global issues have come to play a particularly important role for Japan's promotion, together with the EU, of a non-military stance on political cooperation and security diplomacy.

➤ Language

Defined, language is 'a systematic means of communicating ideas or feelings by the use of conventionalised signs, sounds, gestures, or marks having understood meanings' or, 'the suggestion by objects, actions, or conditions of associated ideas or feelings', 'language in their very gesture'<sup>238</sup>. Barriers to communication demand the highest level of attention, especially in International Relations. Language, verbally and physically (body language) has directly affected relations between the EU and Japan. Simple differences in common gestures such as the Japanese 'bow', the British 'handshake' or

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<sup>235</sup> The EU imposed an arms embargo on China after the brutal display of government force at a passive student protest at Tiananmen Square, Beijing in 1989. This ordeal shocked the world and become commonly known as the Tiananmen Square Massacre with the embargo receiving international support.

<sup>236</sup> 10<sup>th</sup> EU-Japan Summit Brussels (8<sup>th</sup> December 2001) [www.jmission-eu/be](http://www.jmission-eu/be)

<sup>237</sup> Committing resources to the fight against terrorism (See Appendix B)

<sup>238</sup> [www.m-w.com](http://www.m-w.com): key word = 'language'

European ‘cheek-kissing’ are loaded movements that only with *experience* can eventually be understood. Both perception and education are vital in this case. The media has helped this cultural understanding but exposure to different cultures creates an open awareness and pre-empts differences. Howard Williams explains the complexities and relevance of language in his comparative studies whereby he outlines, “between the black and white extremes of linguistic nominalism, reality poses a vast stretch of grey... intellectual tolerance *must* prevail (original emphasis)”<sup>239</sup>. Language and the incorrect translation of words and thus meanings often result in misunderstandings that only experience can eliminate. Language is connected intimately to identity and a small misunderstanding can morph into a stereotyping or alternative policy outcome. Often is the case during high-level or ministerial level meeting between Japan and the EU that problems of cultural misunderstanding are illuminated. Such an example can be seen in 1991 with the former European Commissioner, Jacques Delors use of the word reciprocity in a governmental-level meeting<sup>240</sup>, without defining the use of the word or receiving accurate translating. The Japanese interpretation is an economic term usually used in a demanding sense. The use of this word depicted aggravation on the part of the EU, whereas Delors had intended the term to indicate the positive cultivation of a pro-trade consensus. Japan was both shocked and annoyed that no figures could substantiate this false claim, meanwhile Delors returned to Europe criticising the Japanese attitude as rude and stated, “...the Joint Declaration was nothing but political rhetoric that lacked true intent”<sup>241</sup>. This indiscretion was further fuelled by a prolonged lack of dialogue over the matter. With this language barrier recognised, more open dialogue was established and greater caution was exercised

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<sup>239</sup> Williams, Howard. (1991). *International Relations in Political Theory*. London: Routledge. Chap 1

<sup>240</sup> *Agence Europe*. (27-28 May, 1991) p6

<sup>241</sup> Abe, Atsuko. (1999). *Japan and the European Union: Domestic Politics and Translational Relations*. London: The Athlone Press. p135

by the actors throughout ministerial meetings and with the business community. An open table favoured the trading and political relationship induced by the Joint Declaration as Japan's economy peaked in 1990, and as an element of David Williams's research, language did not obscure the mathematical reality<sup>242</sup> of the situation; rather it added depth to the partnership. The EU itself has become very aware of language as a corresponding element of cross-cultural relations, as the process of enlargement has brought the EU language count up to twenty. Established in the Action Plan 2001, appropriately titled 'Shaping our Common Future', was Objective Four: 'Bringing together people and cultures'. This objective facilitated the exposure of both cultures in work, social and academic areas and aimed to deconstruct stereotypes and false images through the medium of language within the two regions. Objective Four has played a significant role in EU and Japan relations from 2001 and has such enhanced the political and economic dynamics of the partnership<sup>243</sup>.

➤ Cultural and ideological boundaries

The barrier of language also adds to cultural and ideological complications. Intercultural competence or the ability to communicate effectively and successfully on a multicultural platform has become a crucial issue as indicated in the language section. Separate from the linguistic hurdles discussed above, cultural and ideological barriers concern themselves with mostly with *stories*, which will be discussed in the fourth segment of Tilly's model. David Williams study of 'cultural dissonance' and uses the phrase "to modernise is to see"<sup>244</sup>. In this case Williams interlocated the term 'modernise' with

<sup>242</sup> Williams, David. (1996). *Japan and the Enemies of Open Political Science*. London: Routledge. p10

<sup>243</sup> Such examples include an educated and cultural savvy business community, a connected political pillar and a socially responsible common agenda that is internationally orientated.

<sup>244</sup> Williams, David. (1996). *Japan and the Enemies of Open Political Science*, New York: Routledge. p11

‘adapt’ to reflect cultural boundaries. By definition culture is, “the integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief, and behaviour that depends upon man's capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations”<sup>245</sup> or as international relations theorists Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil define, “a frame in which people derive a sense of who they are, how they should act, and where they are going”<sup>246</sup>, and they grant attribute identity to the “action role of culture”<sup>247</sup>. Robert Jervis contributes to the study of perceptions in international politics by stressing the prime importance of decision-makers’ perceptions in the formation of foreign policy. Refuting the realist’s assumption of rational policy making, in which actors are presumed to see a condition accurately, Jervis argued that decisions are situational and that irrational factors, such as values, beliefs, goals and motivations, affect the decisions-makers’ perceptions of environments and in turn affect policy outcomes<sup>248</sup>. Both culture and ideology are often broadly encompassed within two incredibly vague subheadings—East and West— or as Tilly improvised, ‘us’ and ‘them’<sup>249</sup>. The East or West can also be categorised as individualist vs. collectivist or largely understood as the labelling of English speaking nations and non-English speaking (nations)<sup>250</sup>. This cultural anecdote has been reduced with the spread globalisation and multilateral dialogue. Culture is largely immersed in language although its impact has become more symbolic than substantial.

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<sup>245</sup> [www.m-w.com](http://www.m-w.com)

<sup>246</sup> Lapid, Yosef and Kratochwil, Frederick. (eds). (1996). *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p9

<sup>247</sup> Ibid. p9

<sup>248</sup> Jervis, Robert. (1976). *Perception and Misperception in International politics*. New York: Princeton University Press. pp32-37

<sup>249</sup> Tilly, Charles. (Summer 2003). *Political Identities in Changing Polities*. *Social Research*, Vol.70, Iss.2. p605

<sup>250</sup> Samovar, Larry and Porter, Richard. (eds). (1994). *Intercultural Communication*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth

### 4.3.2 A SET OF RELATIONS WITHIN EACH BOUNDARY (Domestic)

- Political Context
- Economic Context
- Social Context

This section reflects on the political, economic and social aspect of relations between the EU and Japan within these established boundaries. As 4.2.1 discusses the broad boundaries that affect intercultural bilateral partnerships, the following two sections focus on the relations *inside* those boundaries (in a domestic sense) and *outside* those boundaries (on a multilateral level). Politically, Japan progressed under a collective based diplomatic system; whereas Europe based progress on a Western capitalist cultural sense, emphasising the individual primarily up to the 1990s. Essentially Tilly's focus in earlier research centred on the individual, most predominantly the shaping of a national identity, internal cohesion, or more commonly "Nationalism"<sup>251</sup>. Within Japan, the domestic unit is of considerable importance linking directly to the nationalist image. Japan is a nation steeped with history and tradition; they rally around the Emperor as a symbolic figurehead of a government which places the national interests before anything else. Elite senior bureaucrats, businessmen and politicians in association with prominent intellectuals determine Japan's course of action in all spheres of society. There is a Japanese tradition that decisions are made not by majority, but by consensus, which can often be a long and laborious affair<sup>252</sup>. A Englishman may summarise this as a series of collective compromises, which in part is true, yet intricate to the Japanese psyche 'the

<sup>251</sup> Nationalism defined: 'A sense of national consciousness exalting one nation above all others and placing primary emphasis on promotion of its culture and interests as opposed to those of other nations or supranational groups.' ([www.m-w.com](http://www.m-w.com))

<sup>252</sup> Halloran, Richard. (1985). Japan Images and Realities. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company. p71

collective' ensures the good of the Community<sup>253</sup>. The Japanese respond differently, employing a democratic political system to promote their national heritage and national improvement, rather than a trophy of Western influence. With little usable land, high population density, limited natural resources, virtually no proprietary technology and a devastated economic policy for self interest to survive and grow Japan needed to broaden its perspectives. The security umbrella of American occupation of Japan after WWII ensured compulsory demilitarisation, yet allowed the nation to pursue an undisrupted economic agenda to boost the economy.

Japanese bureaucracy is no longer directly manifest in Confucian through; rather it uses basic principles, teaching of authority, benevolence and paternal responsibility to strengthen standard rational frameworks. Domestic management of the economy absorbed much of the Japanese government's energy and effort through the 1970s as Japanese political restructuring of foreign policy not evident until the 1980s.<sup>254</sup> Japan's economic policy was successful not because of its inherent pragmatism, but rather because it was supported by a set of well integrated industries and business strategies. This was most noticeable in the car manufacturing sector<sup>255</sup>. A well developed infrastructure created and sustained a modern industrial society in Japan. The modernising role of Japan has made change in this area necessary throughout the economic turndown. Recently, companies have had to make employee's redundant, limit

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<sup>253</sup> Mayo, Marjorie. (2000). *Cultures, Communities, and Identities: Culture Strategies for Participation and Empowerment*. New York: Palgrave. p41.

<sup>254</sup> Inoguchi, Takashi. (1993). *Japan's Foreign Policy in an era of Global Change*. New York: St Martins Press. pp27-32

<sup>255</sup> Leitch, Richard.D. Jr., Kato, Akira., and Weinstein, Martin.E. (1995). *Japan's Role in the Post-Cold War World. Contributions in Political Science. No.361*. USA: Greenwood Press. pp15-17; James, Barrie.G. (1990). *Trojan Horse*. London: Mercury Books. pp140-147; Abe, Astuko. (1999). *Japan and the European Union: Domestic Politics and Transnational Relations*. London: the Athlone Press. Chap 3. pp55-86



incomes and use part time contactors as a means to revive the economy after Japan's economic bubble burst in 1990<sup>256</sup>. On economic matters, Japan has a hard work ethic with result-orientated drivers. The apparent preoccupation with perfection was largely spurred by a culture of success and the nationalism surge discussed previously. This image is largely exaggerated in Western scholarship, though elements of truth can be found. Modernisation in the technology and science sectors drove Japan's determinedness to succeed in international markets within a growing multilateral mindset. By the fiscal boundaries established in Japan, market access by foreign companies and FDI has been met with a series of restrictive measures. While dialogue and negotiation have somewhat reduced these barriers it must be understood they were merely a mechanism to ensure the protection of the Japanese market in more unstable building periods.

Interestingly, Kathleen Newland's research summarises in an opinion poll conducted by the Public Relations Department of the Prime Minister's Office of Japan in 1987, concerning the public's view of the direction of Japanese policy<sup>257</sup>. The Japanese public wanted to contribute most significantly to the development of a healthy world economy (50.4 per cent of the sample vote). The same poll showed only 7.8 per cent of public

<sup>256</sup> James, Barrie.G. (1990). *Trojan Horse*. London: Mercury Books; Okuda, Hiroshi (2003). *Challenges and Perspectives of the Japanese Economy and Industry*. Speech: The 22<sup>nd</sup> World Gas Conference: Tokyo. (2 June 2003).

([www.keidanren.or.jp/english/speech/20030602.html](http://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/speech/20030602.html)); Hutchison, M.M. (1997) *The Political Economy of Japanese Monetary Policy*: Cambridge: MIT Press. p27

<sup>257</sup> Both opinion polls were conducted in Japanese and are available in references provided by Newland (1990), pp 208-209. For the 1987 poll, see: Department of Public Relations, Office of the Prime Minister *Gaiko ni kansuru yoron chosa* (Opinion Poll on Diplomacy). Office of the Prime Minister. Tokyo. (April, 1988). For the 1986 poll in Japanese, see: Watanuki, J et. al.' (1986) *Nihonjin no senkyo kodo* (Japanese Electoral Behaviour). Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. Note: Newlands' interpretations of these polls are used because of the inaccuracies of possible translational data issues and time restraints.



opinion placed the highest priority on the consolidation of Japanese defence capability<sup>258</sup>, in line with that of Western nations. In 1986 a second opinion poll was conducted by a team of independent academics asking the public to prioritise the government's role both domestically and internationally. This survey placed much more emphases on Japan as a domestic actor and indicated considerable importance to national security. This once again points towards an overwhelming weight being given to domestic issues, as opposed to security contributions; perhaps this is best explained by the historical role of the US in this area. The 1990's recognised another change in Japanese priorities as they become more aware of the position of Western allies with the involvement of dialogue and negotiations encapsulated in the Joint Declaration 1991, and more recently, the Action Plan 2001. It is unquestionable that foreign trade is paramount to Japan. Japanese industry is reliant on the supply of raw materials from abroad, but as imports rise, exports must expand in order to pay for the increased imports<sup>259</sup>. Once again Japan can be seen to adapt to the international environment to further the internal needs of the nation.

The case of the EU differs from an internal view regarding political, economic and social determinants. Though not dissimilar to Japan, the EU was conceived out of the end of WWII, pushed by a similar period of reconstruction with similar measures taken to assure that such atrocities would never happen again. These differences are both philosophical and structural and show the changing phases of what is now known as the EU to be a distinct domestic and international actor. The largely supranational<sup>260</sup> structure emanates

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<sup>258</sup> The Non-Militant Self Defence Force (SDF)

<sup>259</sup> El-Agraa, Ali.M. (1988). *Japan's Trade Frictions*, London: The Macmillan Press. Supplies an excellent, albeit highly economic transcript of the Japanese economy leading up to the Joint Declaration. Chapter 2.

<sup>260</sup> "Supranational Governance" suggests the voluntary limitation of normal sovereignty processed by member states. (Refer to Feld, Werner. J. (1983). *The European Community in World Affairs: Economic Power and Political Influence*, Colorado: Westview Press.)

from a multi-actor system<sup>261</sup>. These include the EU Institutions themselves<sup>262</sup>, national authorities from the member states and a range of non-governmental interests, which aim to influence the decision makers. The internal economic market of the EU was highly centralised and introverted at its establishment primarily due to the cost-cutting effectiveness of an internal free-trade zone. This has decreased substantially due to external pressures resulting from a change in economic foresight<sup>263</sup>. The idea of a European Union requires group interests to supersede the interests of the individual; by Western standards this is a rather utopian concept yet similar in concept to the Eastern, traditional culture of Japan and the 'collective'<sup>264</sup>. Within the EU as a governing body, issues arise when national member states disagree on the level of transference to the larger institution, especially with regard to the reduction of national autonomy. This can explain perhaps the slow moving nature of the EU and the lack of a 'single voice' as many internal barriers need to be overcome. Gradually the EU institutions, under the established pillars are being accommodated with more powers of political, economic, social and judicial nature. The effect of this culminates in a more comprehensive group identity, both domestically and internationally. This has had the effect of a united front and greater strengths in both internal and foreign policy decision-making<sup>265</sup>. The sheer size of the current twenty-five member Union makes it one of the largest trading blocks in the world, presenting the Union as a significant actor on both domestic and international

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<sup>261</sup> Nugent, Neill. (1999). *The European Union: Volume I*. Aldershot: Dartmouth. p133

<sup>262</sup> The Executive branch: The European Commission and the European Parliament, The Legislative Branch: The Council of the European Union and the Judicial Branch: The Court of Justice of the European Communities

<sup>263</sup> Thomas Bourke elaborates on Fernand Braudel's three-facets of the world economy and attempts to assess the extent to which regional political integration is challenged by globalisation. Bourke, Thomas. (1996). *Japan and the Globalisation of European Integration*, England: Dartmouth Publishing Company. Chap 2, p10

<sup>264</sup> Mayo, Marjorie. (2000). *Cultures, Communities, and Identities: Culture Strategies for Participation and Empowerment*. New York: Palgrave. p41

<sup>265</sup> Especially under Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and pillar two of the Treaty on the European Union 1992.

markets. There are comparatively minimal barriers to enter into the EU market which in return has seen businesses of a multicultural nature flourish. The EU chose a passive approach to economic relations with Asia, and as such Japan's trade deficit with the EU was reduced, while the more demanding US trade deficit rose during the 1990s the EU provided an alternative market for Japanese goods. The scale to which domestic politics is confined to nations within their borders is inconclusive; globalisation has directly changed the political and economic decisions of a nation creating an "international interdependence"<sup>266</sup>. Globalisation has become a primary factor that has reduced the perceived borders, and homogeneity of a nation and as such reduced many of the domestic-based obstacles of bilateral relations.

➤ Social

On a social scale, the EU encompasses many cultures, languages, histories and worldviews, all of which participate in the EU and Japan's increasing size and competence. While a Western-style competitive edge and the promotion of the individual still relates to the business infrastructure, the very nature of cultural constructivism displays a sense of community and understanding. This social dimension integrates identity formation within the internal dynamics of both the EU and Japan; both groups are stable politically and respect interculturalism, yet display consistent differences within the fundamental ideologies involved in the running of each enterprise. Intergovernmental conferences have eased many of the tensions discussed previously and have provided an outlet to negotiate and understand other nations.

From a sociological perspective the community focus of Japan is still somewhat hierarchical in nature with a patriarchal family unit parallel to the broader societal

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<sup>266</sup> Abe, Atsuko. (1999). *Japan and the European Union: Domestic Politics and Transnational Relations*. London: The Athlone Press. pp20-21

structure. Feminism has played a substantial role in Japan over the past two decades. Because of the aging population of Japan, women are becoming highly skilled and taking responsibility in the workplace. The *International Herald Tribune* has even extended the term “womenomics”<sup>267</sup> to their analysis of this phenomenon. Tradition still resides in the public as the participation of women in the workforce has received negative media attention, labelling them “parasite singles” that are selfish and over-educated<sup>268</sup>. The schooling system in Japan is reflective of the societies push to succeed and university entrance exams are among the hardest in the world. Living standards in both Western Europe and Japan are among the highest in the world. Both regions promote a social structure that practices pacifism in nature, based on a peaceful coexistence that largely transcends religious and cultural barriers.

#### **4.3.3 A SET OF RELATIONS OUTSIDE OF THE BOUNDARY (International)**

This section concerns itself with the scope of relations each group exhibits external of the previously established internal boundaries; the international dimension. Consideration toward the global environment and the participation of Multilateral Organisations (MLOs) play a central role under this heading. Once again these issues will be reviewed under the sub themes of political, economic and social to retain consistency.

##### **➤ Political**

Since 1945 there have been three distinct global transitions that have impacted largely on the international environment. These are determined as: The recovery period from 1945 and a necessity to procure peace at any cost; the Cold War period and, the nuclear stand off between the US and the USSR is inclusive of both proxy wars and strain on regional

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<sup>267</sup> Pesek, William.J. (2005). Commentary: Japans’ hidden growth engine. *International Herald Tribune*. (23 October 2005).

<sup>268</sup> Ibid

security. Perhaps only the deterrent of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) facilitated the diffusion of the situation in *detente*. Finally and most recently are the acts of terror beginning with the Al Qaeda bombing of three strategic sites on the American 'homeland', most prominently the World Trade Centre in New York City. National security became closely coupled with international security policy and has become a crucial component in foreign policy decision making since 2001. Bilateral agreements and the promotion of MLOs and international law currently take prominence as nations discuss various options to construct a method to deal with this new paradigm of war. The clear and transparent flow of information between groups<sup>269</sup>, the united stance on the condemnation of terrorism<sup>270</sup>, the promotion of cultural diversity and peace all became integral commitments of nations<sup>271</sup>, drawing a clear circle of like minded communities has ensured that religious extremism is condemned, actors practising terrorism are punished and global discussions are frequent to avoid the escalation of conflicting interests. Religious sanctions cannot correspond to the promotion of terrorism. International political initiatives, such as that evolving from the Joint Declaration 1991, and the Action Plan 2001, joined by the UN, WTO and other organisations, react to impeding grievances. The impact of the common threat of terrorism is linked to the nature of evolving relations between the EU and Japan and illuminates the need to work cooperatively to ensure that each region remains prosperous politically and economically.

➤ Economic

In trade and economy, the EU and Japan Business Dialogue Round Table (EUJBDRT) played an important role in decreasing the frustrating trade frictions that cause tension between the EU and Japan. The promotion of positive intercultural dialogue, business

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<sup>269</sup> The Joint Declaration 1991, more exclusively in the Action Plan 2001

<sup>270</sup> The Joint Declaration on Terrorism 2001

<sup>271</sup> The Joint Declaration on Terrorism 2001 and the Action Plan 2001

concerns and trading methods are paramount to this success. Japan competes with Europe precisely in the area that Europe excels and as such the EUJBDRT and bilateral Regulatory Reform Dialogues (RRD)<sup>272</sup>, and business exchange initiatives have impacted the external bilateral trading functions of the EU and Japan. The WTO is a multilateral advocate to vent trade concerns in a regional context; but recent issues and influences from the US have begun to impact in this area. Sociologically, a global recognition of cultural awareness is transported through such forums and has thus become an important part of trans-national dialogue from outside the boundaries of direct EU and Japan relations.

➤ Social

Socially, people-to-people exchanges are paramount to the deconstruction of stereotypes and perceptions of the EU and Japan. The political, economic and public sectors have all benefited from this deeper cross-cultural understanding which has run parallel to the importances of bilateral, regional and multiregional dialogue. An awareness of the environment, nuclear proliferation, the depletion of the ozone layer and carbon emissions and the Kyoto protocol have called for and largely been met by global efforts. The EU and Japan are expanding their cooperation in these fields and establishing a global identity in pursuit of a healthy global environment that extends beyond regional barriers. Reactionary and often unilateral policies of the US non-ratification of protocols to combat these problems have been met with great resentment. The group dimension remains paramount to global relations outside of national boundaries. A common agenda that includes EU and Japan cooperation has been realised officially.

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<sup>272</sup> These make recommendations to each party about positive economic prosperities and common groundings.

#### 4.3.4 A SET OF 'STORIES' ABOUT THE BOUNDARIES

This section of analysis will illuminate the *stories*<sup>273</sup> and stereotypes the EU and Japan formed about each other both as domestic and international actors. This enables the analysis of reasons for and against the pursuit of certain bilateral policies at any point in time. These stereotypes must be overcome by both governing officials and public opinion to produce a more productive frame of interaction. The deconstruction of these barriers is the last steep required to complete Tilly's Four Point Plan of analysis. As suggested previously the stereotypes surrounding identity are of an unbalanced nature. More *stories* exist within the European perception of Japan than vice versa. The historical reliance and domestic nostalgia of Japan towards the US may partially explain this observation. Recent health issues such as the Avian Bird Flu and possibilities of a human pandemic have contributed to the public perception in both Europe and Japan, but SARs, the instability on the Korean peninsula and terrorism have had a more considerable impact in Asia.

The following section establishes the boundaries attributed to the stereotypes, thus partial image formation surrounding the EU and Japan and acts as an indicator to understand levels of interaction between the two. The role of 'stories' and the construction of stereotyping contribute significantly to the perceived social, political and economic endeavours of foreign policy.

Common (mis)perceptions and images Europe has created about Japan are loaded with sweeping generalisations, and has received more academic analysis than the reverse.

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<sup>273</sup> Tilly, Charles. (2003). Political Identities in Changing Politics. *Social Research*. Vol.70, Iss.2. (Summer 2003).



Jean-Pierre Lehmann's outline of the European image of Japan is largely gauged on the point of a compass; associating the East and West in a geographical sense. Lehmann's work attempts to diffuse many of these perceptions.<sup>274</sup> European perceptions have been categorised under a shared "Asian identity"<sup>275</sup>: The East, Asian and Oriental without distinction at a national level. Shortly after WWII the extent of Japan's fragility became clear. Labelled as a despot, Japan was not seen as a nation that was capable of restructuring along democratic lines. Inoguchi attributes this stereotyping to a historically overpowering identity encapsulated by memory<sup>276</sup>. Lehmann contributes to this historical account, "Japan was the only non-Western country to have successfully challenged Europe both militarily and economically"<sup>277</sup>, perhaps justifying the impact and caution of the EU under Inoguchi's *memory* notion. Stereotypical traits are usually accumulated along arbitrary lines. Europe views Japan's work patterns as *fourmilier*<sup>278</sup>, teeming yellow masses of anonymous people engaging in practises of conformity rather than individual identity.<sup>279</sup> In essence, member states of the EU view the Japanese as economic animals, reducing them to a state of being 'work horses'.<sup>280</sup> While this denoted European thought on the emerging industrial prowess of Japan, the mysteries of Japan and magic of the 'orient' remained somewhat of a romantic notion. The Japanese *geisha* is a prime example of this, a sexually mystical, elegant, and tranquil mistress, an image that exists in modern days and fuelled by fictional novels and big screen cinema. The

<sup>274</sup> Lehmann, Jean.P. In Tsoukalis, Loukas., and White, Maureen. (eds). (1982). Japan and Western Europe. London: Frances Pinter Publishers. Chapter 2.

<sup>275</sup> Ibid

<sup>276</sup> Inoguchi, Takashi. (1993). Japan's Foreign Policy in an Era of Global Change. New York: St. Martins Press. pp61-65

<sup>277</sup> Lehmann, Jean.P. (1982). In Tsoukalis, Loukas., and White, Maureen. (eds). (1982). Japan and Western Europe. London: Frances Pinter (Publishers).

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<sup>278</sup> French for 'Ant hill'. p17

<sup>279</sup> Lehmann, Jean.P. in Tsoukalis, Loukas., and White, Maureen. (eds). (1982). Japan and Western Europe. London: Frances Pinter Publishers. p17

<sup>280</sup> Ibid, p18

geisha became synonymous to Japan's international marketing, regional tourism can also be blamed for endorsing stereotyping. Interestingly, the European Commission has recruited the use of *manga* or Japanese computer generated TV programmes and comic books as a symbol of Japan and has adopted 'Kitty' the Japanese cat to represent many facets of Japan in Europe. This marketing strategy classifies Japan by technological mediums and childish images, a change from despotism and ultra nationalism but still propagates a sense of stereotypes. This point is however factually accurate in that many people both male and female, young and old, see 'Kitty' as an iconic new age symbol of Japan.

Academic scholarship on EU and Japan relations have constructed an identity of Japan as a 'free-rider'<sup>281</sup>, historically established in accordance to Japan's lack of defence mechanisms and reliance burden on other nations. Japan is divided by the 'free-rider'<sup>282</sup> status, suffering criticism for not building military capacity, under Article IX of the Constitution and its inability to aid its foreign allies<sup>283</sup>. The European Commission has encouraged Japan to expand its areas of competency in passive aide, especially via international joint actions to resolve this. Japan remains divided domestically. Japan has chosen to supply humanitarian aid and technical assistance as a passive participant during

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<sup>281</sup> Inoguchi, Takashi. (1991). Chapter 1; Hook Glenn.D. (1996). Militarisation and Demilitarisation in Contemporary Japan. London: Routledge. pp58-64; Hook, Glenn.D., Gilson, Julie., Hughes, Christopher.W., Dobson, Hugo. (2001). Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security. New York: Routeledge. pp134-135

<sup>282</sup> "Free rider status" acquired by Japan is largely pursuant to the US complaint that Japan is not paying its own share of the defence burden in maintaining regional and global security (refer: Hook et. al.' (2001) p134), or simplified by Inoguchi as 'Japan is a taker, not a giver'.(1991). p9

<sup>283</sup> Appendix C

these circumstances<sup>284</sup>. European images of Japan can be summarised as contradictory in nature, perhaps explainable by the large number of *stories* created about Japan's identity. On the one hand, Europe appears to hold a degree of admiration (or transparently, jealousy), whereas on the other hand there is a degree of scepticism that is in part hostile. These alternating images provide reasons for foreign policy decision making constraints and incentives.

The analysis of Japan's perceptions and images of the European Union are plentiful, but appear more factual than stereotypical. The common reference of the 'West' is referred to in scholarship to group 'non-communist' nations which is a cognitively positive image. The lack of a single voice for the EU in the group's foreign relations provides a minor factor that can confuse bilateral contact. This confused image is an obstacle in the identity formation of the EU's unique governing body but this has been recognised within the Joint Declaration 1991, and more so under the Action Plan 2001. As institutions of the EU stabilise and synthesise a more mature phase of power structure is identifiable. Both the Joint Declaration 1991 and the Action Plan 2001 have required that Japan be totally informed during the transitory stages of enlargement and the adoption of a single currency to avoid the escalation of unwarranted concerns.

The complexities of the EU are accentuated by the multifaceted images portrayed by each of the member states. Japan has a clear image associated to each member country from past political and economic experience at a governmental level. However, just as Europe categorised Japan, continental images would include the Alps of Switzerland, the cuisine

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<sup>284</sup> For further info on examples of this see: Japan's Contribution to de-mining activities in Afghanistan

[http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle\\_e/afghanistan/min0201/demining.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/min0201/demining.html)

of France and the tulips of Holland; but falters at the supranational of the EU. Likewise, political and economic relations with the member states prior to Maastricht resonate, especially in response to formal relations such as the Joint Declaration in 1991. Japanese images of Europe are conditioned by historical experience and as Richard Storry suggests, up to the end of WWII Japan saw Europe as a menace and a model, despised and yet admired<sup>285</sup>. The internal restructuring of the 1960s exacerbated the Japanese view of Europe being uncooperative and introverted. Japan, aided by a growing discontent toward the United States, tried to establish economic relations with Europe but saw no reciprocal gesture and refocused on attention on the US.

The global positions of, and stories about the EU and Japan are not restricted to the two nations. The US has referred to Japan in less colourful terms, as, “an economic Pearl Harbour”<sup>286</sup>— rather a poor analogy referring to Japan’s ‘explosive’ economy, which has naturally been misconceived as malicious in nature. Obviously such comments are in distasteful humour but are descriptively negative and stereotypical. Germany can also be a target for poor quality comments; though politically incorrect, these stereotypes do exist and have been difficult for successive generations to shirk away from. There are also a series of less flattering images about other key actors such as China, some of which can explain the staunch joint efforts of Japan and the US against the EU’s possible end to the arms embargo placed on China in 1989. Each nation holds their own ‘national’ views of other nations and cultures. Only with closer bilateral or multilateral dialogue combined

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<sup>285</sup> Storry, Richard. (1979). *Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia*. London: The Mcmillian Press. p15

<sup>286</sup> White, T. The Danger from Japan, *New York Times Magazine*. (28 July 1985) p19-44. Cited in: Inoguchi, T. (1993). *Japan’s Foreign Policy in an era of Global Change*. New York: St. Martins Press.

with noted action on behalf of an actor will these images subside. The framework of identity becomes a key research component in creating an awareness of these factors.

#### 4.4 IDENTITY AND THE JOINT DECLARATION 1991

Political dialogue between the European Community and Japan was formally recognised with signing of the Joint Declaration 1991 at The Hague and was initiated by the Japanese government<sup>287</sup>. The fall of communism and a changing “world order”<sup>288</sup> offered an alternative to the EU, motivated by fears of isolation.<sup>289</sup> The Joint Declarations contribution was undoubtedly aimed at facilitating closer relations. The Action Plan 2001 is summarised by Cardwell as a document to “add flesh to the Joint Declaration”<sup>290</sup>, as it pursues a more ambitious joint actions; it shifts emphasis to a more political and economic balance.

The Joint Declaration between the EU and Japan signed in 1991 was the recognition by both parties that the global environment needed their cooperation even as a matter of survival.<sup>291</sup> The barriers outlined in the first step of Tilly’s Four Point Plan were put to the test in the late 1980s and provided that geography was of less importance as long as both groups’ security concerns were mutually recognised. An important aspect of the partnership between the EU and Japan has been cooperation on a multilateral level— An

<sup>287</sup> The Joint Declaration can also be seen as a consequence of the ‘opportunity to demand equality’ after the Trans-Atlantic agreement that was signed between the EU and US in 1990. Refer to Gilson, Julie. (2000). *Emerging from Washington’s Shadow: Japan’s new relations with Europe*, European View, Vol.8, Iss. 4.

<sup>288</sup> Cardwell, Paul.J. (May 2004) The EU-Japan relationship: from mutual ignorance to meaningful partnership. *Journal of European Affairs: EU Policy Network*, Vol.2, No.2

<sup>289</sup> Abe, Atsuko. (1999). *Japan and the European Union: Domestic Politics and Translational Relations*. London: The Athlone Press. . p122

<sup>290</sup> Cardwell, Paul.J. (May 2004) The EU-Japan relationship: from mutual ignorance to meaningful partnership. *Journal of European Affairs: EU Policy Network*, Vol.2, No.2

<sup>291</sup> Bourke, Thomas. (1996). *Japan and the Globalisation of European Integration*. England: Dartmouth Publishing Company. p37

example of this would include common support for permanent seats in the UN, on the Korean peninsula<sup>292</sup>, the G7/8, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). By 1990 the Japanese were unconvinced that the market integration of Europe would proceed as planned based on the notion that Europe characteristically and historically was divided about what their shared vision would provide. Japan's doubtful evaluation of Europe slowly changed with the unification of East and West Germany, but still remained on a double tracked path of negotiation. While the Joint Declaration provided the cornerstone agreement between the EU and Japan, its nature is difficult to pinpoint as the needs of EU member states were divided. Britain has been closely tied economically with Japan and thus it supported closer regional agreements and in turn was backed by the Netherlands. Pressure from both France and Italy who were most specifically concerned with greater political connections were in favour of purely economic-based political relations. They cited concerns about Japan wanting to "conquer the world"<sup>293</sup> which echoed worries from the Commission President, Jacques Delors about a Japan "...bent on economic domination"<sup>294</sup>. Italy wanted specific market opening pledges from Japan to be non-negotiable. A political component of the Joint Declaration 1991 seemed far from possible and it appeared that the Joint Declaration 1991 would amount to nothing more than another economic-based joint agenda, as past attempts had proven. After much discussion within the member states the Commission, embassies and business interests the Joint Declaration 1991 was finally signed resulting in the inclusion of an important phrase: "equitable access to their respective markets and removing obstacles where the structural or other, impeding the

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<sup>292</sup> Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO)

<sup>293</sup> Leitch, Richard.D. Jr., Kato, Akira., and Weinstein, M.E.(1998). Japan's Role in the Post-Cold War World. *Contributions in Political Science*. No. 361. USA: Greenwood Press. p117

<sup>294</sup> Ibid. p17

expansion of trade and investment, on the basis of comparable opportunities.”<sup>295</sup> Political dialogue was nonetheless included in Objective 4: Framework for Dialogue and Consultation. The nature of the Joint Declaration 1991 was almost a token, politically speaking, and an avenue to expand upon. The political component was perhaps more reflective of the European Commission’s limited competence in political affairs at this time and as such became more symbolic than engaging.<sup>296</sup>

Language and communicative barriers were overcome with experience and frequent high level interactions endured. A consciousness effort was made about the terminology used in joint narratives and translations interpretations evaded. Cultural components became influential and included in the Joint Declaration 1991 was the promotion of cross-cultural exchanges. This was especially recognised at the business level with initiatives such as the Export Promotion Programme (EXPROM) and Vulcanus programs coming into fruition. Even with the establishment of the Joint Declaration 1991 at a government level, the opinion of the Japanese public remained conservative and reflective of the 1980’s.


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<sup>295</sup> The Joint Declaration 1991: (para 3): Objectives of dialogue and cooperation.

<sup>296</sup> Abe, Astuko. (1999). *Japan and the European Union: Domestic Politics and Translational Relations*. London: The Athlone Press. p137



(Figure 6)



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Source: *Eurobarometer* (December, 1991) no.36

*Figure 6* shows the results of a *Eurobarometer* survey in December 1991. There are interesting parallels between the public's support of both economic (trade issues) and political cooperation being considerably lower than issues that include human value (culture and the environment). Technical research is a component of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and thus centrally placed within this scale of 'support issues' facing the Japanese community.

The Joint Declaration encouraged a programme, somewhat subliminally, of intercultural contact that would become a core component ten years later under the Action Plan 2001. While spanning a decade, a summary of the Joint Declaration remains conservative. While its intent and purpose was genuine in terms of productivity, the words it described did not expand to actions. The Joint Declaration 1991 and its objectives were undoubtedly a learning curve for actors, even while only a few matters of joint

cooperation were actualised, a respect and knowledge of each community was beginning to penetrate the previously stereotypical stigmas that dominated in the 1970s and 1980s. Nongovernmental Organisations (NGOs) and business interest groups were among those who benefited most by the Joint Declaration. Under the theoretical concept of identity, the Joint Declaration was pushed for the mutual good of two regions looking to diversify politically and economically and to truly establish a positive image for each nation-group in the wider world. Analytically the Four Point Plan describes two actors, regionally separated, that placed priority on internal development up until the Joint Declaration 1991. Subsequently, the Analytic Narrative supplied a mechanism to deconstruct stereotypes and stories.

#### **4.5 IDENTITY AND THE ACTION PLAN 2001**

The Action Plan 2001 provided a higher standard of dialogue and commitment that was lacking in the Joint Declaration 1991. The considerable breadth and depth of the Action Plan 2001 reconsolidated the intent of the Joint Declaration, at the same time build a more aggressive line of co-operative, joint power through the WTO, UN, NATO; on a multilateral level, ASEM and ASEAN on a regional forum; and economic and culture matters bilaterally.

The EU and Japan shifted from their sole focus on trade disputes and economic obsessions subsequent to WWII. These had been characterised by Cardwell who claimed that “[F]or Japan, it was felt that Europe was finding a convenient scapegoat for its own economic and social problems<sup>297</sup>.” The Action Plan pursued more ambitious objectives.

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<sup>297</sup> Cardwell, Paul.J. (2004). The EU-Japan Relationship: from mutual ignorance to meaningful partnership? *Journal of European Affairs*. Vol.2, No.2. (May, 2004) [www.europeananalysis.org.uk](http://www.europeananalysis.org.uk). p12

Common concerns were met with meaningful cooperation, most notably by environmental challenges and nuclear non-proliferation. Only under the Action Plan 2001 did partnership acquire a true sense of meaning. With previous reluctance to push joint political dialogue under the Joint Declaration 1991, a series of events indicated a need for this to change. In 1993 the 'New Asia Strategy'<sup>298</sup>, was designed to create a greater regional awareness of Asia in Europe; the 1995 Commission communication to the Council, *Europe and Japan: "The Next Steps"*<sup>299</sup> favouring an increased political role to run in tandem with economic importance. The 1999 Bonn Summit was an avenue to further promote Asian prosperity and peace, and as Tanaka, Toshiro<sup>300</sup> states in a paper presented in Macau in 2004, the 1999 Bonn Summit provided the urgency for the Action Plan which could have otherwise been thrown in the "dustbin"<sup>301</sup> The Tokyo Summit in 2000 launched "decisive impetus"<sup>302</sup> to the overall EU and Japan relationship. The largest component of the Action Plan is Objective 3, relevant to 'Coping with Global and Societal Change' is indicative of distinctive changes in the relations between the EU and Japan. The Action Plan gives the 'words' of the Joint Declaration 'action' status across all levels of bilateral interaction, while acted as a practical application of silence critics of the worth and substance of the EU and Japan relationship. The Action Plan 2001 has led to a significant merging of thoughts and actions of the EU and Japan. It is a functional plan that has contributed to the diffusion stereotypes that affected EU and Japanese

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<sup>298</sup> COM (94)34

<sup>299</sup> COM (95)73

<sup>300</sup> Professor of Political Integration at Keio University, Tokyo

<sup>301</sup> Tanaka, Toshiro. 'Japan and the European Union (1)', Fourth meeting of the European Studies Centre in Asia, Institute of European Studies of Macau, Special Administrative Region, Peoples Republic of China (April 7-8, 2004) p12

<sup>302</sup> European Parliament Fact Sheets 6.3.10 Japan, Article 133. [www.europarl.eu.int](http://www.europarl.eu.int)

relations. The Action Plan is linked directly to the visual determination of the EU and Japan's willingness to contribute to the bilateral and multilateral partnership.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### **Theory Two: Rational Choice vs. the Analytic Narrative**

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#### **5.0 RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY**

This chapter discusses the contributions of rational choice theory in its traditional sense, and the contemporary adaptations of these frameworks. This chapter places the core analysis on the Joint Declaration 1991 and the Action Plan 2001 drawing key assumptions from the context of the rational choice Analytic Narrative<sup>303</sup>. International relations frameworks are a valid source of inquiry but have failed in keeping current, and thus appropriate. The process of globalisation, the International Political Economy (IPE), the formation of supranational entities (such as the European Union), the role of Multilateral Organisations (MLOs) and Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) have changed the face of strategic interaction between global communities. The Analytical Narrative utilises a blend of strategic reasoning that includes how beliefs and values shape an actor's behaviour. This chapter is divided into sub-sections for analysis; the first includes a definition of the key actors; secondly, their goals and perceptions, and thirdly, a discussion of these effects on the primary documentation presented. While Chapter Four of this thesis established the 'barriers' and obstacles to international relations based on these assumptions, the Analytic Narrative compartmentises these barriers, and categorises the decisions that are made in that framework in a cost/benefit manner.

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<sup>303</sup> Levi, Margaret., Bates, Robert., Greif, Avner., Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent., and Weingast, Barry (1998). *Analytic Narratives*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.



Rational choice followers would then purely devise the ‘costs and benefits’ with ‘loss and profit’ and assume that the action of an international actor will be purely self-seeking. However, the Analytic Narrative approaches this situation more optimistically and presents a collective advantage. This provides a more optimistic, if not less sceptical, view of human interaction. This chapter finds that the rational choice tradition is misguided to assume that social phenomena is reducible to statements about individual action, and provides that collective outcomes have no great ‘cost’ that will impinge up on joint initiatives undertaken by the EU and Japan as rational actors. The increasing number of academia that directly (or not) uses identity paradigms in political science justifies its use<sup>304</sup>.

### 5.1 THE ANALYTIC NARRATIVE and RATIONAL CHOICE

...the observationally equivalent interpretations rest on markedly different theories of behaviour. To settle upon an explanation, we must move outside the game and investigate empirical materials. We must determine how the opponent’s beliefs shape their behaviour. This blend of strategic reasoning and empirical investigation helps define the method of analytic narratives...<sup>305</sup>

Rational choice theory is an international relations paradigm that is often assumed to be essentially economic and deductive. Rational choice frameworks are multifaceted and quantitative, being comprised of decision-making frames, game theory, zero-sum games and conflict resolution paradigms. The oversimplification of economic-based frameworks

<sup>304</sup> Halloran, Richard. (1970). Japan: Images and realities- the inner dynamics of power in a nation of outward change. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company; Storry, Richard. (1979). Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia. London: The Mcmillian Press; Tsoukalis, Loukas., and White, Maureen. (eds). (1982). Japan and Western Europe. London: Frances Pinter Publishers; Gilson, Julie. (2000). Japan and the European Union: A Partnership for the Twenty-First Century? Basingstoke: St. Matins Press; Cardwell, Paul.J. The EU-Japan Relationship: from mutual ignorance to meaningful partnership? *Journal of European Affairs*. Vol.2, No.2. (May, 2004) [www.europeananalysis.org.uk](http://www.europeananalysis.org.uk)

<sup>305</sup> Levi, Margaret., Bates, Robert., Greif, Anver., Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent., and Wiengast, Barry. (1998). Analytic Narrative. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p241

was recognised in the 1970s<sup>306</sup> due to their specificity and lack of social content. Zero-sum games accruing to decision theory combine a player's choice parallel to their 'aims' and 'preferences' the measure of utility by prioritising the preference. In zero-sum games, one actor's gain is balanced by another's loss, which is unrealistic in a modern and diplomatic example. Likewise the prisoners' dilemma theory is derived from the foundations of rational choice yet it ignores a "sense of obligation"<sup>307</sup> that may in fact exist between parties. Andrew Moravcsik provides a contemporary analysis of rational choice as a framework with core assumptions showing that "...actors make international choices to manoeuvre domestically, and make domestic choices to influence the nature of international bargains."<sup>308</sup> This two-tiered choice can be applied to the Joint Declaration 1991 and reflects the Analytic Narrative of Levi et. al.<sup>309</sup>. Margaret Levi's article, *A model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis*, and Gerardo L. Munck's article, *Rational Choice Theory in Comparative Politics* both summarise the major points and applications of rational choice in comparative politics, analysing both the strengths and weaknesses of this empirical approach. It is because of this article that the Analytic Narrative was devised, retaining an economic undertone but legitimising its application to the human experience. Levi et. al.' and Robert Bates direct their studies to encapsulate a socially nous response to the more traditional rational choice prerogatives. Levi et. al.' and Bates have reformed the Rational Choice model to provide an analytic narrative tool which encompasses empirical and comparative elements that can be applied to interstate relations. While Levi et. al.' admits their

<sup>306</sup> Groom, A.J.R., and Light, Margot. (1994). *Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory*. UK: Pinter Publishers. p208

<sup>307</sup> Jervis, Robert. (1998) Realism, Game Theory and Cooperation. *World Politics* Vol.40, No.3.

<sup>308</sup> Clark, Ian. (1999). *Globalisation and International Relations Theory*. New York: Oxford University Press. p28.

<sup>309</sup> Levi, Margaret., Bates, Robert., Greif, Avner., Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent., and Weingast, Barry. (1998). *Analytic Narratives*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

framework is not a methodological breakthrough<sup>310</sup>, a critique of their work would indicate otherwise<sup>311</sup>. Still, the Analytic Narrative melds both economic and political concepts and focuses on actors in time and place under a neo-realist framework. The structure of this framework provides an analytic undertaking that includes goals and perceptions, identity and belief and a casual structure that was previously discouraged. This creates a narrative, or 'story' to show intent and purpose to the multidisciplinary study of international relations. While predominantly involved in political economy research, the co-authors of the Analytic Narrative observed an abundance of theory within this framework—yet, nothing that could be applied in a practical sense with qualitative and interpretive, analytic values. Much of their general groundwork draws from constructivist principles and establishes the role of, place of and thus description of the actions of rational actors, but analytically uses a more adept evaluation style. The multidisciplinary nature of this model, in political, economic, sociological, psychological and historical terms appeals to the nature of relations between the EU and Japan echoing the diversities of this pair. Ultimately this theory assumes narratives of action pertaining to the choice of one being dependent on that of another. While Analytic Narrative seeks maximised utility which may include a collectively beneficial outcome, it refines an awareness of social identity frames. Both the Analytic Narrative and the Four Point Plan are derivative of constructive identity themes; each framework directs attention towards stories, perceptions and stereotypes and aim to characterise the 'narrative' more so than

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<sup>310</sup> Levi, Margaret., Bates, Robert., Greif, Avner., Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent., Weingast, Barry (1998). *Analytic Narratives*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

<sup>311</sup> Levi, Margaret., Bates, Robert., Greif, Avner., Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent., and Weingast, Barry. *Analytic Narratives Re-visited*. *Social Science History*. Vol.24. No.4. (Winter 2000)

the method. Rational choice theory is a contemporary tool in comparative politics<sup>312</sup>, and views the state comprised of an international *society*, not merely an international system. It deems that choices are made rationally and for both the greater good and maximum potential outcomes. Rational choice theorists assume that complex social phenomena can only be explained in terms of elementary individual actions and are of an individual nature. The rational choice Analytic Narrative assumes that individual intentions are aggregated and that collective action is an important aspect of decision-making, whereas rational choice theorists provide a 'means to an end' situation derived from greatest satisfaction of the individual<sup>313</sup>. The Analytic Narrative more openly suggests that collective action may be a case where 'a loss for one is the best for all'. Rational choice theory is unable to classify ethical considerations between 'right and wrong' yet this is a community value that must be represented. Differences are dependent on variables such as values, norms, social exchange and compromise which are not accepted by the economic model, whereas the more contemporary Analytic Narrative overcomes this structural naivety with cognitive mutual advantage, anticipation and long-term reciprocity to counter-balance immediate profit. This also suggests that an element of trust is not possible under the traditional rational choice framework. Margaret Levi<sup>314</sup> and Gerald L.

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<sup>312</sup> Bates, R.ober t in Levi, Maragret., Bates, Robert., Greif, Anver., Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent., and Weingast, Barry.R. (1998). *Analytic Naratives*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Itoh, Mayumi. (2000). *Globalization of Japan*. New York: St Martins Press; Abe, Atsuko. (1999). *Japan and the European Union: Domestic Politics and Transnational Relations*. London: The Athlone Press; Williams, Howard. (1992). *International Relations in Political Theory*. Open University Press.

<sup>313</sup> Levi, Margaret. Bates, Robert., Greif, Avner., Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent., and Weingast, Barry (1998). *Analytic Narratives*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

<sup>314</sup> Levi, Maragret. (1997). *A Model, A Method, and A Map: A Rational Choice in Comparative Historical Analysis*, in: Lichbach, Mark.I., and Zuckerman, Alan.S. (1997) *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure*. New York: Cambridge. Chapter 2.



Munck<sup>315</sup> advocate the contextual and narrative application of Rational Choice theory because of its appropriateness in comparative analysis<sup>316</sup>.

In the course of this research, the EU and Japan have become a part of an international society by accepting that various principles and institutions govern the way in which they conduct their foreign relations. Rational choice is assumed to be goal orientated behaviour; individuals or groups making decisions that maximise the utility they expect to derive from such a choice<sup>317</sup>. Many of the joint policy initiatives undertaken by Japan and the EU follow this accordingly. Mary Clark defines worldviews as “beliefs and assumptions by which an individual or group make sense of experiences that are hidden deep within the language and traditions of the surrounding society”<sup>318</sup>, which reflects the importance of identity yet this also is not a component of traditional rational choice theory in framing in international relations studies. The first theoretical concept of this research observes a distinct link between the frames of identity and rational choice, arguing each informs the other. The interconnected natures of these theories are pivotal when reviewing the modern relations between Japan and the EU and the building of joint cooperation agreements. Japan sees rational choice logically manifest to exposure within European markets, also in encouraging European companies to trade within Japan. Likewise for the EU to establish a favourable position within Japan for joint economic and political purposes. Central to the success of the theoretical concepts that link this

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<sup>315</sup> Munck, Gerald.L. (2002). Rational Choice Theory in Comparative Politics, in: Wiarda, Howard.J. (2002). *New Directions in Comparative Politics*. Westview: Boulder. Chapter 9.

<sup>316</sup> Mahoney, James. (Summer 2002). Rational Choice Theory and the Comparative Method: An Emerging Synthesis. *Studies in Comparative International Development*. Vol.35, Iss.2: New Brunswick.

<sup>317</sup> Munck, Gerald.L. (2002). Rational Choice Theory in Comparative Politics. in: Wiarda, Howard.J. (2002). *New Directions in Comparative Politics*. Westview: Boulder. Chapter. 9. p166

<sup>318</sup> Clark, Mary. (2002). *In Search of Human Nature*. London: Routledge.

analysis is the practical and visual ability to examine the EU and Japan bilaterally and displaying patterns of how each group forms and acts upon goals and perceptions in a global context. A narrative as a methodological pursuit enables this.

The Analytic Narrative requires two cases relatively diverse in nature to draw up on a sequence of events. According to tenets established by John Stuart Mill, the more diverse the groups are the greater explanatory power they can contribute<sup>319</sup>. The comparative quality of this research emphasises a focused and structured comparison process tracing method<sup>320</sup> to explore the primary documents of the EU and Japan partnership.

Contemporary rational choice theorists have attempted, with increasing frequency, to bridge the theoretical gap between identity and expression on the one hand, and strategic rational action on the other. Margaret Levi et. al.' describes this combination of topics compellingly and assesses the breadth and applicability of their rational choice sub-theory, and to the inter-subjective concepts it includes. Randall Calvert, a professor from the Political Science Department of Washington University validates Levi et. al.'s Analytic Narrative approach, albeit indirectly, identifying that rational choice theorists of the past have failed by not including identity and the expression as variables to their study.<sup>321</sup> Calvert summarises the work of previous scholars in this area and draws the conclusion "... [by] disregard of fundamental variables, such as identity and belief systems because they are too transient...contextually poignant, epiphenomenal and

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<sup>319</sup> Levi, Margaret. (2002). 'Modelling Complex Historical Processes with Analytic Narratives, <http://www.yale.edu/probmeth/Levi.pdf>

<sup>320</sup> George, Alexander. (1989). Case studies and Theory Development: the Method of Structured and Focused Comparison. in: Lawrence, P.G. (1989). *Diplomacy: New Approaches to History, Theory and Policy*. New York: Free Press. pp43-68

<sup>321</sup> Levi, Margaret., Bates, Robert., Greif, Avner., Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent., and Weingast, Barry. (2000). Analytic Narratives Re-visited. *Social Science History*. Vol.24. No.4. (Winter 2000).

illusionary...”<sup>322</sup>, all of which are only a quantitative necessity. Levi has proven, as this research will demonstrate, that the Analytic Narrative of Rational Choice takes ‘everything’ into consideration when making policy decisions; by excluding natural human elements a false outcome would be given. It is not a “one size fits all”<sup>323</sup> framework quotes prominent critic Ian Shapiro, nor is it as Robert Wagner’s article ridicules a “why did the chicken cross the road” approach<sup>324</sup>. The overall critique of the Analytic Narrative is inconclusive and pessimistic.

Rational choice is best supported by evidence of rational choices; and the key empirical strategy for assessment in this area is to analyse the decisions and negotiations that lead to specific foreign policy initiatives. Levi et. al.’ provides a framework to do exactly this, and use a revitalised criterion for assessment. Bearing in mind we are confronted with the correlation-does-not-equal-causation problem, this method supplies possible alternative explanations for outcomes, or choices for the actors. The Analytic Narrative accounts for preferences to explain choices and realises that choices may be interdependent. For example, what one person chooses depends on their expectations about what the other group will choose and vice versa. Even in the rationalist tradition, alternatives exist in the form of structural and functional logic that leads to *why* institutions make the choices they do.

The inclusion of a culture based level of assessment in Levi et. al.’s model enables greater explanatory value to be added to the review of the nature of relations between the

<sup>322</sup> Calvert, Randal. (2002). *Political Science: The State of Discipline III*. USA: W.W Norton and Company.

<sup>323</sup> Shapiro, Ian. Political Science Debate of Rational Choice: A Model that Pretends to Explain Everything. *The New York Times* online (26 Feb, 2000) [www.phoenix.liunet.edu](http://www.phoenix.liunet.edu)

<sup>324</sup> Wagner, R. H. (October, 2001) ‘Who’s Afraid of “Rational Choice Theory”’ [www.la.utexas.edu/~hw/papers/rct.pdf](http://www.la.utexas.edu/~hw/papers/rct.pdf)

EU and Japan on a bilateral tier. As such Chapter Four of this research complements the integrated approach of the Analytic Narrative. The most important factor to establish an Analytic Narrative is to address and to account for the extent to which choices are made by *whom* and *why*<sup>325</sup>, then identify and explore the mechanisms that generate them. These choices are shaped by experience and need and assimilate with goals and preferences, while also being subject to both internal and external pressure.

The rational choice theory is a scholarly approach to combine historical and comparative research. This theory has long influenced the studies of legislative politics, particularly in stable democracies, but Levi et. al.' departs from this tradition of the pure political economy and neo-classical economics in favour of a combination that includes more social elements<sup>326</sup>. The Analytic Narrative is an innovative and productive work that bridges the gap between theoretical and empirical driven approaches in political economy research. This research improves on earlier studies by advancing the application of a cross-disciplinary approach to explain strategic decision-making history. Levi et. al.' embarks on the task of revitalising rational choice theory, and has reacted to claims of methodological non-specificity. Critics such as Donald Green and Ian Shapiro assess the rational choice analytic theory with some contempt arguing that it does not advance our understanding of how politics works in a real world, "they do little more than restate existing knowledge of rational choice terminology"<sup>327</sup>. Green and Shapiro analyse this methodological defect in 1994.<sup>328</sup> Prompted by this review Levi restructured the rational

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<sup>325</sup> Levi, Margaret., Bates, Robert., Greif, Avner., Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent., and Weingast, Barry. (1998). *Analytic Narratives*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p9

<sup>326</sup> Ibid p21

<sup>327</sup> Green, Donald., and Shapiro, Ian. (1994). *Pathologies of Rational Choice: A Critique of Applications in Political Science*. USA: Yale University Press.

<sup>328</sup> Ibid

choice theory to become more encompassing.<sup>329</sup> This pressed Levi and likeminded scholars to create a distinct subsection add to rational choice literature to improve the field's substance and worth, albeit stepping out of the traditional confines of the framework. As mentioned earlier this framework moves away from an economic theme, preferring to incorporate a new and socially interpretive dynamic to current affairs.

This thesis argues that a degree of generality can supply many alternative choices that are governed by maximising gains both long term and short term, enabling research to test and re-test contending outcomes. The scope of generality undertaken in this research to include the key actors, goal and preferences of each actor going into the Joint Declaration 1991 and the Action Plan 2001. The Analytic Narrative also supplies a framework to predict the path of future interactions. John Scott reinforces this assumption in 'From Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of the Present' "People anticipate that any loss<sup>330</sup> can be traded in for a counter balance profit, which may become effective some time in the future", he also contends, "People can anticipate a long term reciprocity that is in everybody's interests can become an accepted norm"<sup>331</sup>. By way of measuring the success of this Analytic Narrative, the balance of power motives of Kenneth Waltz echoes subliminally. Waltz claims, in one of his most influential books about international politics, *Theory of International Politics*,

If states wished to maximise their power, they would join the stronger [of two states or coalitions], and we would see not balances forming but a world hegemony forged. This does not happen because balancing, not bandwagoning, is the behaviour

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<sup>329</sup> Levi, Margaret. (Summer, 1995). (Book Review): *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A critique of Applications in Political Science* by Donald Green and Ian Shapiro. *Political Science Quarterly*. New York. Vol.110, Iss.2. p326

<sup>330</sup> with regard to the Rational Choice calculation

<sup>331</sup> Scott, John. *Rational Choice Theory*. in Browning, Garry., Haldi, Albigail., and Webster, Frank. (eds). (2000). *Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of the Present*. Sage Publications. pp55-57 <http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~scottj/socscot7.htm>.



induced in the system. The first concern of states is not to maximise power but maintain their position within the system<sup>332</sup>.

Here Waltz argues that weaker states band together against strong ones, which would not maximise their power, rather ensure survival. This explains the deepening and widening of the EU and Japan as bilateral actors with the change in the identity of the US as a political and military actor, likewise how the increased presence of China will require action to maintain the balance.

Based on the various case studies undertaken Margaret Levi et. al.' asserts, the Analytic Narrative<sup>333</sup> "...represents an effort to clarify and make explicit the approach adopted by numerous scholars trying to combine historical and comparative research with rational choice models"<sup>334</sup>. This framework incorporates elements of behavioural studies, both formal and informal as a means of influence with incentives and constraints being highlighted; this in turn works well with the Identity theme reviewed in Chapter four of this thesis. The particular emphasis on the institution as a self-enforcing equilibrium that coordinates behaviour, the application of stable democracies (as opposed to conflict situations) and basic neoclassical economics all advocate the utility of this approach correlate values and beliefs with events. The use of this framework emphasises an approach of framing rational choice actors to draw better explanatory power over their actions; in this case the EU and Japan forming the Joint Declaration 1991, and the Action

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<sup>332</sup> Waltz, Kenneth. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*: Addison-Wesley. pp126-127

<sup>333</sup> Levi, Margaret., Bates, Robert., Greif, Anver., Rosenthal, Jean-Laurant., and Weingast, Barry., *Analytic Narratives*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Also, for further information, Robert Bates. (2000). *Analytic Narratives Revisited*. *Social Science History* Vol.24. pp685-696; Robert Bates. (2000). 'The Analytic Narrative Project'. *American Political Science Review*. Vol.94. pp696-702

<sup>334</sup> Levi, Margaret. (December 2002). *Modelling Complex Historical Processes with Analytic Narratives*. <http://www.yale.edu/probmeth/Levi.pdf>

Plan 2001. The section on Tilly's Four Point Plan<sup>335</sup> provides a basis to understand the objectives of the Analytic Narrative. Emphasis must be placed on identifying the shift of equilibrium at different points in time, advancing some actions but restraining others. It is because of this dimension that this analysis explores 'why the EU and Japan moved from relative political non-interaction to an agreement that encompasses a broad spectre of joint cooperation?' Are the consultation meetings openly establishing the short and long term goals of their actors? Consideration must be given to behaviour that affects, or may affect the EU and Japan as a causal comparative. Tilly's conclusions about the effects of divergent images and stereotype resonate in Levi et. al.'. Likewise "what actors believe will happen should they make a different choice may determine the choice they do make"<sup>336</sup>. James Mahoney agrees that the narrative approach is "...a useful tool for assessing causality in situations where temporal sequencing, particular events, and a path of dependence must be taken into account"<sup>337</sup>. Viewing the subject of analysis contextually and understanding the areas of similar and diverging beliefs are conclusively summarised by Robert Bates in the opening section of this chapter.

## 5.2 THE KEY ACTORS

The key actors of this investigation are the EU and Japan. When reviewing rational choice frameworks these key actors are not mutually exclusive and also include other nations and organisations that impact on the decisions that are made. In this case the role of the US and China remain central, as does the part played by MLOs and IGOs, such as the UN and the WTO (formally GATT), specifically. This section aims to outline and

<sup>335</sup> Tilly, Charles. (Summer, 2003). Political Identities in Changing Polities. *Social Research*, Vol.70, Iss.2

<sup>336</sup> Levi, Margaret. (2002). Modelling Complex Historical Processes with Analytical Narratives.

<http://www.yale.edu/probmeth/Levi.pdf><http://www.yale.edu/probmeth/Levi.pdf>, p5

<sup>337</sup> Mahoney, James. (1999). Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal in Macro-Causal Analysis. *American Journal of Sociology*. Vol.104, pp1154-1160

review the goals and preferences both domestically and on an international level of these key actors, displaying the costs and benefits to each group. The EU and Japan have been subjected to different experiences which have orientated their decisions. These include: history, culture, tradition and ideology,<sup>338</sup> and thus define different values and beliefs, some of which are outlined in Chapter Three: Historical Background. The grounding of these thoughts and goals from the past experience often attribute to the current status of a relationship, many of which are restated in the Four Point Plan in Chapter Four of this thesis. The establishment of the key actors' goals and preferences also are synonymous with the identification of constraints that may be defined from this level of analysis, displayed by a sequence of events that become causally important.

The foreign policy prerogatives of the primary actors in this discussion are important to distinguish. Some of these policy goals are domestic and bilateral while others are reflective of the increasing level of global interdependency across political, economic and social forums in line with international charters.

The Japanese successfully aimed to build an export market that held a competitive advantage that not only rallied around customer satisfaction through high-quality products, but also localisation which became a necessary strategy to maintain a competitive edge<sup>339</sup>. An economic shift to new host markets became a crucial component of Japan's success. Perhaps more so this shift was a need that metamorphosised into a

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<sup>338</sup> Holloran, Richard. (1985); Feld, Warner.J. (1983). *The European Community in World Affairs: Economic Power and Political Influence*. USA. Westview Press; Itoh, Mayumi. (2000). *Gloabalization of Japan*. New York: St Martins Press. p55

<sup>339</sup> Hook, Glenn.D., Gilson, Julie., Hughes, Christopher.W., and Dobson, Hugo. (2001). *Japan's International Relations*. London: Routledge. pp260-262. This was intrinsically connected to Foreign Direct Investment in Europe during the 1980s and resulted in a series of anti-dumping problems. Anti dumping is when "the export price to the Community is less than the normal value of that product on it home market". p261



goal of big business that would consume the Japanese business community and government interests for the next decade. Likewise, the EU wanted access to the affluent Japanese market but faced a series of restriction. This caused tension. Moving into the 1990s trade frictions about market access, FDI and trade deficits were ignited between Europe and Japan. Both the EU and Japan proceeded to use the Joint Declaration to pursue their national economic goals, but in doing so, Japan achieved a second goal—the deepening and widening of a joint political agenda. Both sides strengthened their cooperation in partnership in different areas to meet future challenges. Bilateral dialogue surrounding a broad agenda has enabled both actors to present policy goals to each other. Traditional rational choice frameworks do not account for a mutually beneficial outcome to be factored into the analysis, whereas the Analytic Narrative provides a discussion of cooperation; opposed to pure self-interest. The EU and Japan Joint Summit meetings reflect the formal dialogue, and the negotiations that were undertaken. Comparisons can be made annually for example between the 5<sup>th</sup> EU-Japan meeting<sup>340</sup> and the 6<sup>th</sup> EU-Japan Summit<sup>341</sup> there is evidence of the growing political awareness and goal-obtaining mechanism of the actors included in the Joint Declaration 1991.

The goals of Japan shifted somewhat after the signing of the Action Plan 2001. While market access, deregulation and trade deficits were prevalent between the EU and Japan with bilateral joint summits show a change in the initial aims of the two parties. Bilateral affairs, debatably self-satisfying goals have been superseded, with the bulk of Summit meetings being occupied by matters of a more regional and global agenda. The terrorist attacks of 2001 sent warning signals around the world and reinforced priorities of peace

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<sup>340</sup> Tokyo. 30 September, 1996. The Hague. 22 June, 1997

in confrontation with a new paradigm of war. The 12th Joint Summit<sup>342</sup> provides this example with only two small sections dedicated to economic matters and the remaining three pages promoting an increased strategic partnership, based on interdependency.

Japan's technological proficiency and bourgeois economy enabled the establishment of a strong global economy. While Japan has followed a path of modernity it maintains priority on the continuance of tradition<sup>343</sup>. Japan aims to improve policies of connectivity via multilateral institutions, and perhaps most central to the foreign policy of Japan at present is a commitment to world peace. The restrictions of Article IX of the Constitution of Japan are fostering a minimal degree of resentment about Japan's restricted ability to provide non-financial support. While Japan has embraced the war renunciation article for sixty years, recent contributions of the Self Defence Force (SDF) in offshore intelligence and non-combatant operations offshore have prompted a call for from the international community to revise the application of the Constitution. This has been a goal of Japan, having proven to the world community that they are a strong, responsive and responsible actor especially after the Terror attacks in 2001, rather than that of "cheque book diplomacy"<sup>344</sup>. Observers were astonished at the decisiveness with which Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi acted to lend Japanese support to the US war on terrorism. This action stood in stark contrast to decades of Japanese passivism and public ambivalence about the nation's military stance.<sup>345</sup> This raises the question of Japan's security position in Asia and the role they should play in ensuring this—providing fuel for the 'free rider'

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<sup>342</sup> Athens. 1-2 May, 2003

<sup>343</sup> Storry, Richard. (1970). *A History of Modern Japan*. England: Penguin books. p45

<sup>344</sup> Leheny, David. (2001/02). Tokyo Confronts Terror. *Policy Review*.

<http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3462446.html>

<sup>345</sup> Stewart, Devin.T. (2003). Japan's spontaneous support for war. *Asian Times*. (14 Feb 2003). [www.atimes.com](http://www.atimes.com)

discussion.<sup>346</sup> A change in the Constitution has been met with harsh internal criticism, such as a *Japan Times* article that suggests that any revision of Article IX, is “...an indication to the countries of the region, and to the rest of the world of the willingness to go back to the possibility of war.”<sup>347</sup> Charles Tilly would denounce such a statement as a ‘story’, or barrier that relates to stereotype rather than fact. The Analytic Narrative may provide this push to revise because of external pressure. There is no real cost to Japan other than at the domestic level yet it is important that Japanese leaders discuss the threats of terrorism which is now constitutionally condemned.<sup>348</sup> The terrorism amendment is important as citizens understand the threat posed by such actions, and why the government must adhere to fixed, transparent standard with regard to its enactment. The question of removing or altering Article IX remains problematic only on a regional level with the reaction from China. The Analytic Narrative recommends a gradual and supervised transition, once again reiterating the power of the collective over the individual, whilst redefining Japan’s post-war politics.

The EU has succeeded in emerging from a long period of internally focused goals both political and economic during the enlargement of the group to twenty-five members. The EU has become increasingly involved in Overseas Development Aid (ODA), the threat of terrorism and environmental issues such as the ratification of the Kyoto protocol and nuclear proliferation as external goals. The EU’s powerful population base, economic stamina aided by the single currency, and involvement in multilateral forums define the group. The EU was born out of a philosophy of never a war again on the continent, a goal which has been achieved with unparalleled success. Ironically, the security dimension of

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<sup>346</sup> See Chapter Four for more information.

<sup>347</sup> Arita, Eriko. (2004). Article 9: Change Signals Desire to Start War: NGOs. *Japan Times*. (August 13).

<sup>348</sup> The Joint Declaration on Terrorism 2001

the EU, CFSP was one of the last competencies the EU filled. The primary goals for EU foreign policy is determined the *Joint Summit Meetings*. The promotion of global peace, the rule of law and human rights are important to both groups. The inter-regional support of Japan was contingent upon meeting goals and perceived level of importance within the dialogue.

The secondary roles of the US and recently, China are key actors that determine the decision-making of the EU and Japan as domestic and international players. The changing nature, or rather global identity attributed to the US has also had impact in this area. How the US uses multilateral forums such as the WTO and UN has been in contention, a view that is not only restricted to the views of the EU and Japan. China's economic rise, pegging of their currency<sup>349</sup> and push to remove arms control restrictions makes the nation a very contentious actor in the affairs of the EU and Japan. Also key to the narrative of relations between the EU and Japan is the role, importance, perceived importance and actions of multilateral institutions. The role of regional blocks is not neglected, rather is incorporated into the building blocks of this discussion.

### 5.3 THE GOALS: THE PREFERENCES

The second requirement of the Analytic Narrative is to reinforce the policy goals of the EU and Japan. The goals are multidimensional in nature and draw attention to the more specific policy agendas and decisions made by Japan and the EU whilst acknowledging the role of multilateral institutions as a vent for these objectives.

Given the increased magnitude of the EU with regard to its position in Europe and as an international figure, the EU has a goal to use its powerful population and economic

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<sup>349</sup> The Yuan (RMB)

resilience, and to channel a more competent single voice. The EU's discernable goals revolve around the Euro, enlargement, regional and international sustainable peace and development aid to name a few. The issue of a single voice has been a controversial topic of discussion, especially concerning the ability of the EU to act as one in the WTO for example. The goal of creating single voice for the EU in international politics to be formally established in part results from a need to solidify the groups' identity in general, but also due to trade wars fought with the US in the 1990s. More recently, a single EU voice creates a pathway for the Union to work a more coordinated and efficient manner on matters of peace, the environment and terrorism. The capacity of the EU to act as an international actor was truly ignited in 1993 under the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This framework allowed the national and foreign policies to co-exist on a formal scale and began to fulfil a joint international policy dimension to the Union. Maastricht confirmed a supranational Union of member states, promoting the 'Three C's', coherence, complementarity and coordination as an EU objective<sup>350</sup>, and a necessary requirement for political union. The success of the single European currency, the Euro has been a goal consumed by the Community since the Single Market Programme of 1985 and formally as an aim to europeanise the continent. The Euro was been met with reasonable optimism and close coordination and dialogue with Japan and other nations has assured the currency a smooth transition and successful realisation in both domestic and international markets. The enlargement process of the EU pursues a goal to unite all of Europe under one elaborate umbrella. Starting with six countries in 1957 the Union now encompasses twenty five member states, with more

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<sup>350</sup> Holland, Martin. in: Cram, Dinan and Nugent. (1999). *Developments in the European Union*. USA: St. Martins Press. p231

phases to come. The long-standing goal of a consolidated European front<sup>351</sup> and has been met with great encouragement from Japan because of the open and transparent nature of dialogue between these two groups. Japan has supported the process of enlargement promoting open and transparent dialogue which will lead to greater joint movements between the two nations. The accession of 10 new Eastern European Countries to the Union, on May 1, 2004 has been recognised by Japan as being beneficial to the current bilateral relationship between these two nations. In the Joint Press Statement of the 12<sup>th</sup> EU-Japan Summit in Athens, 2003 Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi, Junichiro cites enlargement will "...lead to the stability and prosperity of the EU and world at large"<sup>352</sup>, while in a statement issued in 2004 by Ms. Kawaguchi, Japan's Minister for Foreign Affairs quotes a very similar viewpoint, "... the enlargement of the EU will lead to the stability and prosperity of Europe and the international community"<sup>353</sup>, including both economic and political spin offs for Japan.

The end of the Cold War has seen an increase in the practical importance of multilateral institutions to solve regional tensions. Facilitated by the Joint Declaration 1991 and the Action Plan 2001 dialogue and consultation fora have been incremental to bringing cultures and communities together. During this period the recognition of cultural diversity has been positive and encouraging, and has creating greater cultural understanding and lenience to the relationship of the EU and Japan. Intercultural involvement such as the EXPROM initiatives from 1979 and student, business and

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<sup>351</sup> For an accurate account of Enlargement of the European Union and its direct effect on Japan, see: [http://trade-info.cec.int/doclib/docs/2004/january/tredoc\\_115526.01.06](http://trade-info.cec.int/doclib/docs/2004/january/tredoc_115526.01.06) Posted by the European Commission 14-11-03.

<sup>352</sup> Zepter, Bernhard, EU Enlargement and Its Economic and Business Implication, Speech: Doshisha University Kyoto. (8 May, 2004) see: [http://jpn.cec.eu.int/home/speech\\_en\\_speechobj294.php](http://jpn.cec.eu.int/home/speech_en_speechobj294.php), No.0405

<sup>353</sup> Kawaguchi, Yoriko. Speech: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (1 May, 2004) see: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2004/5/0501.htm>



academic exchanges via the EU and Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation from 1987<sup>354</sup> indicate this. Also, the European Union Japan Business Dialogue Round Table (EUJBDRT) is a non-governmental initiative to overcome hurdles of development in business bilateral relations. The EUJBDRT, comprised of forty Chief Executive Officers of leading EU companies, was set up in 1995 provide policy recommendations to European and Japanese authorities. The goal of the EUJBDRT is to achieve greater market access in both regions, an area which has historically been a contentious issue. The goals of Japan are to become an integral part of the international community, to support the rule of law and democracy and encourage regional and international development initiatives.

On the domestic scale, Japan is among the few countries that have not waged a war since 1945— an act of restraint that cannot be exaggerated as it directly contrasts the fifty years proceeding, when Japan was one of the most intensely war-waging nations of the world. The desire to expunge the shame of the past still persists, under Prime Minister Yoshida the post war constitution of Japan is expressed in Article IX, “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means to settling international dispute”<sup>355</sup>, and has since remained at the forefront of Japanese foreign policy. On the international agenda, Japan has cautiously modified its security policy to drive out the ‘free-rider’ and ‘island of peace’ stereotypes and initiate a more active role.

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<sup>354</sup> More in depth information on the establishment and objectives of these programs are available at <http://www.eujapan.com/europe/centre.html> and <http://www.gatewaytojapan.org/eu/home.shtml> with an assessment of the productivity of these programs given in the Newsletter No.2, (30 January 2004) as a link from the Gateway to Japan web site mentioned above.

<sup>355</sup> The Constitution of Japan (3 November, 1946) Article IX see: see Appendix C or [www.constitution.org/cons/japan.txt](http://www.constitution.org/cons/japan.txt)



With regard to key actors of a multilateral nature, the EU and Japan have established a number of informal dialogues in specific or general areas, in addition to ministerial meetings and Government-level yearly Summits. At the 10<sup>th</sup> EU-Japan Summit<sup>356</sup>, leaders adopted an action plan to reinforce the EU and Japan partnership and move it from consultation to joint action. One of the four objectives for a stronger partnership is ‘the strengthening of the Economic and Trade partnership’ in bilateral relations and in multinational forums including the WTO”<sup>357</sup>. The EU and Japan launched a bilateral consultation that contributed to the successful WTO Ministerial meeting in Qatar in November 2001 and the adoption of the Doha Development Agenda. The EU and Japan have maintained this close relationship in order to conclude the new round of negotiations with other WTO members and to encourage the active participation of developing countries. Both partners also worked together to enable the accession of China and Taiwan to the WTO in December 2001. Problematically, is Washington's unwise return to economic regionalism, and the creation of new bilateral or regional free trade agreements? The EU and Japan have pushed the US to stimulate a move that directs strength to the WTO and the single world trade system it represents. More over the EU and Japan also urge the US to refrain from acting upon unilateral policy decisions and consult the greater global community. At this same time the US has also accelerated its Free Trade Areas (FTA) policy, precisely because they are not broadly multilateral, and have caused friction between nations. Aside from the conceptual and practical challenges FTAs pose to the WTO (a point its leaders recognize and often condemn), regional FTAs are also fundamentally incompatible with America's national interests. Nowhere is that incompatibility clearer than in East Asia, where local FTAs are proliferating, and where all are justified as a necessary response to American initiatives. Since 2001, China is an

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<sup>356</sup> Brussels (8 December 2001)

<sup>357</sup> See: press statement, [http://jpn.cec.eu.int/home/news\\_en\\_EU20NEWS202601.php](http://jpn.cec.eu.int/home/news_en_EU20NEWS202601.php)

example of this and has embarked on a mission to achieve a free trade area with all of Southeast Asia, and has begun work to create a similar arrangement in Northeast Asia.

Still the positions of the EU and Japan are usually of a solid nature, and their bilateral goals are stated in annual high-level summits. The most recent of such meetings is the 14<sup>th</sup> Japan-EU Summit.<sup>358</sup> These summits address key issues of bilateral, international and multilateral importance and thus establish the primary objectives of joint coordination between the two regions. In December 2005, both EU and Japan underlined their commitment to ensure the WTO Ministerial Conference of that year would have a meaningful and balanced result, specific to the negotiations in the Doha Development Agenda. On other multilateral frontages leaders of the EU and Japan reinstated preference of joint contributions to the Kyoto Protocol and climate change. The 2004 EU and Japan Joint Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament promoted this objective but this is in conflict with the EU's proposal to lift the arms embargo currently in place on China. Japan is formally opposed to this and the 14<sup>th</sup> EU and Japan Summit ensured deals with closer bilateral dialogue on this subject. The removal of the embargo destabilises the Asian region and while the restrictions of the Constitution of Japan have endured 50 years, China has only met 16 years of arms restriction. Both nations agreed that the work of the International Criminal Court was complementary to state driven efforts in this area.

This then gives an overview of the goals each party aspires to in accordance to the first part of Levi et. al.'s Analytic Narrative. There remains but two real choices for both the EU and Japan with regard to their goals as both domestic and international actors; either

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<sup>358</sup> A copy of the press statement of the 14<sup>th</sup> Japan-EU Summit in Luxembourg on 2 May 2005 is available at [http://www.kantieigo.jp/forgien/koizumispeech/2005/05/02seimei\\_e.html](http://www.kantieigo.jp/forgien/koizumispeech/2005/05/02seimei_e.html), which includes all of the reference points stated above.

work towards self-satisfying and independent policies that would perhaps alienate other international actors, or become an integrated part of the world community voicing goals that would be beneficial at large. The goals of both the EU and Japan are mutually meditative and parallel with multilateral issues of this period, so this section concludes that joint multifaceted cooperation would be the most optimal choice to achieve the goals of both the EU and Japan.

The rise of the constructivist paradigm and its challenge to mainstream international relations models has deepened the frame of identity, and as such is embraced throughout the theory of this research. Traditionally identity was credited as nothing more than “epiphenomenal adjuncts”<sup>359</sup> that focus only on the strategic incentives and the consequence of a decision in international politics. The constructivist dimension, on the other hand, maintains that identity is a fundamental actor that gives meaning to the nature of units being studied as well as reasons for their actions. Levi et. al.’ uses the analytic narrative, similar to this constructivist framework to pursue the idea that narratives condition an actor’s identity (together with beliefs, traditions and values) and hence inform their preferences and behaviours<sup>360</sup>. It is these non-material structures that condition actor’s identity and henceforth inform their perceptions and behaviour.<sup>361</sup>

The inter-subjective basis of the relationship between social goals and individual preferences, including strategic and purposeful behaviours, can be typified as rational analysis. The element of rational choice in the Analytic Narrative forms a synthesis

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<sup>359</sup> Ryu, Yongwook. (2005). The War on Terror and Japan’s National Identity. *Harvard Asia Quarterly*. Vol. IX. No. 1 + 2 (Winter/Spring 2005)

<sup>360</sup> For a purely constructivist analysis of Identities and Preferences see: Wendt, A. (1999). Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construct of Power Politics. *International Organisation*. Vol. 6, No.2. pp391-425

<sup>361</sup> Wendt, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

between rationalism and constructivism when evaluating the preferences of the primary actors. The constructivist approach helps to establish the preferences of an actor, and the rationalist approach asks how those preferences interact within particular structural or strategic environments to produce outcomes. On the other hand, the example of Japan differs as Post-war Japan did not attempt to maximise power through the use of force. However constricted the nation was after the Constitution of Japan with regard to Article IX, Japan has not attempted to sustain a functional armed military even when the international situation could perhaps allow the case. Instead Japan opted for an economically based foreign policy, operating and supporting what international relations literature would describe as a policy of interdependence or mutual dependence. Japan was bound to recognise the use of force to be unproductive and potentially destabilising.<sup>362</sup> The largely reactive nature of Japan during this period perhaps indicates the mix of strategy, pragmatism and reluctance that has surrounded its actions. The non-militarisation of the nation is attributable to the goal of economic development through industry and policy of non-aggression in diplomacy. On a trade frontier, in the 1970s Japan showed dissatisfaction with traditional bilateral relations with the US and the passivity on Japan's part was to be expected. The Prime Ministerial change to Takeshita, Noboru showed a change of the Japanese goal, instead a more proactive role in the marketing in Japan on an international scale<sup>363</sup>, but also to encourage the development of Japan and US relations on a more equal scale even through the 1980s. The goal Japan set itself during this time was to increase multilateral initiatives, foreign economic assistance, and continuity in Japan's foreign diplomacy, thereby increasing the nation's profile in general. Takeshita announced in 1988 a policy called 'International

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<sup>362</sup> Newland, Kathleen. (1990). *The International Relations of Japan*. Great Britain: Millennium Publishing Company. p141

<sup>363</sup> *Ibid* p154

Cooperation Initiative' which was to be based on three pillars: the expansion of Overseas Development Aid (ODA), the promotion of international cultural exchange, and strengthening the contribution of Japan to international peace. These goals are reflective of current policy prerogatives and are contributing factors to the increase in bilateral relations between the EC and Japan, consolidated in the 1991 Declaration.

In terms of preferences, Japan dealt with its feeling of subordination with the US by changing the terms of endearment as discussed above. The European Community held potentiality for Japan, but the 1980s found Japan's preferences drawn toward bilateral agreements between EC member states rather than the community at large. Regionally, Japan was the *de facto* leader and as such supported the region through industry and Overseas Development Aid. The late 1980s saw a deeper interest in Japan to the EU because of trade frictions with the United States, and Europe being a largely untapped market.

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## CHAPTER SIX

### SUMMARIES and CONCLUSIONS

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The most important change that people can make is to change their way of looking at the world. We can change studies, jobs, neighbourhoods, even countries and continents, and still remain much as we always were. But change our fundamental angle of vision and everything changes—our priorities, our values, our judgements, our pursuits<sup>364</sup>

#### 6.0 OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS<sup>365</sup>

The nature of relations between the European Union and Japan, as an exclusive partnership has been given minimal analysis over the past fifteen years. Each group independently has accumulated an abundance of literature however bilateral, theoretical, and objective accounts of the nature of the EU and Japan relationship is amiss. This thesis has compiled a unique collection of secondary works to interpret how two political agreements have shaped and moulded the foreign political and economic relationship between the EU and Japan. The merger of objective information has created a platform to critique subjective inaccuracies and add insight to the nature of relations between these actors. As such, the governing theme throughout this thesis is the concept identity, a subject which is dominant in both the Four Point Plan and the Analytic Narrative. The humanistic, yet politically and economically astute nature of the theoretical components applied to this research complement the diverse nature of the subjects being studies. The framework offered by Charles Tilly has drawn attention to the various ‘stories’ that are formed over time and by the experiences of the EU and Japan. These stories affect the

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<sup>365</sup> Footnotes have not been used in the summary and conclusions of this research. This is due to the full and individual footnotes that consume the rest of this thesis, and because no new concepts will be introduced here. For more in depth analysis of the information in Chapter 6 please refer to the appropriate page in this thesis.

creation of foreign policy in its raw state. This is discussed with particular emphasis on the Joint Declaration 1991 and the Action Plan 2001. Subsequently, the Analytic Narrative formed by Margaret Levi et.al.' explains on the goals and perceptions of EU-Japan and narrates conclusions about the EU and Japan joint ventures. Both the Four Point Plan and the Analytic Narrative conclude that the role of stereotyping plays a considerable role in cross-cultural policy formation. Tilly's Four Point formulation allows at least a comparative outlet to draw attention to the general stereotypes that are demonstrated across a varied subject range.

Throughout the course of this research a series of questions have been established to provoke thought and contextualise the various topics that have been covered within this scope of EU and Japan relations. The following section will reiterate these questions and provide a synoptic response. The final two sections of this Chapter provide a working definition of the current nature of relations between the EU and Japan as a process of historic interactions. In consideration of these interpretations it is possible to outline future options and as such, policy recommendations to continue the progressive nature of EU-Japan relations.

### **6.1 A summary of the questions posed within this research**

This summary provides condensed answers to the questions that are posed throughout this research. They are based on historical and theoretical components of this investigation which analyse stereotypes comparatively by interpreting secondary scholarship. This can therefore reach an accurate conclusion about *The nature of relations between the European Union and Japan*.



**i. What is the driving force behind EU and Japan relations?**

The driving forces behind EU and Japan relations are relevant to time and place. As discussed within the previous chapters of this investigation, the driving forces behind EU and Japan interaction shift from a purely economic level to a more diplomatic and global orientation. The 1980s demonstrate that EU and Japan were occupied with internal structuring, regional security and political coordination and as such the relationship was largely determined by economic factors. At this time Japan and Europe were economically bound to the United States under a hegemonic world structure. This research indicates that the fall of Communism and the end of the Cold War reduced much of the security reliance that had been connected to the United States. To compensate for this, the US changed its previously soft economic policy towards Japan and began to demand a higher level of reciprocal trade. This in part accelerated Japan's entrepreneurial confidence, affirmed by the EU wanting to benefit from Japan's high-quality value added technology, and car industry. Also, Japan recognised a growing global market in the European Community and pursued access to the size and wealth of the European market. The signing of the Joint Declaration was indicative of many of these economic pursuits, demonstrated by the numerous dialogue and consultation frameworks that it established. The Joint Declaration also introduced a political dimension to the bilateral relationship. While the political component of the Joint Declaration was weak on a practical level it did however successfully draw upon areas of mutual interest at a global level, pointedly by reducing the power-cycle of the USA. The ten year period of the Joint Declaration resulted in the Action Plan 2001 which can evaluate the true driving force behind EU and Japan relations, presently. The Action Plan built up on a mutual recognition that was established by the joint Declaration 1991, but with more efficiency improved upon current economic agendas by largely focusing on joint cooperation via MLOs, IGOs and

other such multilateral initiatives. In sum, the current driving force behind EU and Japan relations transpire directly from the evolution of the Joint Declaration 1991 and the Action Plan 2001. This driving force is globally orientated and promotes a global peace that benefits from an intercultural understanding; it is also recognised because of the international difficulties of the political and economic experiences of both groups.

## **ii. What hinders this driving force?**

Simply, the Constitution of Japan and Article IX play a dominant role in the lack of progressive action that Japan can par-take in on a global scale. There has been a great level of controversy both inside Japan and on an international level with debate heading the current relevance of Article IX. The international community have requested that it be removed, which would release Japan from its imposing 'free-rider' status. A shadow-stance style of diplomacy has typified the past national contribution of Japan in areas of global instability and this has become of increasing concern for the EU. Japan's physical inactivity is further troubled by the internal debate surrounding how the removal of Article IX will be perceived by its neighbours, and as the spin-off effects on regional stability. While terrorist attacks on the US (2001) fuelled a new global need to reduce discrimination along arbitrary lines, this method of thought has been pursued by the Joint Declaration 1991 signed more than a decade prior to this. As discussed, the effect of constructed identity formations, stereotypes and perceptions can hinder the nature of cross-cultural relations, 2001 feeds into this problem. Provided that open and frequent dialogue is maintained this should not impinge upon the current nature of relations between the EU and Japan, nor any other intercultural communications. Political research should not be based on a specific event, but analyse the roots and histories that surround an event acknowledging the impact of stereotypes and stories.

**iii. Does the construction of identity substantially affect foreign policy decision-making?**

The construction of group identity significantly affects the way in which foreign policies are made. The way in which a nation is historically regarded premeditates the assessment of their character in current times. This has been explained by the effect of memories, regardless of the time gone past. The construction of Japan's identity prior up to the Joint Declaration was classified by its ultranationalist years prior to the end of WWII. Japan remained cautious toward a European Community that placed itself before anything else, a not-so-Community feel. The deconstruction of many of the barriers that hinder international relations is analysed in Chapter Four with the model of Charles Tilly's Four Point Plan. Tilly's method provides an assessment that describes both internal and external areas of which story-based barriers effect relations. This also adds to an identity-based impact on foreign policy coordination. The western phrase of 'one bad thing can destroy the work of a hundred good things' summarises the possible outcome of foreign policy decisions based on the perception of one's character, rather than the reality of the situation.

**ix. Will the increasing growth of China surpass the usefulness of Japan in the eyes of the EU?**

Contemporary scholarship deems China to be the economic miracle of the twenty-first century, similar to the analogy that was accredited to Japan shortly after WWII. The relationship between the EU and China is growing in competence and has a strong economic interconnection, yet the European Central Bank has proceeded with caution, sceptical about how the Chinese currency is marked against other leading currencies. With the largest population of any single nation, the Chinese market is closely watched

and nurtured. The political level of relations between the EU and China are in a maturing, transitional phase plagued by historical reference and discrepancies over political practises. There is international concern about China's lack of regard for the rule of law, democracy and human rights all of which are embedded at the core of EU foreign policy. Japan has a proven track-record in these areas and has demonstrated these abilities at the highest global level. The relationship between the EU and Japan will not be affected by the increasing global presence of China because of their established political and economic relationship provided that Japan remains competitive within the Asian market. This is not to imply that China will not prove itself to be an adaptive and more conscious actor in our global environment in the future, but as yet the nation poses no significant threat to the political and economic development of the current EU and Japan relationship.

**x. What impact (if any) will the unilateral policies of the United States have on the relationship between the EU and Japan?**

The historical dependency upon the US as the global hegemonic entity has changed with the rise and competence of globalisation and interdependency. Unilateralism does not complement the established multilateral covenants of the present day and as such has met increasing international frustration. Compliance with global environment initiatives such as the Kyoto protocol provide an example of this, as the cost of compliance for the US outweighs the immediate and tangible benefits of such an act. The foreign policy prerogatives of the US could theoretically interchange with the words 'traditional rational choice' in Chapter Five of this research. More explicitly this implies that traditional rational choice (the US), as a purely economic tool, is outdated and a narrative method that includes a series of variables to evaluate outcomes is favoured to be more

appropriate. The most recent example of US unilateralism was the complete disregard for international decision making channels after the World Trade Centre bombings in 2001. The US acted emotively and without the consent of the United Nations Security Council sent troops abroad. The fall out cost of this has been enormous and while the US disregarded the need for consent from other nations for a retaliatory attack against both Afghanistan and Iraq, they demanded a global effort to help in the reconstruction of these nations. With regard to the impact that these policies will have on the relationship between the EU and Japan, this research has found that it has brought these actors closer. The EU and Japan have played a leading example in the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, assistance to foreign aid in the third world and also in the area of intercultural exchanges and multiregional actions that promote international peace and prosperity that is without condition. If anything, globalisation has affected the way in which other nations treat the US, but not the way in which the US treats them.

**xi. How do the theoretical themes of this thesis help to understand the nature of relations between the EU and Japan?**

*The social construction of identity:*

The social construction of identity draws parallels to the key words: Identity, Constructivism, Multi-culturalism, Tolerance and Experience. This concept has been discussed in regard to the role in which identity plays in foreign policy decision making, its substance and applicability will be reaffirmed here. The social construction of a group is a modern concept that is paramount to the identity to which it is attributed. Currently the national identities of the EU and Japan are summarised by their assertiveness in a global context and by their passive and diplomatic manner. Both actors are regional leaders with their passivity being determined by legal restraints, yet both have a

diplomatic urgency that ensures a stable political and economic environment. Japan has however been categorised as a follower rather than a leader, which perhaps reflects a safety mechanism to avoid a resurgence of pre-WWII connotations. The European Union has the potential to be a strong leader; the power-base is in place yet member state nationalist resurgences hinder the synthesis of the EU to act as a single power. The increasingly globalised international environment has paved the path for intercultural exchange and closer understanding. The theoretical guideline that is provided by identity is an important analytic tool with studying two groups that are diverse in nature. While the concept of identity observes the differences between two groups it also highlights their similarities. Particularly since 1991 the EU and Japan have become aware of constructed political and social identities and have proactively used joint action mechanisms to reduce any negative impacts that could arise.

*The Four Point Plan:*

The Four Point Plan designed by Charles Tilly is explained by the keywords: Barrier, Stories, the West and the East, Stereotype and importantly by identity. This theoretical model provides a multidisciplinary approach to understanding the nature of relations between the EU and Japan by establishing the boundaries and stories that may detract from positive relations. Many of the barriers described within the Four Point Plan have been recognised by the EU and Japan through joint action initiative. Again understanding the social construction, or breaking down 'stories' has been an integral part of the increasingly insightful nature of this partnership. The theoretical attractiveness of this approach is the ability to extract and correct misconceptions that can effect certain policy decision. The Four Point Plan provides a conscious effort to ensure that all information is accounted for and analysed before any action is taken. The provision of informed and

conclusive narratives between the EU and Japan is a positive spin that is explained directly by the Four Point Plan method of deduction.

*The Analytic Narrative:*

The Analytic Narrative is summarised by the keywords: Identity, Goals, Perceptions, Narratives, Rational Choice and the study of International Relations as a social construction rather than an uninformed cost/benefit analysis. This contemporary framework extends beyond the traditional confines of international relations and the economic foundations of rational choice theory that provides a semi-mathematical method with a largely empirical content. The Analytic Narrative promotes a type of collective action that classifies ethical consideration, sometimes a loss for one is the best for all. While the Analytic Narrative still emphasises the cost/benefit influences of rational choice, its focal point is the outcome more so than the method, a community dimension with a sustainable outcome. The Analytic Narrative includes the influence of goals and preferences in its analysis of the primary documents of this research's analysis: The Joint Declaration 1991 and the Action Plan 2001. The Analytic Narrative observes the impact of the US and China as third party factors that influence relations between the EU and Japan, highlighting many of the subconscious reasons in decision making. The most important notion that the Analytic Narrative offers is the understanding of what can seem like an immediate loss is actually a conscious foresight to a greater profit. The Analytic Narrative helps to understand and contextual nature of EU and Japan relations and is thus of analytical importance.



## **6.2 CONCLUSIONS**

The nature of relations between the European Union and Japan can be characterised as entrepreneurial, responsive and complimentary – a bilateral relationship that is pro-active in a global society. The EU and Japan are positively orientated nations that have been moulded by similar historical experiences. As regional superpowers both groups have learnt the art of tolerance in their joint foreign policy decision-making. The importance of the construction of identity in foreign policy analysis has been demonstrated by the Four Point Plan and the Analytic Narrative and is integral to the continuation of EU-Japan relations. This thesis has demonstrated that while the Joint declaration between the EU and Japan in 1991 was the cornerstone document to improve bilateral relations, the importance of recognising cultural differences and how an identity can be compiled of stories rather than facts is paramount. The success of the Action Plan 2001 is indicative of this new era of cautiousness and interest within the global community.

The theoretical nature of this research has been demonstrated by considerable interregional knowledge between the EU and Japan. Both groups have a broad community focus and are closely tied to a number of multilateral organisations. Both the EU and Japan have recognised the need to promote intercultural relations, this has been apparent by Objective Four in the Action Plan 2001.

Both Japan and the European Union have proven themselves to be both resilient teachers and students. By this, I conclude that the degree of adaptability that both Japan and the EU have shown post-WWII is well advanced. Both groups have rebuilt economically and politically to become some of the largest trading markets in the world. The Four Point Plan allowed the deconstruction of stereotypes which plagued the earlier years of EU and

Japan coordinated policy. The Four Point Plan indicated that because of the depth and breadth of intergovernmental, economic and social contact that these stereotypes have reduced to almost nothing. The only area of foreign diplomacy policy that is not yet solidified is the scope of 'Regional Security'. As discussed earlier in this research Japan is bound by Article IX of the Constitution of Japan. With regard to the removal of, or adjustment to the context of this legally binding commitment, greater domestic, regional and international dialogue must be encouraged. Trade access and FDI initiatives are at the top of the agenda for discussion between Japan and the EU. Unequivocally this has no direct relation to identity nor stereotype misperception, only political and economic advancement. The Action Plan 2001 directly attributes to positive negotiations in this area.

The Analytic Narrative draws conclusions from the goals and preferences of the EU and Japan. Throughout the primary documentation this thesis explores (the Joint Declaration 1991 and the Action Plan 2001) and discussed amid the secondary works to which I refer, a great number of commonalities are observable. The preferences of both groups are more grounded than in many other bilateral relationships and are not separated by "we will do this if you will do that" arbitrations. The lessons of the past twenty years, of misunderstandings, due to uninformed and ill-conceived and inaccurate information have been reduced, or as Anthony Grafton was quoted earlier in this research, 'the line between us and them must fall'.

This thesis concludes that the role of the United States, as a third party intervening factor between the EU and Japan has prompted a closer relationship. The analogy of the US as a 400pound gorilla ensnares the unilateralist periphery that US foreign policy is confined to

leaving the EU and Japan to prefer joint cooperation plans that have collective outcomes. While Japan remains under the umbrella of Article IX the US remains in control of much of the nation's external participation. Japan deems itself to be sufficiently capable to etch out a position on the international stage and is taking the appropriate steps to ensure that this happens.

Presently, the impact of China on the foundations of EU and Japan relations is relatively minimal on a practical level. While the Chinese economy and rate of production continues to rise, Japan holds the trump-card with regard to modern experience, ideological duality and a common respect to the rule of law. The future predictions section (part 6.3) for the EU and Japan relationship does however include China as a positive variable over the next decade. Remaining watchful as China's interests expand Japan's policy prerogatives stay concentrated on the EU and the Japanese internal market. What needs to be monitored in future research is the possible artificial buoyancy of the upcoming Olympic Games in Beijing, 2008—the economic miracle that assisted the Japanese economy up in 1964.

### **6.3 POLICY RECOMMENDATION FOR THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF BILATERAL REALTIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND JAPAN.**

While the European Union and Japan have a relationship that is very rare in cross-cultural politics, it is essential that the level, content and frequency of their current consultative formats are not reduced. Also, it is paramount to ensure that the Action Plan 2001 initiatives for bilateral relations continue to set a high standard of joint policy and establish a precedent for other nations to follow.

Both the EU and Japan need to remain watchful towards the increasing prominence of China. The Beijing Olympics 2008 will more than likely trigger the need for closer political partnerships but will not define the future of bilateral, economic relations between groups. Caution must be maintained with the extent to which China becomes involved in multilateral initiatives yet these instances give China the chance to further prove itself on an international level. Also, as China petitions to have arms restrictions removed, scholars should be aware of the length of time the constrictions of Article IX played in Japan's involvement in international affairs. As such any rash decision will create instability in the area until the Constitution of Japan is revised.

In summary, Japan must renegotiate its national mandate to remove the restrictions of Article IX of the Constitution of Japan. A slow and subtle policy change, over a longer period of time should avoid any regionally and internationally discontent. While it is recognised that Article IX is outdated it does serve the purpose of stability and as such any change at a slower pace will ensure that negative media attention is minimal, and the cultural constructs that would follow are pro-active.

There remains minimal research that places direct focus on the EU and Japan as primary actors. The literature available at present largely constitutes case studies pursuant to the US dimension. The research that this thesis has undertaken found that the literature about Japan as the Primary actor was both easily accessible and of scholarly content. European theorists need to take a lead and contribute to this evolving partnership by providing a greater emphasis on the dynamics of the EU-Japan relationship- both past and present to greater balance.

2011 will see the next step in relations between the EU and Japan. Historically this relationship has been through many dimensions, early economic relations led to a deeper political undertaking to begin with. Secondly, the economic level transcended to political competencies' which established the emphasis of cultural interaction and understanding. Now firmly engrained in EU-Japan relations is the bilateral dimension at a multinational level, and it is my opinion that the next paradigm in this long term relationship will be focused on international relations and beyond the human level—the environment. As cultural interactions began as a small section of the greater Action Plan in 2001 then environmental issues will replicate this in 2011 with the further ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, the impact of global warming, renewable energy sources and global disarmament. Certainly by 2021 these issues will be at the forefront international discussion.

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The Japanese Business Council in Europe. <http://www.jbce.org>

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American Political Science Review  
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International Political Science Review  
Political Science Quarterly  
The Australian Journal of Politics and History  
The Journal of Common Market Studies  
The Journal of Conflict Resolutions  
The Journal of Japanese Trade and Industry  
The Review of Politics

**Websites of Interest:**

The World Bank	<a href="http://www.worldbank.org">www.worldbank.org</a>
The United Nations	<a href="http://www.un.org">www.un.org</a>
The Constitution of Japan	<a href="http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Japan/English/english-Constitutions.html">www.solon.org/Constitutions/Japan/English/english-Constitutions.html</a>
The World Trade Organisation	<a href="http://www.wto.org">www.wto.org</a>

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## APPENDIX A

### Joint Declaration on Relations between The European Community and its Member States and Japan

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#### **(1) PREAMBLE**

The European Community and its member States on the one part and Japan on the other part,

- conscious of their common attachment to freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights
- affirming their common attachment to market principles, the promotion of free trade and the development of a prosperous and sound world economy;
- recalling their increasingly close ties and acknowledging growing worldwide interdependence and, acknowledging growing worldwide interdependence and, consequently, the need for heightened international cooperation;
- affirming their common interest in security, peace and stability of the world;
- aware of the importance of deepening their dialogue in order to make a joint contribution towards safeguarding peace in the world, setting up a just and stable international order in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter and taking up the global challenges that the international community has to face;
- mindful of the accelerated process whereby the European Community is acquiring its own identity in the economic and monetary sphere, in foreign policy and in the field of security;

have decided to intensify their dialogue and to strengthen their cooperation and partnership in order that the challenges of the future may be met.

#### **(2) GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DIALOGUE AND OF COOPERATION**

The European Community and its member States and Japan will firmly endeavour to inform and consult each other on major international issues, which are of common interest to both Parties, be they political, economic, scientific, cultural or other. They will strive, whenever appropriate, to co-ordinate their positions. They will strengthen their cooperation and exchange of information both between the two Parties and within international organizations.

#### **(3) OBJECTIVES OF DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION**

The two Parties will set out to explore together areas of possible cooperation, including where appropriate common diplomatic action. They will endeavour to strengthen their cooperation in a fair and harmonious way in all areas of their relations taken as a whole in particular with respect to the following :

- promoting negotiated solutions to international or regional tensions and the strengthening of the United Nations and other international organizations;
- supporting social system based on freedom, democracy, the rule of law, human rights and market economy;
- enhancing policy consultation and, wherever possible, policy coordination on the international issues which might affect world peace and stability, including international security matters such as the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, the non-proliferation of missile technology and the international transfer of conventional weapons;
- pursuing cooperation aimed at achieving a sound development of the world economy and trade, particularly in further strengthening the open multilateral trading system, by rejecting protectionism and recourse to unilateral measures and by implementing GATT and OECD principles concerning trade and investment;
- pursuing their resolve for equitable access to their respective markets and removing obstacles whether structural or other, impeding the expansion of trade and investment, on the basis of comparable opportunities;
- strengthening their dialogue and cooperation on various aspects of multifaceted relations between both Parties in such areas as trade, investment, industrial cooperation, advanced technology, energy, employment, social affairs and competition rules;

- supporting the efforts of developing countries, in particular the poorest among them, to achieve sustained development and political and economic progress, along with fostering respect for human rights as a major factor in genuine development, with due regard for the objectives set by international organizations;
- joining their efforts in meeting transnational challenges, such as the issue of environment, the conservation of resources and energy, terrorism, international crime and drugs and related criminal activity, in particular the laundering of the proceeds of crime;
- strengthening cooperation and, where appropriate, promoting joint projects in the field of science and technology with a view to contributing to the promotion of scientific knowledge which is essential for the future prosperity of all mankind;
- developing academic, cultural and youth exchange programmes aiming to increase knowledge and improve understanding between their respective peoples;
- supporting, in cooperation with other States or organizations, Central and Eastern European countries engaged in political and economic reforms aimed at stabilizing their economies and promoting their full integration into world economy;
- Cooperating, in relation with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, for the promotion of peace, stability and prosperity of the region.

#### **(4) FRAMEWORK FOR DIALOGUE AND CONSULTATIONS**

Both Parties are committed to engage in continuous dialogue to give substance to this Declaration. To this end, in addition to the full use of all existing regular consultation mechanisms, both Parties have decided to strengthen their mechanisms for consultation and substantial cooperation on global and bilateral issues;

- especially they have decided to hold annual consultations in Europe or in Japan between, on the one hand, the President of the European Council and the President of the Commission and, on the other, the Japanese Prime Minister;
- an annual meeting continues to be held between the Commission and the Japanese Government at ministerial level;
- six-monthly consultations continue to be held between the Foreign Ministers of the Community and the Member of the Commission responsible for external relations (Troika) and the Japanese Foreign Minister;
- the representatives of Japan are briefed by the Presidency of European Political Cooperation following ministerial political cooperation meetings, and Japan informs the representatives of the Community of Japanese Government's foreign policy.

In order to give substance to this declaration, both Parties will make use of the existing and above-mentioned fora with a view to regularly review its implementation and to provide a permanent stimulus to the development of EC-Japan relations.

18 July 1991 at The Hague

## APPENDIX B

An Action Plan for EU-Japan

Cooperation

**European Union – Japan Summit**

**Brussels**

**2001**

**SHAPING**

**OUR**

**COMMON FUTURE**

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1. We, the European Union and Japan, have decided to launch a Decade of Japan -Europe Cooperation.

We are determined to shape our common future. We must give new impetus to our relationship, with greater focus on concrete measures and concerted action. As a reflection of our shared responsibility to contribute to international peace, security and prosperity, we have today adopted a broad and forward-looking agenda for EU-Japan co-operation.

**Evolution since the Joint Declaration of 1991**

2. This year we celebrate the 10th anniversary of the European Community-Japan Joint Declaration

adopted on 18 July 1991 in The Hague. The Declaration's general principles and objectives remain as valid as ever and rest upon a solid foundation of common values including a belief in peace, freedom, democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and the promotion of sustainable development.

3. Our relations have developed steadily since the adoption of the 1991 Declaration. An extensive bilateral political dialogue has evolved. A regular rhythm of annual Summits, Troika ministerials and official level meetings cover a wide range of issues. In the economic sphere, ties have expanded and we have worked closely together to strengthen the multilateral trading system and to pursue a constructive dialogue on investment and trade.

4. Our relations continue to grow closer. We are working together to address global challenges and we are actively involved in each other's region. Mutual links have grown across the whole spectrum of relations: political co-operation, trade and investment flows, business collaboration, and a remarkable rise in the number of exchanges and visits to and from Japan and EU Member States. These developments are welcome, but, at the same time, they underline the untapped potential for more extensive contacts and co-operation.

#### **The changes in Europe and the Asia-Pacific Region**

5. We have witnessed significant changes in Europe and the Asia-Pacific Region over the past ten years. The end of the cold war has ushered in great opportunities for dynamic regional, inter-regional and global co-operation. In Europe, the EU has advanced in political integration and achieved economic and monetary union. It is now preparing for enlargement of its membership, while striving to promote stability and prosperity among its other neighbours. It has considerably strengthened its capacity for external actions, including through the development of its crisis management policies by using both military and civilian means in accordance with the principles of the UN charter.

6. In the Asia-Pacific Region, ARF, APEC and ASEAN+3 are examples of growing regional dialogue. The continued development in the Asia-Pacific Region, overcoming the financial and economic crisis, has great impact on the political and economic landscape of the world as a whole. An important feature of the growing EU-Japan political relationship in recent years is co-operation in promoting regional dialogue both at the multilateral level and bilaterally. Japan and the EU also encourage and support cross-regional links of co-operation, e.g. through ASEM and the OSCE.

#### **Enhanced EU-Japan co-operation in the age of globalisation**

7. We have achieved a significant convergence of views and policies on a range of global and regional issues, including the promotion of peace and stability in regions of conflict. This provides a solid foundation for further developing our political co-operation to prevent such conflicts and the

### **SHAPING OUR COMMON FUTURE**

- EU-Japan Agenda for Co-operation -

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human suffering they entail and to ensure good governance, the rule of law and respect for human rights.

8. The EU and Japan are totally committed to the international fight against terrorism. We will actively engage in this fight and take concrete measures to demonstrate clearly our determination, including continued support to the global coalition and the provision of humanitarian assistance to those who suffer. We have issued a separate declaration on terrorism at this summit meeting and will continue to exchange information on the measures each side is taking.

9. As the trend toward globalisation presents both opportunities and challenges to our societies and to the international community as a whole, we are determined to take its advantage and to share with developing countries its inherent opportunities, while mitigating its adverse effects.

10. Closer co-operation is a true necessity. As global partners, accounting for major share of world GDP, and the world's largest donors of development assistance, we have a special responsibility to the global community. With this in mind, we will intensify our efforts to promote sustainable development and to reduce poverty, while striving to make our assistance more efficient and better directed to those most in need.

11. We aim to ensure that our bilateral economic relations continue to foster an open environment for trade and investment and develop the potential offered, for example, by information technology and



biotechnology, that will serve as important and complex driving forces in realising growth in new economy and forming the world of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. As the fast evolution brought by the knowledge-driven

economy naturally directs us towards strengthening mutually beneficial economic relations, we will continue our partnership in support of the multilateral trading system and our efforts to ensure a stable macro-economic environment.

12. Pursuit of economic growth must go hand in hand with the promotion of social cohesion. The EU and Japan are both facing challenges to their own social systems and quality of life, among other things unemployment, aging populations and the need to review social security arrangements. We are also intent on promoting gender equality.

#### **Action Plan for EU-Japan Co-operation**

13. The time is therefore ripe to strengthen further the bilateral relationship and to express this in a new political commitment. At the EU-Japan Summit in Tokyo in July 2000, we decided to elaborate an Action Plan. Through strong policy co-ordination and concrete joint initiatives, both immediate and over the long term, we aim to address the challenges which Japan and the EU confront together, both at home and globally.

14. Our co-operation rests on shared global responsibilities with a view to promoting human security for the benefit of all. Furthermore, our co-operation should enhance engagement in each other's region and be based on a spirit of mutual respect and with due consideration to cultural diversity.

15. The Action Plan addresses four major objectives: (1) Promoting Peace and Security; (2) Strengthening the Economic and Trade Partnership Utilising the Dynamism of Globalisation for the Benefit of All; (3) Coping with Global and Societal Challenges, and (4) Bringing Together People and Cultures. The attached Action Plan is intended to lay the foundation for well diversified EU-Japan relations over the decade ahead. So that our cooperation strategy is energetically pursued and kept current, we will coordinate regularly, and update the Action Plan as necessary at the annual EU-Japan Summit.

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16. We are committed to implementing the Action Plan, putting to full use the mechanisms already in place. Across the range of the Action Plan, the EU Presidency and European Commission will be fully associated and implicated in line with their responsibilities, as will the Government of Japan. In order to deepen the existing political dialogue in the foreign policy sphere, the EU and Japan will intensify their contacts. On behalf of the EU Council, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) will keep the Foreign Minister of Japan informed of important developments in the CFSP, including the European Security and Defence Policy. The Japanese Minister will, in turn, inform the EU of key developments in Japanese foreign policy.

17. Ultimately, it is people who breathe life into the EU-Japan relationship. That is why we attach such importance to the development of people-to-people links. Only with their active support will we succeed in attaining our goals.

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We have a particular ambition to develop our relations in the political sphere. Tapping the unrealised potential for co-operation in this area can help us attain the many objectives we have in common, and also broaden the base of our own relationship.

Reflecting the values and objectives we share, this co-operation will be organised in the first instance around three central themes:

- the strengthening of the UN;
- continued co-operation designed to achieve the elimination of all Weapons of Mass Destruction, based on the principle of undiminished security for all ; and
- the promotion and the protection of human rights.

The promotion of regional dialogue and political stability already constitute a growing area of our mutual co-operation. We shall pursue these efforts, through work both at multilateral level (through the UN, and organisations and fora such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM)) and bilaterally in areas such as the Balkans, East Timor, and the Korean Peninsula.

Sharing responsibility for promoting peace and prosperity in the world, we will enhance human security for the benefit of all, and encourage enhanced engagement in each other's region. In this context, Japan will continue various forms of support to the EU candidate countries and other countries in the region, with a view to contributing to regional stability and development. The EU will similarly continue its support in strengthening economic infrastructures and democratisation of Asian countries.

*Initiatives to be launched immediately*

- In the light of the Millennium summit and assembly, and in view of the challenges posed to the organisation, the EU and Japan reaffirm their commitment to reform, strengthen and enhance the effectiveness of the UN system, including the intensification of their efforts to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects, which has primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security.
- Active co-operation will also be pursued regarding the strengthening of UN peace operations on the basis of the Brahimi report and relevant reports of the Secretary-General, and the full implementation by all member states of the decision to reform UN finances, including a solution for arrearages.

**OBJECTIVE 1:**

**PROMOTING PEACE AND SECURITY**

**United Nations Reform**

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*Initiatives to be launched immediately*

- Continued co-operation to achieve the elimination of all Weapons of Mass Destruction, based on the principle of undiminished security for all, including:
  - promoting the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as soon as possible, as well as urging all states to maintain global existing moratoria on nuclear testing pending the entry into force of the CTBT; in the first instance through followup to the conference on this subject held in 2001;
  - making efforts for the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee in the Conference on Disarmament as soon as possible in its 2002 session, to negotiate the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty with a view to its conclusion within five years and, pending its entry into force, a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons;
  - Joint efforts aimed at strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) including in multilateral negotiations on the BWC Protocol, to be concluded at an early date;
  - promoting universal ratification of and adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention and working to ensure the full and effective implementation of all its provisions.
- Active co-operation on combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons, through:
  - working together in the follow-up to the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, which was held in July 2001;
  - implementing the "Weapons for Development" project, in particular in Cambodia, where the EU and Japan will develop joint or closely co-ordinated parallel projects, in conjunction with that country, the UN, and other international organisations;
  - addressing the problem of illicit trade in, uncontrolled spread, and excessive accumulation of small arms and light weapons in the Western Balkans.

*Other actions to be pursued*

- Strengthening co-operation on disarmament and non-proliferation issues, both bilaterally and in relevant multilateral fora, on the basis of mutual understanding on each other's security concerns, including the universalisation of the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. To this end, regular consultations will be strengthened, targeting also non-state actors such as terrorists.
- Co-operation towards the total elimination of anti-personnel landmines, including:
  - the possibility of closely co-ordinated parallel efforts in one or several countries;

- promoting adherence to the Ottawa Convention on Anti -Personnel Mines;
- the destruction of these weapons.
- The exchange of information, between Europe and Japan, on co-operation with Russia in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, such as the disposition of surplus weapon-grade plutonium.
- Close co-operation towards ensuring that strengthened IAEA safeguards are universally applied.

### **Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation**

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#### *Initiatives to be launched immediately*

- The holding of regular EU-Japan meetings on human rights, in principle, before the annual session of the UN Commission on Human Rights and before the meeting of the 3rd Committee of the UN General Assembly. Held at expert level, in troika format, these meetings will develop co-operation on geographic and thematic human rights initiatives, and consider the possibility of the joint submission of resolutions.
- Co-operation against commercial sexual exploitation of children notably in preparing and following up the Second World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, to take place in Yokohama, Japan, in December 2001 and in the framework of the preparation of and the follow up to the Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Children that will take place in New York in May 2002.

#### *Other actions to be pursued*

- Coordinated efforts to establish and render fully operational the International Criminal Court.
- Working together in overseas aid programmes, to ensure respect for human rights, promotion of democracy, and good governance. The coordination of efforts to promote democracy can include strengthening the functioning of judicial, legal, administrative, and electoral systems, through the dispatch of experts, the acceptance of trainees, and the organisation of seminars and symposia.
- Specific joint actions against child labour, notably in the context of strategies for poverty eradication and social development, will also be considered.

#### *Initiatives to be launched immediately*

- The EU and Japan will cooperate in improving the international community's institutions and instruments for conflict prevention and will pursue sustained efforts in the UN and regional bodies to promote a spirit of tolerance among and within nations. In this context, noting that 2001 is the "United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilisations", they will cooperate in following up on the "Global Agenda for Dialogue among civilisations" adopted at the 56th session of the UN General Assembly.

#### *Other actions to be pursued*

- Encouraging efforts by non-governmental organisations in both the EU and Japan to develop their capacity to play a larger role in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace-building.

### **Human Rights, Democracy and Stability**

### **Conflict Prevention and Peace-building**

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- The exchange of information on the civilian aspects of crisis management (including humanitarian aid), covering both the general instruments used and specific actions undertaken.
- Strengthen the capacity of international and regional organisations to carry out conflict prevention and to ensure a smooth transition once a conflict is settled, from emergent humanitarian assistance to rehabilitation development co-operation.
- The EU and Japan will follow up the Seminar on Education and Protection of Cultural Heritage in South Eastern Europe which was held in Japan in March 2001. In this context the EU and Japan will examine the possibility of taking effective measures in the United Nations and other international fora to prevent the destruction of important cultural heritage, such as the Buddhist statues destroyed in Bamiyan.

#### *Initiatives to be launched immediately*

Korean Peninsula

- The EU and Japan will reinforce their efforts:
  - to support the process of reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula including through the Republic of Korea's "engagement policy", and continue their support for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO);
  - to urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply with and commit itself fully to relevant international norms with regard to nuclear non-proliferation and weapons of mass destruction and stop its missile related activities including deployment; and
  - to urge the DPRK to respond positively to international concerns especially on humanitarian issues;
  - to exchange information on each other's policies towards the DPRK, including on the EU's efforts to improve the human rights situation and to promote dialogue on economic reform.

### **Specific Regional Issues**

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#### **The Balkans**

- Sustained and substantial efforts in the Balkan region, to promote security, democratisation, and economic development. In the context of EU-Japan co-operation, these efforts will include in particular:
  - co-operation within the framework of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, extending help to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (including Kosovo), Bosnia-Herzegovina, and other parts of the Balkan region in support of democratisation and economic recovery;
  - the exchange of information, and strengthened co-operation, on humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons in the region.

#### *Other actions to be pursued*

- As regards Russia, the EU and Japan will exchange information on their support for reforms, strengthening the rule of law and building of civil society. In their technical assistance activities, they will continue to support economic reforms including in such areas as the development of small and medium-size enterprises.
- As regards China, continued co-operation in supporting its reform and open policy, based on the recognition that a stable, open and developing China is significant for the peace and development of the Asia-Pacific region and the entire world. The EU and Japan will exchange information in order to improve co-ordination and policy implementation on their technical assistance activities.
- As regards the Middle East Peace Process, the EU and Japan will continue to support any efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict built on the general principles of international law, UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and particularly the formula 'Land for Peace', as well as the agreements of Madrid and Oslo.
- Strengthened support for efforts by African regional organisations (including the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, and the Southern African Development Community) and African countries to prevent and resolve conflicts in the region. In this context, the EU and Japan will cooperate closely to implement at an early date the G8 Initiatives for Conflict Prevention issued at Miyazaki (2000) and Rome (2001).
- Both parties will support the creation of an independent, self-sustaining, and viable state in East Timor as an important element of stability in the region and will continue to support its efforts to bring this about.
- Both parties will continue to work together to support the efforts of the UN Secretary General to achieve a comprehensive settlement on Cyprus, consistent with the relevant UNSC resolutions.

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We, two of the largest economies in the world, commit ourselves to advance the global economy. We will therefore develop a deeper and wider economic and trade partnership between ourselves, with a firm belief in the multilateral trading system, in a way which promotes economic stability worldwide, and ensures that all countries benefit from this process.

We want particularly to facilitate the two-way flow of trade and investment, so that our bilateral

economic relationship can realise its full potential - in the interests of all, consumers, producers, and society at large. To this end, we intend to:

- create an open environment for trade and investment, through working on a forward-looking agenda, taking into account the recommendations made by the EU-Japan Business Dialogue Round Table;
- reinforce existing efforts, in particular through our regulatory reform dialogue, to remove obstacles and barriers to trade and investment with the aim to develop an appropriate regulatory framework;
- harness for both economies the dynamism of the information technology revolution, to develop a "Global Information Society".

We already co-operate closely to strengthen the multilateral trading system, and will continue our joint efforts to further liberalise trade, to strengthen the WTO rules, to address the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, to support the goal of sustainable development, and to integrate developing countries into the world economy. This will be achieved by ensuring successful negotiations based on the comprehensive work programme enshrined in Ministerial Declaration adopted at the Qatar Ministerial Conference in November 2001. Convinced of the importance of these negotiations for the prosperity of the world economy, we will do so in a way which promotes economic stability world-wide and ensures that all countries benefit from the process.

We share an understanding that a stable international macroeconomic environment is indispensable for the sound and continued development of the global economy. In this context, we intend to discuss measures to strengthen the international monetary and financial system, particularly in the area of monetary and financial coordination in Europe and East Asia, continuing our close co-operation since the Asian financial crisis.

We are the principal donors of development assistance in the world. Closer co-operation could help ensure effective implementation of our respective efforts to promote sustainable development and to eradicate poverty, to the greater benefit of the recipient countries.

Initiatives to be launched immediately

- Identify ways to foster the economic partnership for an open environment for trade and investment, including broadening co-operation into rapidly growing areas of the economy. As a first step, start implementing the EU-Japan Agreement on Mutual Recognition which is expected

## **OBJECTIVE 2:**

### **STRENGTHENING THE ECONOMIC AND TRADE PARTNERSHIP**

### **UTILISING THE DYNAMISM OF GLOBALISATION FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL**

#### **Encouraging our Bilateral Trade and Investment Partnership**

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first step, start implementing the EU-Japan Agreement on Mutual Recognition which is expected to facilitate market access and promote trade between EU and Japan. In further proposing concrete measures to stimulate bilateral trade and investment, particular attention will be given to establish an attractive business environment, including for innovative small and medium sized enterprises, drawing thereby on existing best practices by central and regional authorities.

- Reinforcing their regulatory reform dialogue in order to foster self-sustained growth by removing obstacles and barriers to trade and investment. This will be achieved notably by reinforcing dialogue at technical level between the relevant authorities, by making better use of consultations and expanding those as necessary. In the areas of specific importance for each side, taking into account their relative impact on bilateral trade and investment, both sides will regularly review changes in the regulatory framework and their implementation. Moreover, further cooperation will be pursued between the competent authorities in a variety of areas (including standards and conformity assessment) and sectors (notably telecommunications, environment, energy supply, commercial transport services and construction) in order to follow a consistent regulatory approach in the future.

*Other actions to be pursued*

- Support and encouragement for, notably:
  - private sector exchanges, in particular the activities of the EU -Japan Business Dialogue Round

Table, whose recommendations provide useful input to the overall trade and investment partnership;

- contacts between consumer groups, including at an appropriate stage further editions of the EU-Japan Consumer Dialogue; and
- exchanges between small-and medium-sized enterprises, including through the "Gateway to Japan" programme and the EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Co-operation's human resources training programme.
  - Co-operating to develop and promote the use of international standards and of international guides and standards for conformity assessment procedures so as not to create unnecessary obstacles for international trade, and encourage the establishment of international rules in general.
  - In the framework of the implementation of the EU-Japan Agreement on Mutual Recognition, consultations will be initiated concerning possible sectoral extensions of the agreement.
  - Promoting customs co-operation for the purpose of facilitating legitimate trade and combating illegitimate practices. The EU and Japan will consider the feasibility of concluding a customs mutual assistance agreement which is equally beneficial for Japan and the EU and also compatible with their respective laws and regulations.
  - Co-operation to enhance effective bidding by European companies in Japan and by Japanese companies in the EU, taking account of information and recommendations from the EU and Japan business communities and notably the EU -Japan Business Dialogue Round Table.
  - A particular effort to facilitate the movement of employees with specific skills, of EU nationals working in Japan and Japanese nationals working in the EU, for example through the simplification of formalities for visas, work permits, and other requirements, as well as through equitable arrangements for pensions.

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- Work to increase mutual understanding of the agricultural situation in the EU and in Japan, to resolve bilateral agricultural issues, and to intensify dialogue on issues of common concern.
- Complementing the Co-operation Agreement Concerning Anti-competitive Activities with:
  - the exchange of information and opinions between the relevant authorities, with a view to the full enforcement of competition policy;
  - efforts to enhance understanding by business and the public of the importance of competition policy;
  - assisting developing countries to acquire the capacity to enforce competition laws and policy in response to the globalisation of the economy.

*Initiatives to be launched immediately:*

- Co-operate towards the creation of a "Global Information Society", by taking a range of measures to encourage co-operation in the IT sector, that include as first steps:
  - closer technical consultations on the fourth generation mobile communication system to ensure its realisation via international standards on the basis of annual progress reviews;
  - close cooperation on development and further implementation of regulatory reform in order to encourage competition relying upon open market principles in the telecommunications service sector respecting our respective rights and obligations in the WTO/GATS, this will also help to improve our mutual understanding of the regulatory frameworks of the EU and Japan;
  - enhanced co-operation to establish high standards of data protection based on best international practices that will ensure the free and secure flow of information between the EU and Japan; this enhanced co-operation will also include certification service and cryptography and exploring the feasibility of mutual recognition of electronic signatures, with the objective to facilitating its cross-border use;
  - establishing close co-operation on issues related to new network security and the timely introduction of new internet protocol IPv 6;
  - exploring ways to bridge the international digital divide, inter alia through the follow -up of the G8 Dot Force set up at the Okinawa Summit and in other international fora such as the ITU and the OECD.

*Other actions to be pursued :*

- Further development of a "Global Information Society" through:
  - research and development on information and communications technology, including cooperation in the private sector;
  - fora, symposia, and expert meetings, aimed at various actors, including regional and local governments;
  - support the development of e-networks between European and Japanese universities and research institutes to foster common projects by European and Japanese researchers, including information exchange and the development of science and technology applications and research activities;

## **Strengthening Co-operation on Information and Communication Technology (IT)**

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- seminars, working groups and possible joint research on IT -related transport issues such as Intelligent Transport System (ITS).

*Initiatives to be launched immediately*

- Continued close co-operation to strengthen the multilateral trading system by ensuring a successful outcome of the new round of trade negotiations based on the Ministerial Declaration adopted at the Qatar Ministerial Conference in November 2001, so as to respond to the members' wide-ranging interests, including those of developing countries.
- Efforts to facilitate the accession of existing applicants to the WTO, including support for the advancement of Russia's accession process. Recognising the importance of encouraging China, as a new WTO member, to implement the WTO Agreements and its commitments, the EU and Japan will exchange views and information in this regard.
- Close co-operation on how best to integrate developing countries fully into the multilateral trading system, including through trade-related technical assistance for the least developed, and initiatives such as the EU's "Everything but Arms" initiative or other improved forms of market access for less developed countries.

*Other actions to be pursued*

- Continue dialogue on regional economic matters and trade policies, including on economic integration and enlargement of the EU, and on the regional trade agreements between Japan and third countries .
- Work together to improve the functioning, transparency, and efficiency of the WTO as well as working to strengthen the coherence in international and economic policy-making between the WTO, the Bretton Woods Institutions and other relevant international organisations.
- Co-operation within the WTO framework on the review underway of the Plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement.

*Initiatives to be launched immediately include*

- The discussion of measures for strengthening the international monetary and financial system, in particular measures in the area of monetary and financial integration and co-operation in Europe and East Asia. In this context, the EU and Japanese authorities will set up a Working Group to exchange information on the macro-economic assistance and monitoring which the European Union and Japan offer their neighbouring countries with the aim of promoting financial stability.

## **Strengthening the International Monetary and Financial System**

### **Reinforcing Co-operation on Multilateral Trade and Economic Issues**

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stability.

*Other actions to be pursued*

- Extending the bilateral dialogue on financial issues to cover subjects such as best practices in financial regulation and supervision, and the regulatory implications of financial innovation. The EU and Japan will also start discussions on a possible framework to enhance information sharing



among supervisors.

*Actions to be pursued*

- Policy co-ordination in the preparation, implementation and monitoring of sector-wide approaches, as appropriate, in countries and sectors of mutual concern. The EU and Japan will also promote exchange of information and co-operation in order to cope with infectious and parasitic diseases, including HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, poliomyelitis and malaria.
- Joint comparison and assessment, when appropriate, of each other's development policies and programmes, with a view to increased effectiveness and improved monitoring. This may include: consultations at expert level, the organisation together of seminars and symposia, and the dispatch of joint assessment missions.
- The exchange of personnel between the Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA) and the relevant parts of the European Commission including aid administration in EU Member States, to deepen mutual understanding of policies and procedures.
- Increasing the effectiveness of international financial institutions' support to developing countries, in particular when the fight against poverty is concerned.
- Co-operation in African development, given its significance in the policies of both the EU and Japan. This will be done on the basis of the guidelines contained in the Tokyo Agenda for Action adopted at the Second Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD II) and in the Cotonou Agreement based on the discussions at the TICAD Ministerial -level Meeting and Africa-EU Ministerial Conference.

## **Development and the Fight Against Poverty**

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The future offers great opportunities but also significant challenges:

- the events of 11 September 2001 show that we have to cooperate – multilaterally and bilaterally – to fight as a priority terrorism in all its expressions and whatever its cause;
  - in our own societies, demographic trends oblige us to review employment and social policies, where gender equality is at the forefront of our attention; internationalisation of crime and drug trafficking also require a comprehensive response;
  - in the world at large, where dealing with the threat to our global environment remains of primordial importance. Science can help us to understand the problems, and technology help find solutions.
- Some of these challenges demand a response which the EU and Japan can help develop and apply together. Others may not in themselves require coordinated action, but call for open exchange and discussion - between ourselves and more widely - if we are to confront them effectively and in ways beneficial to all.

*Initiatives to be launched immediately*

- The holding of a joint symposium on older workers and employment, in 2002 at senior level, focusing on improvement of new employment opportunities and on promoting "active ageing".

*Other actions to be pursued*

- The exchange of experience between the EU and Japan in various areas, including: pension and welfare policies, the promotion of social inclusion (social policy area) and health care, medical insurance, care systems for the elderly and hospital management (health policy area).
- The stimulation of greater direct contact - between the EU and Japan - involving officials, employers, and worker representatives; as already happens with the annual tripartite visit which takes place alternately in each location.
- Co-operation to launch an international dialogue on the social dimensions of globalisation, with the participation of governments, international organisations within their respective mandates, and civil society representatives, to undertake analysis and to exchange experience on the interfaces, while rejecting sanctions-based approaches.

*Actions to be pursued*

### **OBJECTIVE 3:**

#### **COPING WITH GLOBAL AND SOCIETAL CHALLENGES**

##### **Ageing Society and Employment**

##### **Gender Equality**

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- EU and Japan will work jointly to promote gender equality in our societies as well as internationally with a view to ensuring full and equal opportunities to both sexes. This will include:
  - integrating a gender equality perspective in all policies both at national and international levels, with particular emphasis on mainstreaming;
  - dialogue between policy makers and experts;
  - regular exchanges of expertise between relevant institutes and centres;
  - the comparison of how, from the perspective of "gender equality", policies are evaluated, assessed, and monitored;
  - promoting gender equality in all areas of international cooperation, for example in UN policy, development cooperation, poverty eradication, and the respect of human rights.

##### *Actions to be pursued:*

- The exchange of experience on "education policy", with a view both to promoting respect and understanding for other traditions and cultures, and to enabling the EU and Japan to address better the education problems they each face. This may include:
  - setting up a regular round-table dialogue on education policy;
  - supporting efforts by UNESCO and others to implement the conclusions of the World Education Forum held in April 2000 in Dakar;
  - the further development, through exchange and discussion, of "lifelong learning" for vocational training, allowing individuals to adapt to new opportunities and requirements.

##### *Initiatives to be launched immediately*

- Co-operation to ensure the successful preparation and negotiation of the UN "Rio + 10" Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development due to be held in 2002. This will require, among other things, the adoption of a focused and forward-looking agenda.
- Additional efforts to ensure the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol by 2002 and co-operation to seek the effective participation of all countries.

##### *Other actions to be pursued*

- Co-operation to step up the effective implementation of all the relevant conventions on environmental issues adopted since the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, and to address other global environmental issues through early high level consultations on the environment.
- Work together with developing countries to assist their pursuit of sustainable development. In particular, the EU and Japan will:

##### **Environment**

##### **Education**

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- seek to improve co-operation with the developing countries - within the UN Forum on Forests to establish effective mechanisms for the conservation of forests, as well as the development and implementation of sustainable forest management;
- conduct research into desertification with affected countries, and pursue effective and durable solutions under the UN Convention to combat Desertification;
- examine ways to combat illegal logging, including export and procurement practices.
- Jointly support the efforts of the developing countries to elaborate national strategies for sustainable development to be implemented by 2005. Through enhanced bilateral efforts, the EU and Japan will:
  - explore possibilities of equivalency between the EU and Japanese approaches designed to encourage more sustainable production and consumption, and promote greater environmental

awareness among producers and consumers;

- develop a dialogue to promote co-operation on conformity assessment and mutual recognition of environmental standards.

- Strengthen bilateral co-operation aimed at achieving mutual support between the rules of the multilateral trading system and the objectives of multilateral environmental arrangements, as well as the broader conservation of the environment, including the sustainable use of natural resources.

#### *Actions to be pursued*

Biotechnology opens new horizons to tackle health or environmental problems in novel ways, and to create new industries. It also raises largely-unprecedented ethical issues, and must develop with those in mind.

- The EU and Japan will therefore pursue the following actions:

- encourage dialogue between intellectuals, scientists, and civil society at large, on the whole range of bio-ethics issues (cloning, research on human ES cells and human genome, genetic manipulation, organ transplants, etc) including those related to safety;
- exchange information between regulatory authorities on safety-related issues, including the implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety;
- exchange views on other regulatory issues, such as the protection of personal data, intellectual property.

The application of new technology, and the industrialisation of agriculture, similarly offer new opportunities in food production, but prompt new concerns about food safety.

- The EU and Japan will therefore pursue the following action:

- utilize relevant multilateral fora to enhance mutual understanding, improve standards and procedures, promote inclusive dialogue and a more rapid flow of information, and multilateral co-operation.

In the area of public health, new and re-emerging diseases pose a particular threat.

- The EU and Japan will therefore pursue the following actions:

- co-operate to strengthen existing networks for epidemic alert and response as cost-effectively as possible, through work in international fora such as the World Health Organisation;

### **New Challenges**

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- promote exchanges of information and visits of personnel between research institutes specialising in infectious diseases, and in particular to facilitate the use of laboratories specialising in highly-dangerous diseases (so-called "P4" laboratories) in EU member states.

#### *Actions to be pursued*

- Expanding co-operation in the field of science and technology. The EU-Japan Science and Technology Forum, held since 1994, has led to enhanced mutual understanding of policies and systems in this area, and will be maintained. The EU and Japan will also discuss the possibility of a framework agreement with a view to facilitating this co-operation.

- Co-operation on major international projects aimed at understanding the environment and the earth system, in particular:

- to deploy floats under the ARGO (A Global Array for Profiling Floats) Project, and share the resultant data;

- to promote the IODP (Integrated Ocean Drilling Programme) that will, in 2003, start providing information on climate change and geo-dynamics;

as well as on:

- new satellite-based approaches for the global monitoring of the environment;

- seismic research, on the international harmonisation of seismic parameters, and on evaluation of seismic risk.

- Support for the development of biotechnology, as a major new field offering great potential, through:

- academic and technological exchanges involving Europe and Japan;

- organising workshops and other activities to encourage the development of biotechnology by the private sector, through exchanges involving the industrial sector, capital providers, private laboratories and universities;
- private-sector activities, and exchanges on bio-venture business between the industrial sector, private laboratories, and universities; workshops will be held on this issue.
  - Continued EU interest and involvement in the Japanese-inspired Human Frontier Science Programme, as described in 1997 HFSP Intergovernmental Conference Joint Communiqué.
  - The pursuit of joint or coordinated research activities in the areas of:
    - nuclear fusion;
    - nuclear materials and measurements.
    - The organisation of symposia, workshops, and scientific meetings in the following areas:
      - life sciences (including biotechnology, infectious diseases, nanobiotechnology, risk assessment, and in vitro testing);
      - materials (such as superconductivity materials, and new plasma engineering and surfacing techniques);
      - space (satellite navigation);
      - prospective studies, including technology.

## Science and Technology

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### *Initiatives to be launched immediately*

- Efforts to conclude the agreement which has been negotiated between the EU and Japan, providing a framework for stable long-term co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy including nuclear trade, and research and development, for the needs of their respective nuclear energy programmes.
- Promotion of joint efforts to advance clean urban transport including through establishing a joint working group to identify future co-operation as well as the contribution to be made to the successful conclusion of the Ministerial Conference on "Transport and Environment" to be held in January 2002.

### *Other actions to be pursued*

- Cooperation to give a high priority to actions which help to reduce energy demand, to share information on efforts to increase diversification of energy supply, to develop sources of energy which have less environmental impact than current ones, to encourage the efficient use of energy and to intensify dialogue with oil and gas producing countries.
- Strengthened cooperation in multilateral fora and processes, including to make a success of the 8th International Energy Forum in Osaka scheduled for September 2002 and to expand the membership of the Energy Charter Treaty, as well as in the context of the International Energy Agency.
- The exchange of information on and co-operation aimed at developing transport systems. This will involve seminars, working groups, and possibly joint research projects, on the whole range of issues relating to transport such as: the so-called "Intelligent Transport System" (ITS), new transport systems, promotion of public transport, efficient goods distribution, demand management, road networks and structures, environmentally-friendly maintenance, technological development and regulations, barrier free transport accessible to all, including persons with reduced mobility, road safety management and disaster prevention, research on automotive emissions and safety (including with regard to pedestrian safety), etc.
- The improvement of maritime safety, through bilateral contacts and multilateral efforts in the International Maritime Organisation, including:
  - the exchange of information between European and Japanese authorities, in particular through the use of the EQUASIS database for identifying substandard vessels.
  - The development of satellite navigation systems which, in order to enhance transport safety in general, are interoperable around the world.

## Energy and Transport

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*Initiatives to be launched immediately*

- Further promote co-ordinated international action to prevent and combat international terrorism by taking the following joint measures as first steps:
  - enhanced co-operation in all relevant international and regional fora;
  - early signature and ratification of relevant counter-terrorism conventions and protocols, and smooth and rapid implementation of relevant UN Security Council Resolutions;
  - early finalisation of the UN Comprehensive Convention against International terrorism;
  - enhancing common efforts to stop the financing of terrorism, including freezing of funds and other financial assets of terrorists;
  - reinforcement of technical co-operation to developing countries for their capacity building in the field of counter-terrorism.

*Actions to be pursued*

- Continue combating terrorism through:
  - early finalisation of the international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism;
  - strengthening of non-proliferation regimes of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies connected with terrorism;
  - cooperation between the European Police Office (Europol) and Japanese police authorities;
  - enhanced drugs control and active measures to reduce the supply and demand of drugs.
- Co-operation to facilitate the early entry into force of the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, and its related Protocols (Smuggling of Migrants, by Land, Sea and Air; Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children; and Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition).
- Increased support for multilateral efforts to combat crime and strengthen judicial co-operation, notably through:
  - the activities of the G8 including within the Senior Experts' Group on Transnational Organised Crime (Lyon Group);
  - "capacity-building" in countries where the criminal judicial system is vulnerable and law enforcement is inadequate, with a view to eliminating "safe havens" around the world;
  - improving international mechanisms and procedures, such as those dealing with extradition, legal assistance, and the detention and repatriation of nationals (the latter subject, for example, being covered by the Council of Europe Convention on the transfer of sentenced persons).
- The progressive development of bilateral co-operation, in particular between Europol and the Japanese police departments fighting transnational crime with a particular focus on:
  - money laundering and other illicit practices;
  - illegal drugs (including stimulants, other synthetic drugs and precursors);

**Terrorism, Transnational Crime, Drug Trafficking, and Judicial Co-operation**

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- special investigation techniques and technologies for drugs, such as controlled delivery and signature analysis;
- the trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants;
- new forms of crime, such as cyber-crime (illegal disclosure of personal data, hacking, computer-related piracy and fraud, child pornography on line and cyber-terrorism).

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The links between the peoples of Europe and Japan are many and varied, and we want to enhance the mutual understanding of life and culture that they bring. The diversity of cultures is a source of spiritual richness, and bringing people together helps promote mutual respect and peaceful coexistence. Greater contact of this sort will help underpin the wider and deeper EU-Japan relationship we have in mind for the political and economic spheres.

Various programmes to encourage people to people contact already exist. We intend to build on this base, as resources allow, and aim over the years:

- to extend contacts at all levels of academic life, from pupils and schools, through students and

universities, to professors and research institutes;

- to promote schemes offering periods of training and/or work experience, especially for those early on their careers (the Executive Training Programme in Japan is one successful example of this);

- and, more generally, to encourage exchange and contact across civil society as a whole.

We hope in this way to enhance mutual understanding, to encourage the learning of each other's languages and in general to broaden public involvement in the partnership between the EU and Japan.

#### *Actions to be pursued*

- The establishment of a framework for sustainable mutual co-operation between the EU and Japan in the field of education. This will focus on higher education, and aim to facilitate reflection and cross fertilisation on education policy and education provision.
- The reduction of obstacles to the mobility of teachers, administrators, and students.
- The comparison, for example through the organisation of expert workshops, of the respective EU and Japanese systems of study credits, with a view to facilitating the exchange of students in the future.
- The expansion of the exchange of researchers for instance, through a possible extension of Jean Monnet professorial chairs to Japan and by exploring the possibility of inviting Japanese researchers to study at the European Institute in Florence.
- Encouragement of "twinning" between individual schools in Europe and Japan.
- The identification of appropriate higher education institutions and research institutes, which might link and promote intellectual exchange in specific areas. These "centres of excellence" (which

### **OBJECTIVE 4:**

### **BRINGING TOGETHER PEOPLE AND CULTURES**

#### **In the Academic World**

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may develop their connections in new ways, for example through use of the internet) could, in the first instance, include those specialising in:

- foreign and security policy;
- European affairs (especially integration).

#### *Actions to be pursued*

- Upgrade and expand EU-Japan programmes for exchange of interns, in both directions. This can draw on the experience of the Vulcanus programme, the pilot Europe-Asia Business Internship Programme and the Japan-EU Industrial Co-operation Programme, which introduce European business and technology students to Japanese companies, and vice-versa.
- The promotion of internships linked to official structures of the EU and of Japan, using the experience of the European Commission's "stagiaire" scheme, the European Parliament's "Schuman scholar" and MEP assistant schemes, and pursuing in particular a "parliamentary intern exchange", in which there would be European interns attached to the Diet and Japanese interns attached to the European Parliament. The EU and Japan take note with satisfaction of this initiative, which contributes to strengthening the links between their political institutions.
- The intensification and further development of various programmes, notably:
  - in the field of exchanges of young people: the invitation programmes for young Japanese people and students to Europe, the Japan Exchange and Teaching Programme, the Study Programme in Japan for European Youth, the Global Youth Exchange, and the Asia-Europe Young Leaders Symposium.
  - in the field of training: the various programmes managed jointly through the EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Co-operation.
- The progressive extension over time of the working holidays visa scheme for young Europeans visiting Japan and young Japanese visiting Europe, based on careful examination of the situation of each country. This successful scheme currently operates only between some parts of the EU and Japan.

- Personnel exchanges, including the dispatch of young Japanese diplomats to the Collège d'Europe in Brugge and of young European diplomats to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Initiatives to be launched immediately*

- Japan, in collaboration with the EU, will organise a symposium in the first half of 2002, consisting of intellectuals, politicians, experts and journalists with expertise, with a view to considering how best the EU and Japan can develop civil society links, cultural contacts and

### **Developing Civil Society Links and Encouraging Inter-Regional Exchanges For Young People Starting Out in Life**

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considering how best the EU and Japan can develop civil society links, cultural contacts and people to people exchanges.

#### *Other actions to be pursued*

- Consideration of how to encourage and praise – for example through the award of an annual prize – the contribution made to enhancing dialogue and relations between the EU and Japan, be it by an individual or an organisation.
- The promotion of general exchanges covering all parts of society, and including:
  - the encouragement of inter-regional exchanges in various fields, based upon the recognition that such exchanges will contribute to strengthening the civil level mutual understanding between the EU and Japan;
  - “twinning” and other arrangements between local governments in the EU and Japan, and between regions and prefectures;
  - exchanges in the field of sports across the whole age and ability range (“lifelong sports”).
- The support of contacts and exchanges between specific groups; including dialogue between:
  - non-governmental organisations, in the EU and Japan, such as that already underway between consumer associations;
  - journalists, given the importance of the media to comprehensive mutual understanding; in this context, the annual EU-Japan Journalists’ conference, and the respective invitation programmes, can be further developed;
  - young leaders, for example through an annual meeting to exchange views on issues of mutual concern for the EU and Japan.
- Promoting greater virtual mobility, for example, by encouraging universities and other educational institutions to use information technology to teach European languages in Japan and the Japanese language in the EU.
- Further co-operation, in multilateral fora such as UNESCO and Asia Europe Meeting, to implement projects aimed at maintaining and protecting cultural diversity.



## APPENDIX C

# The Constitution of Japan (1947)

[Hanover Historical Texts Project](#)

Scanned by Jonathan Dresner, Harvard University.

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*Promulgated on November 3, 1946. Put into effect on May 3, 1947.*

### CHAPTER II. RENUNCIATION OF WAR

Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a mean of settling international disputes.

(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

## APPENDIX D

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May	2006	6th EU-Japan Friendship Week
24 April	2006	15th EU-Japan Summit in Tokyo
6-7 April	2006	EU-Japan Joint Symposium "New Visions for EU-Japan Relations" held in Brussels
31 March	2006	6th EU-UNU Tokyo Global Forum held in Tokyo
20-21 March	2006	EU-Japan Regulatory Reform Dialogue in Brussels
2 February	2006	EU and Japan sign an Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
24-25 November	2005	EU-Japan Regulatory Reform Dialogue in Tokyo
30 September	2005	2nd EU Institute in Japan inaugurated in Kobe
7-8 July	2005	EU-Japan Business Dialogue Roundtable in Brussels
15-20 May	2005	26th EP-Japan Interparliamentary Meeting (Tokyo)
2 May	2005	14th EU-Japan Summit in Luxembourg
3 February	2005	5th EU-UNU Tokyo Global Forum held in Tokyo
17 January	2005	2005 EU-Japan Year of People-to-People Exchanges launched in Tokyo
7-9 October	2004	5th Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Summit in Hanoi, Vietnam
22 June	2004	13th EU-Japan Summit in Tokyo
20-21 June	2004	6th EU-Japan Business Dialogue Roundtable in Tokyo
May	2004	4th EU-Japan Friendship Week
1 April	2004	1st EU Institute in Japan launched
31 March	2004	High-Level Consultations in Brussels
10 February	2004	10th EU-Japan Symposium on Labour: Industrial Relations and Change in Japan and the EU (Tokyo)
5 February	2004	4th EU-UNU Global Forum held in Tokyo
13-14 November	2003	High Level Meeting on Regulatory Reform in Tokyo
25 September	2003	EC-Japan Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) Third Joint Committee
10 July	2003	EU and Japan sign Competition Agreement
27-28 May	2003	5th EU-Japan Business Dialogue Roundtable in Brussels
1-2 May	2003	12th EU-Japan Summit in Athens
May	2003	3rd EU-Japan Friendship Week

18 March	2003	2nd EU-Japan Consumer Dialogue in Tokyo
5 March	2003	High Level Meeting on Regulatory Reform in Brussels
13 February	2003	3rd 'Gateway to Japan' campaign is launched
16 January	2003	3rd EU-UNU Global Forum held in Tokyo
25 November	2002	High Level Meeting on Regulatory Reform in Tokyo
23-24 September	2002	4th Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Summit takes place in Copenhagen
8 July	2002	11th EU-Japan Summit in Tokyo
7-9 July	2002	4th EU-Japan Business Dialogue Roundtable in Tokyo
May	2002	2nd EU-Japan Friendship Week
25-27 April	2002	Official Working Visit of Commission President Romano Prodi Prodi becomes the first President of the European Commission to address the Japanese Diet
25-26 January	2002	2nd EU-UNU Global Forum held in Tokyo
8 December	2001	10th EU-Japan Summit in Brussels
23 October	2001	High Level Meeting on Regulatory Reform in Tokyo
9-10 July	2001	3rd EU-Japan Business Dialogue Roundtable in Brussels
May	2001	1st EU-Japan Friendship Week
4 April	2001	EU and Japan sign Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA)
9 February	2001	High Level Meeting on Regulatory Reform in Tokyo
25-26 January	2001	1st EU-UNU Global Forum held in Tokyo
26 October	2000	High Level Meeting on Regulatory Reform in Tokyo
20 to 21 October	2000	3rd Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Summit takes place in Seoul
19 July	2000	9th EU-Japan Summit in Tokyo
17 to 18 July	2000	2nd EU-Japan Business Dialogue Roundtable in Tokyo
29 February to 2 March	2000	High Level Meeting on Regulatory Reform in Brussels
22 February	2000	High-Level Meeting on Regulatory Reform in Tokyo
13 January	2000	Then Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono makes a speech in Paris calling for "A Decade of Japan-Europe Cooperation"
11 January	2000	EU-Japan Ministerial Meeting in Brussels
25 to 26 November	1999	1st EU-Japan Consumer Dialogue (EJCD)
24 November	1999	High-Level Meeting on Regulatory Reform in Tokyo
7 to 8 October	1999	1st EU-Japan Business Dialogue Roundtable

20 June	1999	8th EU-Japan Summit in Bonn
22 to 23 April	1999	High-Level Consultations in Brussels
22 February	1999	High-Level Meeting on Deregulation in Tokyo
1 January	1999	The launch of the euro
2 to 3 November	1998	High-Level Meeting on Deregulation in Tokyo
12 October	1998	EU-Japan Ministerial Meeting in Tokyo, 3rd visit of European businessmen to Tokyo with EC Vice President Sir Leon Brittan
4 to 5 June	1998	High-Level Consultations in Tokyo
3 to 4 April	1998	2nd Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Summit takes place in London
12 January	1998	7th EU-Japan Summit in Tokyo
September	1997	EU-Japan Cooperation Week in Tokyo Conference on Cooperation in the fields of Science, Technology and Higher Education; EU-Japan Symposium, jointly organised with Member States, focusing on political and economic cooperation
25 June	1997	6th EU-Japan Summit in The Hague
23 April	1997	High-Level Consultations in Brussels
January	1997	The second 'Gateway to Japan' campaign is launched
30 September	1996	5th EU-Japan Summit in Tokyo
29 April	1996	EU-Japan Ministerial Meeting
March	1996	EU and Japan participate in the first Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) Summit in Bangkok.
	1996	The EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation is established in Brussels, Vulcanus programme is installed.
19 June	1995	4th EU-Japan Summit in Paris
March	1995	Publication of the 1995 Communication from the European Commission to the European Council 'Europe and Japan: The Next Steps'
	1994	Launch of deregulation dialogue
6 July	1993	3rd EC-Japan Summit in Tokyo
	1993	The High-level Forum on Science and Technology is set up
4 July	1992	2nd EC-Japan Summit in London
18 July	1991	The Joint Declaration on relations between the EC and its Member States and Japan is signed in The Hague. (1st EC-Japan Summit)
	1987	The EC-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation is established in Tokyo
	1986	The Commission launches its fellowship scheme to enable young research scientists to work in Japanese research bodies and universities
	1984	1st EC-Japan Ministerial Meeting

- 1979    The Executive Training Programme (ETP) is set up by the European Commission
- 1974    Establishment of the Delegation of the European Communities in Tokyo
- 1959    Japan's Ambassador in Belgium accredited as Japan's first Representative to the three European Communities

Source: Delegation of the European Commission to Japan  
[http://jpn.cec.eu.int/relation/showpage\\_en\\_relations.chronology.php#](http://jpn.cec.eu.int/relation/showpage_en_relations.chronology.php#)